Southeast Asia in United States policy fell from a region of high priority during the Vietnam war to become, after the fall of Indochina, an area of relatively minor interest. For the United States, Southeast Asia evoked memories of misperception, intensified over-commitment, and simplistic assumptions that characterized the American effort to defeat local Vietnamese national communism. Since the formulation of the Nixon doctrine of disengagement in 1969, United States policy towards Southeast Asia has been undergoing a process of long-term readjustment in recognition of the exaggerated significance that the region had assumed in American thinking. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 was a major stimulus to this readjustment as it gave the Americans compelling reasons to anticipate a reassertion of Soviet influence in the region. Successive American administrations attempted to place the region in a wider global context to avoid the dangers of extreme reaction to local national communism while developing the flexibility to coordinate a response to the Soviet Union at a global level. The main concern of American policy was to remove the basis for direct United States involvement in the region in a way that would satisfy post-Vietnam war public and congressional opinion and the demands of strategic planners for greater freedom of manoeuvre against the Soviet Union.

Insignificant as it may seem, not only to the layman but also to professional scholars dealing with Southeast Asian affairs such as political scientists, economists, sociologists, and even historians, the Metal Age of Southeast Asia clearly is a force to reckon with, in the sense that it now seems to occupy everyone's mind in the various countries of the region just as much as contemporary issues do. The Metal Age, in other words, is linked with the present in Southeast Asia as nowhere else in the world, and has become a “contemporary issue” too.

The following papers were presented at a session of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Mid-Atlantic Region of the Association of Asian Studies held in Pittsburgh, 22–24 October 1982. The countries that are discussed (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka) have a number of fundamental structural characteristics in common. All are open economies — i.e. foreign trade is a key element in their economic structure. All are still heavily dependent on the export of primary products, although light manufactures currently account for a small but increasing share of total exports. All have agricultural systems based on monsoon rice culture. All became politically independent after World War II. Three of the four are free enterprise economies while the fourth (Sri Lanka) shifted from a socialist to a free enterprise venue a few years ago. All possess enterprising populations with literacy rates that fall somewhere between 60 and 90 per cent — uniformly high by less developed country (LDC) standards. The importance of personal relationships and a profound sense of individualism permeate these cultures, and the establishment of a modern bureaucracy is a relatively recent phenomenon.

We find this a most curious attack, both in tone and in substance; Loofs-Wissowa appears to believe that we, Solheim, Gorman, and the media have been engaged in a conspiracy to cloud the minds of Westerners and Southeast Asians alike on the origins of metallurgy in the region. Loofs-Wissowa evidently feels that Southeast Asian laymen view this question as equal in importance to contemporary issues there (which is of course not the case). He also believes that it is the most burning issue in archaeology since Piltdown or Glozel, splitting the profession into “Believers” in the “long dates” and “Non Believers”. This is again rather an exaggeration; we would estimate the “Believers” to number not more than a few hundred, while the “Non Believers” may be counted on the fingers of one hand (Marschall, Sørensen, Sieveking, and of course Loofs-Wissowa himself). The remainder of the archaeological world (i.e., over 90%) has other questions to occupy it. However, Loofs-Wissowa is certainly correct in pointing out the attention paid to the question of early metallurgy over the past few years, and we welcome this opportunity to counter his arguments and distinguish between our views and those published by the media. This may best be done by first pointing out errors of omission in the facts presented by Loofs-Wissowa, by examining basic errors in his conceptual framework, and finally by answering the three specific questions he poses.

Considering the importance of the early dates for bronze working technology in Southeast Asia that several of us have been presenting in preliminary reports over the last fifteen years, it is somewhat surprising that there have not been more critical articles published concerning our evidence and interpretation thereof. The primary reason for this is no doubt because final reports of the pertinent sites presenting the relevant data in context have not yet appeared. The great majority of the interested archaeologists are simply awaiting the final site reports before they decide whether our interpretation is reasonable. We are sorry for the great delay in completing the final reports. Speaking of Non Nok Tha, the first site from which excavated data produced early dates for bronze working, the descriptive portion of the research has been completed, the analysis of the data has almost been completed (primarily by Donn Bayard), and it is hoped that the first volume of a two volume final report can be submitted to the press by the end of 1982. The second volume will be totally a data volume, probably published in microfiche.

