The paper investigates the changes to the Fund's bilateral surveillance policy in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–09 asking about the factors that caused the quick and deep shift to a systemic surveillance approach. In answering this question, the paper argues that the causes of the quick and deep transformation of IMF surveillance lie in the preceding two decades of incremental accumulation of knowledge and small transformations in policy instruments and organizational practices. In identifying the causes of present policy choices in the lessons drawn from past experience, the paper provides an example of lagged learning because the lessons drawn from the 1990s emerging market crises exerted their full impact only as a response to the global financial crisis. These findings therefore contribute to the literature that aims at showing the importance of temporality and process sequencing to explain policy change.

Policy responses to the tumult of the global financial crisis of 2007–9 prompt a consideration of the critical dimensions in specifying policy change. UK monetary policy between 2007 and 2009 is characterised by a remarkable degree of innovation yet counts as a ‘normal’ period of policy making under the Hall (1993) framework of policy change, the enduring workhorse of the comparative public policy field. This exposes its lack of conceptual refinement in describing significant but within paradigm policy change. This paper traces this failing to the notion of a policy paradigm, both its scale and the ideational mechanisms which bind policy change. The paper develops the UK monetary policy case to consider the potential of the recently-minted concept of a thermostatic policy institution for the development of Hall's framework; but finds analytical limitations in coping with significant policy spillovers. Suggestions are made to meet this important challenge for future research in policy studies on the specification of policy change.

The budgetary response of Estonia to the 2008 global financial crisis poses a puzzle. While many other countries increased public expenditure and ran high deficits in 2009, the Estonian government was different: it undertook fiscal retrenchment, combining expenditure cuts and tax increases, despite a large drop in economic output. This article explains why the Estonian government opted for fiscal consolidation during the crisis. The ideological position of the governing parties and their desire the join the euro-zone played an important role in driving fiscal discipline. It also argues that the key to understanding Estonia's fiscal decisions in 2009 is what happened in the 1990s: fiscal policy choices became path-dependent as a result of positive feedback loops from previous periods of fiscal consolidation. Path-dependency was further reinforced by institutional capabilities (or lack thereof) created by initial macroeconomic policy choices.

Numerous governments have adopted innovative policy instruments to deal with important environmental policy challenges and negotiated instruments offer the potential to improve performance beyond what regulation alone can accomplish. Dutch covenants, which represent negotiated agreements with sectors of industry as targets of behavioral change, provide useful evidence of the determinants of success. For improving environmental performance, certain features of the policy setting explain much of the variance in ambitions and outcomes: attitudes of decision makers in the affected businesses, attention to cost minimization, and possibly the degree of ambition built into the agreement. Modeling to explain the extent of ambition and compliance offer further insights. While some Dutch lessons may be restricted to more corporatist policy settings, others may help improve the effectiveness of negotiated agreements in many national settings.

Independent agencies are exempted from the accountability mechanisms inherent in the ministerial hierarchy. To compensate for this, politicians incorporate all kinds of information and reporting requirements into the statutes of the organizations. However, the degree to which this occurs varies considerably, which raises the question: Why are some agencies are made more accountable than others? This study examines the impact of political salience on degrees of accountability, controlling for other potential explanations. Using original data on 103 independent agencies in the Netherlands, the analysis demonstrates that salience has a twofold effect. First, agencies dealing with more salient issues are made more politically accountable. Second, agencies whose statutes are written when the issue of accountability is more salient are also subject to higher degrees of accountability. Other explanatory factors are the number of veto players and the legal basis of the organization.