The second issue of the fifth volume of the JPEF features 4 research articles, and a book review section. The first article is by Estelle James, Guillermo Martinez and Augusto Iglesias and looks at: “The payout stage in Chile: Who annuitizes and why?” Low rates of voluntary annuitization are a major issue in defined contribution pension designs. Yet, in Chile, about 2/3 of individuals choose to annuitize instead of taking programmed withdrawals. The paper examines the reasons for this high rate of annuitization and concludes that it is due to the combination of a competitive market in annuities and the relatively constrained alternatives available to individuals. The paper nevertheless finds some evidence of adverse selection in the Chile annuity market.

In 1981 Chile adopted its new multi-pillar system, which featured privately managed individual accounts. Starting in 1983 payouts from the accounts were permitted and detailed rules about payouts were put in place. The Chilean scheme therefore gives us an opportunity to examine how pensioners and pension providers react when individual accounts replace DB systems, and how detailed regulations shape these reactions.

Retirees in Chile have a choice between early versus normal retirement (before or after age 65M/60W) and between annuitization versus programmed withdrawals; lump sum withdrawals are largely ruled out. Almost two-thirds of all retirees have annuitized – a very high proportion compared with other countries. This paper argues that this high rate of annuitization is the result of guarantees and regulations that constrain payout choices, insure retirees through the minimum pension guarantee, eliminate other DB components, and give a competitive advantage to insurance companies selling annuities. The minimum pension financed by the government provides insurance to workers with small accumulations, who retire at the normal age with programmed withdrawals, while those with large accumulations retire early and must purchase annuities to acquire longevity and investment insurance. Insurance companies further induce annuitization by marketing aggressively, facilitating early retirement for those who annuitize and offering a high money's worth ratio for price-indexed annuities. We find evidence of adverse selection based on asymmetric information about short-run health status, but this does not seem to deter the high rate of annuitization.

The independence of outside directors is critical to corporate board effectiveness. We examine a unique period in corporate governance when outside directors' defined benefit pensions are replaced with increases in equity. Firms with pension plans significantly underperform their industry in terms of stock returns. Firms terminating the pension plans in exchange for equity have significant increases in stock returns relative to their industry subsequent to the change. All samples outperform the ROA and ROE industry medians both before and after the change in compensation, indicating pressure from organized investors likely comes from stock performance, not accounting performance. Investor rights pressure and outside director compensation and not takeover risk or institutional ownership best explain firms altering outside director compensation, with board of director effectiveness improving.

We investigate the pension choices made by over 700 firms between 1981 and 1998 when DC plans expanded and overtook DB plans. Their average pension contribution per employee dropped in real terms from $2,140 in 1981 to $1,404 in 1998. At the same time, the share of their pension contributions attributed to defined contribution plans was 23% in 1981 and increased to 68% in 1998. By analyzing pension plan data from the IRS Form 5500 and finances of the plan's sponsoring employer from COMPUSTAT with a fixed-effects ordinary least squares model and a simultaneous model, we find that a 10% increase in the use of defined contribution plans (including 401(k) plans) reduces employer pension costs per worker by 1.7–3.5%. This suggests firms use DCs and 401(k)s to lower pension costs. Lower administrative expenses may also explain the popularity of DC plans. Although measuring a firm's pension cost per worker may be a crude way to judge a firm's commitment to pensions, this study suggests that firms that provide both a traditional defined benefit and a defined contribution plan are the most committed because they spend the most on pensions. Further research, especially case studies, is vital to understand employers' commitment to employment-based pension plans.

The aim of this paper is to explain the ‘annuities puzzle’ in greater depth by introducing the bequest motive. It will try to determine whether this motive really is a relevant feature influencing the demand for life annuities from married couples. With this aim in mind, we develop an optimization model of the utility provided by purchasing a life annuity with contingent survivor benefit or a joint survivor life annuity. Our model is based on that first put forward by Brown and Poterba (2000), to which we have added elements from other models, such as Friedman and Warshawsky's (1990) and Vidal and Lejárraga's (2004), which include the bequest motive. This will enable us to calculate the annuity equivalent wealth and the optimal percentage of wealth to annuitize in various contexts: the possibility of access to actuarially fair annuity markets, the inclusion of so-called market imperfections, and the assumption that couples already have part of their wealth in pre-existing life annuities. Numerical results are presented for the case of Spain. The bequest motive is found not to be a significant factor influencing the demand for annuities from couples. Indeed very few couples would be willing to purchase them once we take into account the combined effects of market imperfections, the possibility of pre-existing annuities and the bequest motive. These findings have repercussions for policy makers regulating defined contribution capitalization systems, which are complementary to defined benefit systems.