During the 1970 decade the Indonesian economy grew at unprecedented high rates after a long period of relative stagnation. It is commonly assumed that this significant improvement in growth performance is largely explained by the rapid growth of oil exports from 1971 to 1978, during which period petroleum's share in total export earnings rose from 39 per cent to 64 per cent. During this period, petroleum exports (in dollar value) rose at an average annual rate of 43 per cent, compared to 30 per cent for non-petroleum exports. Thus, even during the period of rapid petroleum export earnings growth, other exports also grew at a rate far above their long-term trend.

When asking the Editor's approval for responding to the replies to my article it was only with the intention to rectify possible misunderstandings; little did I imagine what unpleasant an exercise this would have to be. For, the first impression I derived from reading these replies was that their impetuosity appears to be out of proportion with the relative mildness of my remarks, which are seen as “a most curious attack” by Bayard & Pisit and as “criticisms” by Solheim. In actual fact they were meant to be neither; but merely an exhortation to ask some questions, albeit maybe slightly embarrassing ones. Contrary to what my three colleagues seem to think, I have no axe to grind and no alternative model to propose, be it my own or that evolved by somebody else; this, I thought, was clearly apparent from my text.

Malaysia's recent economic indicators are fairly positive, despite the impact of the global recession. Yet the country's complex and volatile ethnic and religious divisions are such that one might easily expect both political turmoil and economic chaos. That has not occurred in the recent past (not, indeed, since the riots of 1969), and is not likely to happen in the near future. This paper will attempt to explain this apparent paradox.

The Philippine society confronts formidable longer-term economic problems. The exhaustion of the land frontier suitable for production of present crops under existing techniques, which is compounded by degradation of the environment by wasteful harvesting of forestry resources and over-exploitation of inshore fisheries is an obvious problem. A comparable problem arises in the inertia built into the age structure of the Philippine population. In 1970, those under 15 years of age accounted for 45.6 per cent of all Filipinos and estimated population growth in the 1970s was 2.7 per cent, a rate more than double the “zero-growth rate”. If the growth rate should fall to the “zero-growth rate” tomorrow, the Philippine population would continue to grow for the better part of a century and would virtually double as cohorts of Filipinos entering the reproductive age group would continue to increase for many years.

About the middle of the thirteenth century the great Arab scholar, Ibn Sa'id, compiled his Bast al-Ard or Geography, in which he collected many ancient texts; amongst them is the following, which may offer a clue to the early history of Brunei:

[The Khmers] lived with the Chinese in the eastern regions of the earth. Discord having broken out amongst them, the Chinese chased them towards the islands, and they remained there a certain time. The name of the King was Kamrun. Following this, discord broke out amongst them when they were in the islands, of which we shall speak later. Then those who did not form part of the Royal Family went away to the great island [Madagascar], and their Sultan dwelt in the city of Komorriya.

While Sri Lanka is geographically closer to India, there are greater similarities in economic structure with many Southeast Asian countries. Sri Lanka is a small open economy. Foreign trade has always played a pivotal role in the functioning of the economy. Politically the country has exhibited a preference for democratic parliamentary forms of government, which are compatible with an underlying cultural individualism. There are important differences, however, in both the tempo and direction of economic growth over the past two decades, and these differences, along with the underlying policy strategies that produced them, are potentially instructive in any consideration of economic performance in the region.

Our chief sources of information about Vietnam until the middle of the tenth century are the dynastic histories and related writings of China. This is because, from the beginning of recorded history in Vietnam until then, Vietnam was, for the most part, under the authority of Chinese governors or people who posed as Chinese-style governors. By the end of the tenth century, an independent Vietnamese monarchy was established, and historical information was being independently preserved by the Vietnamese; this information was eventually incorporated into the Vietnamese historiographical tradition as it developed in later centuries. Consequently, the historian of tenth-century Vietnam finds two streams of information, one coming from a wellestablished viewpoint from which Vietnam was a remote frontier district at the edge of the horizon, the other coming from the Vietnamese themselves as they worked toward a standpoint from which to remember their past.

This paper aims to discuss the issue of problem-solving at the national level by focusing on the concept of social discipline. The development of a new nation-state, i.e. contemporary Singapore, will provide the empirical basis for the analysis.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first section deals briefly with relevant conceptual approaches to the solution of social problems, and the definition of social discipline. The second section presents an illustration of social discipline in action. The final section attempts a critical assessment of the approach used in Singapore for the solution of social problems.

