¹ Hsiung, James C., “China Part II: the Conceptual Foundations of U.S.-China Policy”, in Asia and US Foreign Policy, ed. Hsiung, James C. and Chai, Winberg (New York: Praeger, 1981)Google Scholar.

² New York Times, 13 05 1975Google Scholar.

³ ASEAN heads of government agreed upon two broad areas of collaboration at the Bali summit. In the economic sphere five regional industrial projects were to be established pending feasibility studies (urea fertilizer projects in Indonesia and Malaysia, a soda ash project in Thailand, a superphosphate project in the Philippines, and a diesel engine project in Singapore). The Indonesian project will be completed in 1983, the Malaysian the following year. Work on the Filipino and Thai projects has not begun while the Singaporean project is being developed without the ASEAN label. At the Bali summit ASEAN preferential trading arrangements were negotiated, which have had marginal success in countries where economies are largely competitive. In terms of ASEAN organization, an ASEAN secretariat was established in Jakarta together with a committee system. See Jorgensen-Dahl, Arnfinn, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1982), chapter 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ The Indonesians generally disapproved of US bases in the region claiming as Adam Malik did that such bases were not required to, uphold a balance of power; Straits Times, 22 Nov. 1975. Adam Malik, however, also advised a visiting congressional delegation that Indonesia wanted an American presence in the region but in modified form; Straits Times, 8 Jan. 1976. Basically, the Indonesians were prepared to tolerate American bases as insurance against China or the Soviet Union; that tolerance was regarded as a temporary expedient.

⁵ Ford's Pacific doctrine was outlined in Honolulu after the President actually visited Beijing(2-5 Dec. 1975). The key features were the following: first, the United States would retain a military presence in Southeast Asia, which was described as basic to any stable balance of power in the region; secondly, partnership with Japan was described as a “pillar of our strategy”; the third feature entailed continual efforts t o normalize relations with China on the basis of the 1972 Shanghai communique. Ford added that he had found “common ground” with China as a consequence of his visit. New York Times, 8 Dec. 1975.

⁶ Ibid., 5 Dec. 1975.

⁷ The debate within the administration was reportedly between the “minimalists” who wanted to withdraw from Asia in several stages and the “internationalists” who adopted either the “equilibrium” approach or sought to involve allies like Japan and outside powers such as China in the region. Carter's policy was essentially confused and tended, at different times, to exhibit the characteristics of all approaches. See Scalapino, Robert A., “Approaches to peace and security in Asia; the Uncertainty Surrounding American Strategic Principles”, in Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia, ed. Chawla, Sudershan and SarDesai, .R. (New York: Praeger, 1980)Google Scholar.

⁸ “Southeast Asia has seen too much of the great powers”, editorial, New York Times, 25 July 1977.

⁹ Ibid., 11 Mar. 1978.

¹⁰ Ibid., 10 Apr. 1977. It was suggested that the Carter administration considered withdrawing from the Philippines with the possible intention of establishing a position in the Pacific islands. See Vietnam's Future Policies and Role in Southeast Asia, Committee Print, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington D.C., Apr. 1982Google Scholar.

¹¹ New York Times, 15 Mar. 1979Google Scholar.

¹² The Carter administration continually emphasized the importance of developing trade relations with the ASEAN countries. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, remarked before the Senate Foreig n Relations Committee on 1 Mar. 1979:“Weare counting on American business to act energetically to realize the potential of ASEAN and especially to increase two-way trade.” State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III said Southeast Asia is “one of th e most attractive areas for international direct private investment in the developing world”, Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 1979, vol. 79, no. 2025, p. 20. The obvious political motive as later expressed by U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia John Holdridge was one of the reasons for the above emphasis. Holdridge said in Jakarta that “ASEAN countries have proven the efficacy of the free market system and open market policies”, Bangkok Post, 6 May 1983. The second reason was that the United States was facing a growing trade deficit with ASEAN caused by imports of oil and raw materials, mainly from Indonesia and Malaysia and to some extent the Philippines. See table below.

In 1981, ASEAN as a group continued to be the United States' fifth ranking trading partner, in terms of volume of two-way trade, after Canada, Japan, Mexico, an d the United Kingdom. Direct U.S. investment in the ASEAN countries, encouraged by the Carter administration, rose from $3,156 million in 1977 to $4,752 million in 1980 (US Embassy [Singapore] statistics, July 1982). Direct investment, which rose by 50.6% in these years, hardly matched the increase in two-way trade, which was 92% over the same period.

¹³ Zhirnov, O., “ASEAN: vozmozhnosti i deistvitel'nost'”, Aziya iAfrikasegodnya (Moscow: 05 1977)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ US Embassy text (Bonn), 25 Oct. 1977Google Scholar.

¹⁵ The argument has been adopted by Gareth Porter, “Discordant Overture; the US and Vietnam — the Missed Chance”, The Nation, 20 Oct. 1979. President Carter's stated policy was to normalize relations with Vietnam, finally agreeing to lift the American veto on Vietnam's membership of the United Nations on 20 July 1977. The move to establish relations, despite the Vietnamese concession over reconstruction aid, was aborted by the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance of 3 Nov. 1978. In any case Congress was basically hostile to policies of reconciliation with Vietnam and it seems unlikely that American diplomatic intervention in normalizing relations before the signing of the above treaty but after Phan Hien's Tokyo statements could have led to another outcome.

