The census is a social fact, the outcome of a process that involves the interaction of public laws and institutions and citizens' responses to an official inquiry. However, it is not a ‘hard’ fact. Reasons for inevitable defects in the census count are listed in the first section; the second section reports efforts by the US Census Bureau to identify sources of error in census coverage, and make estimates of the size of the errors. The use of census data for policy purposes, such as political representation and allocating funds, makes these defects controversial. Errors may be removed by making adjustments to the initial census count. However, because adjustment reallocates resources between groups, it has become the subject of political conflict. The paper describes the conflict between statistical practices, laws and public policy about census adjustment in the United States, and concludes by considering the extent to which causes in America are likely to be found in other countries.

The collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe has also caused the collapse of old-fashioned studies of Communist systems that subscribed to a simple notion of totalitarian uniformity, or a static belief in the continuance of self-equilibrating cycles within socialist states. To understand what is happening in Central and Eastern Europe today we need to be discriminating in a choice of paradigms. European conceptions of democracy as having a socio-economic as well as political dimension are more relevant than formalist American definitions. Moreover, Europe, in the form of the European Community, is also a much more immediate influence than the United States upon what is happening in Central or Eastern Europe. The transition to democracy in Southern Europe provides encouraging models for ex-Soviet satellites. The failure of Latin American countries to democratize provides warnings, such as the risk that Presidential government can produce dictatorship or instability, a risk that is present in new democracies in Europe too.

Undertaking cross-national research in order to improve national policy is an idea that goes back centuries. Aristotle examined the constitutions of city-states for the sake of civic betterment. The American Founding Fathers studied the English Constitution to avoid its presumed defects. In turn, Tocqueville examined democracy in America because, as he explained to his French readers, ‘My wish has been to find there instruction by which we may ourselves profit’ (1954 ed.: vol. 1, 14). In the contemporary world, policymakers in every society constantly cite the lessons that they draw from their own past or from the experience of other nations – and in Eastern Europe and the Third World there are many governments anxious to learn from the practice of others how to improve their own policies.

This paper discusses the prospects of Greece, Portugal and Spain completing stage 1 of the Delors plan. Much of the academic literature on the removal of capital controls seeks to extend the experience of the ERM countries in the 1980s. We argue that its applicability for southern Europe is not straightforward, because these countries have not had the same experience of operating the ‘old’ ERM with capital controls, and examine the implications for these countries of removing capital controls for macroeconomic, and especially, fiscal policy. Intermediate institutional arrangements may be necessary and we consider how EC-wide measures may help these countries in this transitional phase. For the next phase of European integration, the focus of the EC should be on developing appropriate public institutions at the European level to promote positive integration.

Lesson-drawing addresses the question: Under what circumstances and to what extent can a programme that is effective in one place transfer to another. Searching for fresh knowledge is not normal; the second section describes the stimulus to search as dissatisfaction with the status quo. Lessons can be sought by searching across time and/or across space; the choice depends upon a subjective definition of proximity, epistemic communities linking experts together, functional interdependence between governments, and the authority of intergovernmental institutions. The process of lesson-drawing starts with scanning programmes in effect elsewhere, and ends with the prospective evaluation of what would happen if a programme already in effect elsewhere were transferred here in future. Lesson-drwaing is part of a contested political process; there is no assurance that a lesson drawn will be both desirable and practical. The conclusion considers the uncertainty and instability of judgements about the practicality and desirability of transferring programmes.

This paper develops a theory synthesizing credit-claiming and blameavoidance explanations of congressional behavior and evaluates it against asbestos policy in the United States from the 1920s through the 1980s. Public policy is viewed as shaped by officeholders' ability to achieve political ends through augmenting information costs and other transaction costs facing the public. Public perceptions are seen both as the endogenous product of congressional information-cost manipulation and as an exogenous constraint that changes in identifiable ways over time. Different policy stances - open credit claiming, concealed credit claiming, early-stage blame avoidance, and full-scale blame avoidance – are predicted to emerge in response to specified conditions, yielding implications about the expected timing of public policy changes. Specific types of transaction-cost manipulation are predicted to accompany the identified policy stances. The US asbestos policy experience is shown to be consistent with the predictions of the model.

Public officials faced with difficult and technologically complex decisions often resort to decision rules that purport to aggregate disparate judgements. Such multicriterion decisions are only as good as the procedures used to perform such aggregation, however. We examine the use of one such decision-making tool, a variant of the Delphi technique, in the choice of a disposal technology for low-level radioactive waste for the Southeast Compact Commission in the United States. The case focuses on the danger when officials guess when they think they are choosing. Choosing occurs when all participants understand the implications, and sensitivities, of the technique used to aggregate judgement; guessing occurs when the participants choose randomly or without full knowledge of the properties of the process.

Are the systems of collective labor relations in member countries of the European Communities converging towards a common European system of industrial relations? In this paper the hypothesis is put forward that the national systems have not been converging in the past and probably will not do so in the immediate future. The analysis is based on changes in procedural rules of collective labor relations and on data on labor unions, strikes, wage structure, and government employment.

