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Organization and Cooperation: International Institutions and Policy Coordination*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Miles Kahler
Miles Kahler
Affiliation:
International Relations, University of California, San Diego
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Abstract

Systems of policy coordination since 1945 may be classified as rule-governed systems relying on decentralized national decisions (a stylized Bretton Woods system) or discretionary bargaining in which coordination decisions are taken collectively at the international level (e.g. world economic summits). The European Monetary System combines elements of these two models. National attachments to rules cannot be explained solely by the strength of international institutions. A discretionary bargaining model of coordination is more likely to be successful when national leaders share a policy diagnosis that both cuts across economic issue areas and divides their own domestic political coalitions and governments. International organizations may facilitate policy coordination under a rule-based system through provision of resources to ease adjustment costs and rule clarification, and in a discretionary bargaining system by brokering, providing information and model building.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 8 , Issue 3-4 , July 1988 , pp. 375 - 401
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

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Footnotes

*

Revised version of a paper prepared for the Annual Meetings, American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1988. The author wishes to thank Robert G. ilpin, Stephan Haggard, and John Odell for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

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