¹⁶ Department of State Bulletin, 04. 1979, vol. 79, no. 2025, p. 18. See alsoGoogle ScholarHolbrooke, Richard, “America's New Role in Asia”, Asiaweek, 7 July 1978Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Other programmes included the construction of the Bl and the advanced stealth bomber, the introduction of trident and MX missiles. The plan was to cost $180 billion over 1982–87. International Herald Tribune, 3/4 Oct. 1981.

¹⁸ International Communication Agency (henceforth ICA), file, 24 Apr. 1981.

¹⁹ Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, ibid., 3 Mar. 1982.

²⁰ Security assistance includes Foreign Military Sales (which form the bulk of most requests), Economic Support Funds and International Military and Educational Training Assistance. Of a total amount of $482.65 million, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines were to receive $406.36 million, ibid., 25 Mar. 1982. The same figures for 1983 (1983-1984 requests) were $506.09 million and $440.22 million which according to Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz did not constitute an increase in real terms but merely an effort to keep pace with inflation. See USIS file, 23 Feb. 1983.

²¹ Foreign Military Sales requests for ASEAN countries as follows.

*1982–83 requests. Under supplementary appropriations the administration asked Congress to restore requested levels for three ASEAN countries. Congress had cut $30 million from the Indonesian request, $8.5 million from the Malaysian request, and $25 million from Thailand's figure. Wolfowitz argued before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 23 Feb. 1983 that “maintaining adequate, consistent levels of military assistance is necessary to maintaining US influence in an important part of the world at relatively low cost”, USIS File, 23 Feb. 1983. The mood of Congress, reacting to international recession, seemed to be going against the levels of military assistance regarded as necessary by the Reagan Administration.

+The Philippines, under the amendment to the 1947 bases agreement dated 7 Jan. 1979, received $500 million in total security assistance over five years from 1980–84. $100 million was to be granted annually, half in foreign military sales credits, the other half as part of the economic support fund.

+Singapore. In view of its relative economic affluence in the region, Singapore was not slated for any of the programmes included under the rubric of security assistance except for atoken IMETgrant (International Military and Educational Training Assistance) of $50,000 which began in 1981.

²² Straits Times, 14 Nov. 1981.

²³ On the Soviet Union and the sea-lanes in Southeast Asia, see Leifer, Michael, “The Security of the Sea-lanes in South East Asia”, Survival 25, 7 (01./02. 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ Two events are often cited to show that ultimately the Soviet Union will compromise Vietnamese interests. The first occurred during the Geneva Conference of 1954 when Molotov and Zhou Enlai persuaded the Viet Minh to withdraw forces from Cambodia and to settle for partition at the 17th parallel. The second was the Soviet desire to go ahead with the Moscow meeting with Nixon in May 1972 despite American action in mining the port of Haiphong. In the above cases the enemy was the United States whose presence in the region was regarded as passing anyway. In the present situation the principal enemy is China and the tactical flexibility exhibited by Soviet policy above has been considerably limited when dealing with what the Soviets perceive as a historical menace.

²⁵ See comment by US intelligence officers that the Soviet force in Cam Ranh Bay has doubled since 1982. In 1982 the Soviet Union had a cruise missile submarine stationed there, subsequently, however, the force was expanded to include: a nuclear attack submarine, two conventional attack submarines and one whisky class submarine; Straits Times, & Feb. 1983. Otherwise fourTU-95Dreconnaissance aircraft use the 10,000 foot airfield at Cam Ranh Bay on a rotation basis an d naval units of the Pacific Fleet call regularly. Soviet built installations, shelters for nuclear submarines, an electronic monitoring station, underground fuel storage tanks, etc., are still regarded as transitory. Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1983 Yearbook (henceforth FEER Asia 1983 Yearbook), p. 22.

²⁶ See the author's “The Soviet Union in Southeast Asia; Motives, Limits and Opportunities”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 4, 3 (Dec. 1982).

²⁷ The recent Sino-Soviet negotiations at deputy foreign minister level in Oct. 1982 (Beijing) and in Mar. 1983 (Moscow) failed to show any change in the basic positions of the two communist powers. The Chinese demanded Soviet acceptance of three conditions before relations could be improved. These conditions were: (1) reduction of troops along the Mongolian border, (2) withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, (3) withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. The Chinese also submitted a proposal, which requested that the Soviet Union use its influence over Vietnam to secure a withdrawal from Kampuchea. The talks were accordingly inconclusive. See Chanda, Nayan, “Fuelling New Hopes”, Far Eastern Economic Review (henceforth FEER), 3 Mar. 1983.Google Scholar

²⁸ Taylor, Keith Weller, The Birth of Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp.296–301.Google Scholar

²⁹ Straits Times, 31 07 1982Google Scholar.

³⁰ See Vo Van Kiet's report on the economy to the National Assembly, BBC Summaries of World Broadcasts (henceforth BBC SWB) FE/7217/C/1, 24 Dec. 1982.