This article examines how evidence about Program A in Country A may be utilized in Country B, and thus how utilization may explain the adoption of the same program. Elites and activists have a number of interests in using policy evidence from another country: to put an issue to a systemic or institutional agenda, mollify political pressure, provide an exemplar, indicate the range of options or reinforce conclusions already reached. The interests of the importer dictate the nature, timing and origins of the evidence injected into policy debate. This framework is applied to the case of freedom of information policy. An analysis of how and why evidence about the United States Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was utilized in Canada and Britain reveals that FOIA was used as an exemplar in Canada and the reverse in Britain.

This article examines the arguments for and against user fees, privatisation, and decentralisation of health care and family planning delivery systems and compares the effectiveness of fee-for-service delivery by decentralised systems with that of centralised systems with services provided free of charge. Developing countries have achieved remarkable reductions in fertility rates in the past 25 years, but continuing gains depend largely upon increasing the capacity of family planning and health care delivery systems in rural areas. National governments are unlikely to allocate additional funds to improve delivery systems to rural areas because of the greater political influence of urban areas and the declining health-care budgets of the central government. This situation has led many to propose alternative arrangements for health-care delivery in rural areas.

One of the emerging areas in the public policy literature concerns new modes of thought about the construction and analysis of public policy. This article extends notions about politics within the ‘policy design’ literature by considering the implications of different political environments for policy design and implementation. Two different political environments – policies with and without publics – that form ends of a continuum of policy publics are discussed. A contrast is drawn between these two polar political environments with respect to differing policy design and implementation challenges, as well as with respect to differing opportunities for policy learning.

It is widely believed by political scientists that the Thatcher Governments transformed British industrial relations and ‘curbed union power’. In contrast, most industrial relations scholars have argued that despite the legislative onslaught relatively little has changed on the shopfloor. This paper examines both claims. Much has changed in Britain since 1979. In particular, the political role of unions has altered substantially. Unions in 1991 are infrequently consulted and have very little influence. In addition, the legislative framework within which unions operate is very different; their activities are much more circumscribed by the law than previously. But much less has changed on the shopfloor; for example, there is limited evidence of a major move to derecognise unions or restrict collective bargaining. Governments can only set the legislative framework within which shopfloor industrial relations operate; it cannot determine outcomes.

The market orientation of the 1992 European Community programme has given way to a range of other projects involving institutional integration. Issues such as European Monetary Union and the EC Social Charter now dominate the Community's policy agenda. Inducing this shift from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ integration was a growing realisation that institutional interventions are required to secure and coordinate the integration process. This paper examines the nature of the EC Social Charter as a positive coordination mechanism. First the controversies surrounding the adoption of the Charter are outlined. Then an appraisal is made of how the clauses of the Charter' accompanying action programme and recently published draft Directives affect existing national systems of labour market regulation. The conclusion is that although the Charter does not constitute a move towards a harmonised employment regime, it is a serious attempt to bring about greater coherence in Community labour markets.

Political adversaries have reason and opportunity to use foreign lessons to gain advantage in political conflicts. Political factors strongly affect the way public policy lessons are drawn and transformed into public policy. Political opponents contest the value, practicality, and transferability of policy initiatives in order to bias the outcome. The paper hypothesizes that (i) the politicization of lesson-drawing induces issue experts to emphasize the descriptive and technical aspects of programs; (2) gives an incentive to advocates of change to use lessons to advance their position during the agenda-setting process; and (3) gives opponents of change an incentive to draw counterbalancing negative lessons from foreign experience when a proposed lesson reaches the point where adoption is entirely possible. The 1988 Congressional debate over mandatory plant closing prenotification provides evidence supporting hypotheses. The paper further hypothesizes: (4) most polities will not adopt both conservative and liberal programs even when theoretically they could do so; and (5) the degree to which a population of polities adopt a particular lesson will be a function of the program's economic and politicial feasibility. The diffusion of labor market and income maintenance policies across the American states supports both of these claims.

This paper extends previous analyses of industrial policy from a corporatist perspective. We advocate a mid-level measure of group influence; the measure is based upon analysis of newspaper stories. A preliminary exploration of NewsBank data is reported, and several interesting trends in economic development policy are isolated. Business and education are heavily involved in policymaking whereas labor and political parties are not at all involved. On the whole, a meso-corporatist model in which business, state government, and education are partners seems to fit better than a business capture model. Some speculations are offered about this new American form of corporatism and its resemblance to the Japanese case.

In discussing unemployment problems the current literature tends to emphasise supply shocks and real wage rigidity, hysteresis, failure of relative wages to adjust to market conditions and labour market regulations as important reasons of unemployment. By making a comparative study of the unemployment problems in the Netherlands and Norway, this study emphasises the protection of industries, real interest rates and government fiscal policy as important factors explaining the difference in unemployment between the two countries.

Because events occur too fast and ideas mature too slowly for responses to be designed anew for each pressing problem, policy innovation often relies on pre-existing models, foreign or domestic. This seems to be especially true for regulatory policymaking, since public regulation is typically introduced in conditions of crisis. In this paper we examine several cases of policy innovation in the area of economic and social regulation where the influence of foreign models is quite clear: the development of competition policy in Europe in the 1950s, the growth of European Community regulation, and the impact of the American deregulation movement on the telecommunications policies of different European countries. The analysis shows that while utilization of preexisting models is a common feature of policy innovation, such models are not literally translated into current policy. More or less extensive adaptations to a particular political, institutional and economic context are usually required. We also identify two distinct ways – push or pull – in which foreign models can affect domestic policy.