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Disquotational truth and analyticity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Volker Halbach
Volker Halbach*
Affiliation:
Universität Konstanz, Fachgruppe Philosophie, Postfach 5560 D 21, 78434 Konstanz, Germany, E-Mail: [email protected]
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Abstract.

The uniform reflection principle for the theory of uniform T-sentences is added to PA. The resulting system is justified on the basis of a disquotationalist theory of truth where the provability predicate is conceived as a special kind of analyticity. The system is equivalent to the system ACA of arithmetical comprehension. If the truth predicate is also allowed to occur in the sentences that are inserted in the T-sentences. yet not in the scope of negation, the system with the reflection schema for these T-sentences assumes the strength of the Kripke-Feferman theory KF. and thus of ramified analysis up to ε0.

Keywords

AnalyticitydisquotationalismKFtruth
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 66 , Issue 4 , December 2001 , pp. 1959 - 1973
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2001

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