³¹ See Quinn-Judge, Paul, “Contracts for Change”, FEER, 10 Feb. 1983Google Scholar.

³² See address by Vo Chi Cong, Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in Nhan Dan, 10 Feb. 1982, BBC SWB, FE/6969/C/1, 4 Mar. 1982Google Scholar.

³³ Leader of the anti-communist, anti-Vietnamese Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Prime Minister in the Khmer coalition established on 22 June 1982, which includes the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk as president.

³⁴ Bangkok Post, 10 Oct. 1982. See also Melunsky, Bernard, “Occupation is preferred to rule by Khmer Rouge”, The Times, 2 07 1980Google Scholar.

³⁵ See Richardson, Michael, “The Rising Tide of Khmer Rouge Resistance”, Bangkok Post, 12 02. 1982Google Scholar.

³⁶ The Khmer Vice-Minister of Agriculture and two Vietnamese advisers were assassinated in Aug. 1982 in Kompong Cham, a province that had been previously declared secure. See FEER Asia 1983 Yearbook, p. 127.

³⁷ See Kampuchea n Foreign Minister Hun Sen's remarks in Paris on 3 Feb. 1982. The Khmer Rouge forces can only be annihilated if Vietnamese and Kampuchean forces enter Thai territory. “This is why the Vietnamese military presence remains necessary in Kampuchea, notably, along the Khmer-Thai border”, BBC SWB, FE/6946/A3/2, 5 Feb. 1982.

³⁸ It has been argued that Vietnam benefits from the continued existence of the Khmer Rouge as a justification for continued occupation, Asiaweek, 9 Apr. 1982. Though there may be some validity in this point of view the existence of opposition in Kampuchea provides China and ASEAN with an opportunity to deny legitimacy to the Heng Samrin regime. The Khmer Rouge and the non-communist Khmer groups (Moulinaka, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front) may not pose a military threat to the Heng Samrin regime but their eventual emasculation is necessary to overcome the political challenge posed by the loose Khmer coalition government formed in Kuala Lumpur on 22 June 1982.

³⁹ Tasker, Rodney, “Full of Sound and Fury”, FEER, 10 02. 1983Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Straits Times, 25 02. 1983Google Scholar.

⁴¹ The International Conference on Kampuchea called for the following steps: (1) Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea under the supervision and verification of a UN peace-keeping or observer group. (2) After withdrawal, “appropriate measures” for the maintenance of law and order in Kampuchea and the holding of free elections before the establishment of a new government. (3) “Appropriate arrangements” to ensure that the Khmer Rouge will not disrupt the elections or coerce the population. (4)Permanent members of the UN Security Council and other interested states are to declare their respect for “the independence, sovereignity, territorial integrity and non-aligned and neutral status of Kampuchea and recognize its borders as invoilable”. United Nations General Assembly: Declaration on Kampuchea, 17 July 1981. The Vietnamese rejected the resolution as camouflage for a Chinese-sponsored effort, in the absence of effective enforcement procedures, to install a Khmer Rouge government in Kampuchea again. The militarily stronger faction, the Khmer Rouge, would obviously dominate the political scene in the event of any Vietnamese withdrawal.

⁴² Straits Times, 11 03. 1983Google Scholar.

⁴³ Rajaratnam called the proposal a “step forward”, ibid., 17 Mar. 1983. Ghazali Shafie used the word “breakthrough” in a press conference in Kuala Lumpur on 14 Mar. Bangkok Post, 15 Mar. 1983.

⁴⁴ Straits Times, 24 03. 1983Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ FEER, 27 01. 1983Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Straits Times, 22 01. 1983Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ The situation is not analogous to the one faced by the United States in the Middle East prior to the Yom Kippur war. The United States could wait until Sadat broke with the Russians because alliance with the Soviet Union could not achieve Arab goals. Vietnam, however, is in a position to attain its goal in Kampuchea with Soviet support. If policy in the White House is being framed with Kissinger's Middle Eastern experience in mind there are significant differences between the events above that have not been taken into account.

⁴⁸ Bangkok Post, 10 02. 1982Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ See Department of State Bulletin, 08. 1981, vol. 81, no. 2053, p. 40Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Richardson, Michael, “An Indonesian View of Southeast Asia”, The Age (Melbourne), 25 05 1981Google Scholar.

⁵¹ New Straits Times, 14 11. 1981Google Scholar.

⁵² BBC SWB, FE/6803/A3/8, 17, 08. 1981Google Scholar.

⁵³ Straits Times, 22 05 1982Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Bangkok Post, 2 12. 1982Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Straits Times, 14 Oct. 1982, FEER, 10 Dec. 1982. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja made the following comment during the visit: “We were assured that the interests of the Southeast Asian nations would be taken into account in the relations between the United States and China and Japan”, Straits Times,14 Oct. 1982Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Suharto, upon returning from the United States, warned: “If the US truly considers ASEAN as an important partner in this region it should reconsider its support for China's modernization because it could impose a bigger threat to the security and stability of the region.” Bangkok Post, 24 October. 1982.