International monetary problems moved from the back pages to the front pages long ago, and yet, despite much attention, they continue to trouble national leaders, entrepreneurs, international officials and scholars, and to affect the average citizen. World payments imbalances and currency fluctuations have substantial domestic economic effects, give rise to protectionist pressures, put unwelcome heat on politicians, and raise fears that resulting governmental conflicts could unravel political-security relations. Thus, large and small nations meet in various fora, from bilateral sessions through the Group-of-Seven powers to the annual IMF conference, to negotiate proposed changes.

Affected by the ideological symbolism and political controversy surrounding privatization, much of the work on this subject is marred by definitional uncertainty; what should be included in the concept? To get away from this, and to prepare the ground for meaningful comparative analysis of the phenomenon, I propose both a definition and a taxonomy. I argue that it is the active and conscious transfer of reponsibility from the public to the private realm that should form the core of the concept. Furthermore, I argue that neither the principles for, nor the level of, provision of goods and services should be included in the definition. Finally, I propose that the taxonomy should be based on the public/private dichotomy of responsibility allocation included in the definition, as well as on three main activities in goods and services production which the government could privatize; regulation, financing, and production.

International coordination of macroeconomic policies has attracted much attention in recent years. The main issue has been whether economic performance can be improved by coordination. Although still a controversial issue, many economists have argued that coordination would make a positive contribution to economic performance. This paper deals with the requirements for successful fiscal coordination. It concludes that those requirements are such that the best fiscal policies that countries can pursue are those aimed at putting their house in order.

This article examines the divergences in labor market-performances in four small, open economies: Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. It argues that great unemployment in Belgium and the Netherlands is partly due to the implementation of deflationary policies during the 1980s. The decline of Keynesian intervention in Belgium and the Netherlands is traced to the institutional independence of their central banks to set monetary and exchange rate policies separate from government. Because the Swedish and Austrian central banks are more integrated in the policy process and their countries are not members of the Common Market or the European Monetary System, social democratic governments have been able to go against the European trend of monetary restrictiveness and fiscal austerity. Accordingly, business in Austria and Sweden is more optimistic about future profit returns and is more willing to invest in productive capital, resulting in lower unemployment.

This paper stresses the importance of taking domestic economic structures and political pressures into account when considering issues of international macroeconomic policy coordination. The existence of domestic biases can cause policy coordination to increase rather than reduce macroeconomic instability. The paper offers a survey of the literature on national macroeconomic policy preferences and inflation unemployment tradeoffs. While this research is still in its infancy, it is clear that there are important differences across countries which must be taken into account in designing coordination strategies.

In recent years the hopes of finding a solution for the puzzle of mass unemployment shifted to labor market institutions such as the system of regulation and industrial relations. The following study takes up a much neglected aspect of labor market institutions, the issue of financing labor market policy. After developing the analytical framework, the systems of financing labor market policy in six countries are briefly described. Next are analyzed the effects of different financing systems on expenditures for active labor market policy – as an essential element in fighting unemployment. Financial systems, however, influence not only the level but also the structure of labor market policy which in turn has implications for its allocational and distributional effects. Finally, some lessons are drawn from the international comparison, the main thesis is illustrated by the German case. Institutional incongruity, i.e. a mismatch between organizational structures and functions, may have two effects, leading political decision makers to behave in a generally unexpected way, and channelling the effects of political programmes in unintended directions.

The economic content of security, i.e. to what extent security is influenced by economic variables, is a difficult and widely debated one. There has been a tendency, to broaden the concept of security to include certain purely economic interests. The paper is concerned with a precise understanding of the difference between a narrow and territorial definition of security, and a broader definition of security encompassing economic interests. The first section defines security and its economic ramifications and the second discusses the subject within the context of a general equilibrium model. The policy dilemmas of security are then considered at the conceptual level, including the dilemmas in the general equilibrium model.

This paper challenges the mechanical application of inflation accounting to public sector deficits as it has been suggested in recent years. Although the theoretical considerations underlying the proposed adjustment for the inflation premium of interest payments are well taken, the new approach has fundamentally focused on measurement issues with little attention paid to the behavioral aspects of microeconomic adjustment. This paper, therefore, raises skepticism about the usefulness of inflation accounting, if such a correction is not accompanied by a conceptual model that links behavioral responses of individuals to balance sheets and other stock variables. In a departure from previous investigations, the paper also points out the possibility that inflation accounting might have more relevant implications for public, rather than private, spending.

This essay analyzes the relationship between international investment interests and foreign economic policy. The first step and level of analysis looks at nation-states as the relevant actors, and claims that a country's international investment position tends to affect its international economic preferences in ways that are easily understood and anticipated. Countries' international asset positions often have a predictable impact on their policies toward international monetary relations, cross-border investment, and trade.The second step and level of analysis looks inside national societies at the international asset positions of various domestic groups. It argues that sectors with varying interests related to their international investment positions contend for influence over national policy. The economic circumstances of each sector lead to sectoral policy preferences with predictable implications for domestic bargaining over foreign economic policy. The general argument is applied briefly to a number of modern creditor countries and sectors, most prominently the United States after World War Two.