During World War II, Britain and the United States differed over the postwar status of Indochina. Although the United States made several strong statements about restoring the prewar possessions of the French Empire, the Americans, especially President Franklin D. Roosevelt, increasingly came to favour an international trusteeship guiding postwar Indochina to eventual independence. The British were not at first prepared to guarantee the complete restoration of the French Empire. With surprising slowness, the British did gradually sponsor the prompt return of French colonial authority in Indochina. British postwar planning had shown how dangerous a hostile or unfriendly France and French Empire could be to the security of the British Isles and British Empire. The British determination to reestablish the French connection coincided with a refusal by Roosevelt to enter any discussions about the postwar status of Indochina. The presidential silence only served to promote Anglo-French colonial interests. After Roosevelt's death, President Harry S. Truman did not challenge the return of French control in Indochina. Ironically, despite the earnest — but seldom expressed — American intentions to underwrite indigenous dreams of independence, the people of Indochina subsequently associated the United States with Western suppression of those dreams.

This paper examines the role of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in the evolution of organisation modes developed by the Chinese community in Malaya to regulate its social, economic, and political affairs. It advances two assertions: firstly, that the MCA was the vehicle that bridged the divide between traditional and modern modes of community regulation, and secondly, that the MCA linked the political concerns of the Chinese community, which hitherto had been largely China-orientated, with the mainstream development of Malayan nationalism and the emerging Malayan nation state during the years 1949–57.

During the period of American colonial rule in the Philippines prior to the Pacific War, the attitude of most thoughtful Filipinos toward Japan seemed to waver as though tantalized between fear and fascination. For while there was often a genuine concern, principally as a result of Japanese-American tensions, that a predatory Japan was literally counting the moments to an invasion and conquest of the Islands, there was also the tremendous admiration of one Asian people for another and an almost awe-struck eagerness to emulate the startling successes of Japan in achieving modern nationhood in its fullest sense. To this generalization Manuel Luis Quezon (1878–1944) was no exception.

The purpose of this article is to gain insights into the relationship between individual and society in contemporary Thailand and Java by investigating how this relationship is seen by the most creative Thai and Javanese authors of modern Thai and Indonesian serious fiction. These authors have been selected because competent local informants thought them to be the best writers of socially relevant novels and short stories. It is expected that the comparative dimension of this article may be conducive to gain a finer understanding of the relationship between individual and society in two culturally related societies than would be possible to achieve by the study of each of them in isolation. Moreover, such comparison may help to control the observer's bias by raising questions that are not necessarily related to the latter's cultural or academic background.

As the founders of a revolutionary movement with an international ideology, the small group of men who led the Burmese communist parties for their first thirty years were concerned as to whether their ideological views and political tactics were consonant with those of foreign communist parties. While looking to Marx, Lenin, and their European interpreters as the original fount of ideological coherence, Asian parties nearer to Burma provided the most immediate and programmatic sources of interpretation. Since the 1950s the example of the Chinese Communist Party has been the leading inspiration for most Burmese communists. However, in the first decade of communist activity in Burma, the Indian Communist Party provided the closest and most congenial guidance.

The Japanese occupied the Philippines in 1941, and Burma and Indonesia in 1942. French Indochina, then called Futsuin by the Japanese, continued to remain in French hands until 9 March 1945. It seemed to present a contrasting picture vis-à-vis Japanese policies in other Asian countries and to contradict the declared policy as expressed in the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (in Japanese Dai-Tōa-Kyoei-Ken). On 9 March, however, this was reversed by the Japanese military action, which disarmed the French Indochinese Army. This action has come to be known as the Meigo Sakusen (Meigo [bright moon] Action).

This paper is an attempt to analyze briefly the origin and growth of the Darul Islam movement with emphasis on the life of the leader of the rebellion, his ideology for establishing an Islamic theocratic state and a discussion on some of the problems he encountered in his effort to achieve his objective.

Sukarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo: A Brief Biography

Sukarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo was born in the small town of Cepu in North Central Java on the day of Selasa Kliwon (Tuesday Kliwon), 7 February 1905.