Policy design, whether conceptualized as a verb referring to the process of formulating policy ideas, or as a noun describing the logic through which policy intends to achieve its objectives, remains relatively uncharted territory. This paper reviews what we know about how policy designs emerge, and identifies the kinds of biases and weaknesses that are introduced into designs by the decision heuristics employed. Theories of policy invention and expert decision-making suggest that individuals search through large amounts of relevant information stored in memory, reason by analogies, make comparisons, and either copy or simulate patterns of information. Policy scholars may contribute to improved policy design by making more explicit the biases introduced through reliance on decision heuristics, and by suggesting a more formal, self conscious search and selection process that enables designers to be more discriminating when they pinch policy ideas from other contexts. To perform this task, comparative policy analysis is needed in which common elements that exist in virtually all policies are identified and the underlying structural logic of the policies is made explicit. In this paper we set forth generic elements found in policies, describe and compare some of the more common design patterns, and discuss the circumstances where these may be inappropriately copied or borrowed, thereby thwarting the effectiveness of the policy.

Our most prominent theories of international bargaining miss elements essential for understanding national bargaining strategies and international outcomes. In particular they lack sufficient mechanisms of change over time. A focused contrast between the London economic and monetary conference of 1933 and the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 suggests three new dynamic hypotheses. (1) Changes, especially extreme ones, in national market conditions are likely to shift the state's bargaining strategy sharply even if its relative international position has not changed. A slump will produce a more exploitative strategy, while a boom will encourage either a passive or an expansive strategy. (2) Painful national experience running contrary to prevailing policy ideas is likely to discredit those ideas among politicians and officials, turn them toward alternative doctrines, and lead to corresponding strategy changes. The ideas most likely to spread politically are ones which had predicted the currrent problem, and those whose advocates mount the most sophisticated publicity campaign. (3) International technical disagreement can pose a decisive impediment to intergovernmental agreement, while in some conditions at least technical convergence facilitates official agreement.

This paper examines the determinants of Japan's most serious postwar blunder: failure to define and implement effective and timely counter-measures to deal with its change from deficit to surplus international monetary status during the 1969–1971 period. It concludes that intense bureaucratic compartmentalization and a lack of supra-ministerial leadership of national policy were key determinants of this failure, leaving Japan's political system dependent upon irresistible external pressure (gai-atsu,) in this case from the United States, to define and force implementation of necessary policy changes. This critical but largely ignored episode illustrates a negative aspect of the traditional insulation of Japan's national bureacracy from political (as opposed to administrative) interference in the definition and pursuit of basic national policy objectives.

US exchange rate policy shifted in 1985 from unilateralist nonintervention to actively promoting dollar depreciation and multilateral cooperation. Pressures from producer interests, particularly multinational companies making manufactured goods, and from sympathetic members of Congress were the most important of multiple forces pushing the US Treasury toward dollar depreciation. Once the Treasury had chosen an activist course, a multilateral strategy had several benefits over a unilateral approach to depreciation. It could better counter the immediate threat to Administration trade policy from Congress, orchestrate depreciation, strengthen Treasury's influence within Washington and shift the burden of adjustment away from US fiscal policy, then frozen, onto other governments. When the trade account is in balance, individual policymakers have flexibility in determining exchange rate policy. But when large trade deficits arise, the domestic political pressures of trade-exposed sectors will dominate personalities and ideas.

Public enterprises in the Federal Republic of Germany are about average for all nonsocialist countries and markets are more heavily regulated than in the United States. Compared to American deregulation and British privatization, there have been few developments in the Federal Republic. Why? In the last ten years new schools of thought have provided a stronger normative foundation for and a stronger positive explanation against deregulation and privatization in Germany in the near future. The German political debate on deregulation and privatization is characterized by three institutional peculiarities. Major steps to deregulate or privatize economic sectors require legislation, which is influenced by political parties. Trade unions exert a strong influence on the major parties and are opposed to privatization and deregulation. The European Community forces some deregulation upon the Federal Republic in order to liberalize service sectors.

The planning of major energy facilities in Western Europe has met with increasing opposition in the last 15 years. In Scotland formal objections to such developments are considered in public inquiries; in Germany the equivalent institution is the hearing. These two institutions differ fundamentally in scope and in the means of presenting and examining evidence. The involvement of the courts has been greater in Germany, where lengthy cases examining procedural and substantive issues have developed a new field in legal administration. Developers, objectors and administrators find fault with the planning and legal systems, but outcomes invariably favour the developers. Of the two institutions examined, the British public inquiry offers objectors considerably more scope than does the German hearing.

Devaluations are traumatic events. The historical record shows that a devaluation doubles the probability that a ruling group would be replaced and triples the likelihood that the Minister of Finance would be relieved. Yet in November 1978, Indonesia devalued its currency by 50 percent when observers were not predicting a balance of payments crisis in the near future. The devaluation was undertaken to effect an income transfer to the countryside and the Outer Islands, the centers of traditional agricultural export industries. Since this action contradicts the logic of the dominant models of the Indonesian state, we propose that authoritarian corporatism is a more accurate characterization of the state-society relationship. The economic conditions in the countryside and Outer Islands are important to policy makers because the former has a long history of agrarian radicalism and the latter a history of secessions.

This paper considers the effects of uncertainty on the magnitude of prospective welfare gains from international macroeconomic policy coordination. Three different sources of uncertainty are studied: the initial state of the economy; the correct welfare weights to be assigned to policy targets; and the impact on the economy that economic models attribute to policy changes. Simulation results show that uncertainty about any of the three reduces the likely gains from coordination and creates the possibility of negative effects. The gains from improved economic knowledge can be quite substantial in relation to the gains from coordination. This suggests that the development and exchange of economic information can be an important function of international cooperation.