Since the bloody events of October 1988, Algeria has experienced important transformations. That date marked the beginning of the transition from authoritarianism with the opening of political space to previously excluded groups. A number of reforms were introduced, partly because of pressure from the street, but mainly because the incumbent authorities needed them to legitimise themselves and hang on to power. In the aftermath of the October events, the regime fragmented and a hitherto hidden struggle for power among the various political clans rose to the surface. This paper looks at the Algerian transition and assesses the role of Algeria's political parties in this process, asking whether they played a traditional role, or whether they were just puppets of the regime which served only to legitimise the process of change.

The early independence period in Tanzania was not simply an ante-chamber to the post-Arusha Declaration period of Ujamaa. The state undertook to incorporate, for the first time, the people of Tanzania in the formal development planning structures in an attempt to marry national developmental objectives to local needs. Self-help, or ‘nation building’ as it was also known, was an attempt to bring consensus and dialogue to the planning process. The scale of self-help activity unleashed by its formal adoption as part of rural development policy caught the government by surprise, however, and raised fears over the level of control that local government in particular was able to exert over popular efforts in development. The gradual emergence of statism in Tanzania, in place by the end of the decade, was in large part the response of a panicking state, fearing an imminent crisis in its power to direct development policy, and maintain command over scarce resources.

Over the past twenty years, the focus of development policy has shifted from the state to the private sector. Privatisation is now central to utility reform in much of SSA. This paper sets out developments in water privatisation and reviews the evidence regarding its impact. Water privatisation has been carried out to some degree in at least fourteen countries in the region, and many other governments are at various stages in the privatisation process. However, in some cases privatisation has been difficult to achieve, and a few countries have successfully provided water under public ownership. Evidence on the impact of privatisation indicates that the performance of privatised utilities has not changed dramatically, but that enterprises have continued to perform well, or not so well, depending both on their state when they were privatised and on the wider economic context. The evidence points to internal improvements in terms of financial management. However, governments face considerable difficulties in attracting investors and regulating private utilities. Furthermore, privatisation fails to address some of the fundamental constraints affecting water utilities in SSA, such as finance, the politicised nature of service delivery, and lack of access for the poor. A preoccupation with ownership may obscure the wider goals of reform.

Described here is a new data set including all successful coups d'état (80), failed coup attempts (108) and reported coup plots (139) for all 48 independent sub-Saharan African (SSA) states for the 46-year period from January 1956 until December 2001. Elite political instability (PI) in this form remains widespread in SSA, in contrast to other regions of the global South. Military-led PI has been shown to adversely affect economic growth and human development in SSA, and is a major cause of the current African ‘crisis’. The frequency of these instability events is given for each state for all 46 years and for the two periods 1956–79 and 1980–2001. A Total Military Intervention Score (TMIS) for each state is calculated and examined over time to explore trends in coup behaviour. The distribution of these events among major African regions is presented. Appendix A lists all coups and failed coups by state and date. Major findings are that military interventions have continued to be pervasive in Africa, despite democratisation trends since 1990; that coups, failed coups and coup plots form a syndrome of military-led PI; that colonial heritage is unrelated to coup activity; that the chance of success when launching a coup attempt has averaged more than 40% since 1958; that once a successful coup has occurred, military factionalism often leads to more coup behaviour; that except for a declining rate of success once a coup is undertaken, there is no major difference between 1956–79 and 1980–2001; that no trends of increasing or decreasing coup behaviour are evident, except that up to around 1975 as decolonisation progressed, TMIS also increased; and that West Africa is the predominant centre of coup activity in SSA, although all African regions have experienced coups. States that have been free of significant PI since 1990 are examined and those with institutionalised democratic traditions appear less prone to coups.

This paper examines the land occupations and fast-track resettlement process in Chiredzi district in Zimbabwe's southeast lowveld, and argues that their broad-brush representation as chaotic, violent and unplanned is misleading. In Zimbabwe the instruments and mechanisms of order assert themselves even in the midst of violent disorder. The on-going deployment of the formal and technical tools and discourses of land-use planning have been instrumental in securing the visibility and legitimacy of Zimbabwe's new settlers. The speed and short cuts of the fast-track land reform process and vagueness of policies to date have in the short term opened up a certain amount of space for negotiation and a degree of leeway and flexibility in land-use planning and allocation. But the danger for the settlers is that, by deploying a discourse rooted in long-held and institutionally embedded Rhodesian traditions of planning and control, they have played into a process that – as so often in Zimbabwe's history – will re-impose coercive land-use regulations that are at odds with their livelihood strategies and seek to vet settlers and so undermine populist claims of redressing inequalities and providing land to the landless and poor.

Like its counterparts elsewhere, the small business sector of the Nigerian economy is extremely volatile. A corollary of this volatility is the dearth of long-established firms. One issue that can help to account for the scarcity of long-established firms and also contribute to our understanding of the sector's volatility is succession, the ease with which ownership changes from one hand to another. This paper explores the issue of succession in privately incorporated small firms in south-eastern Nigeria. The finding that nearly half of the closures are attributable to the succession problem has implications for research on the small business sector, and on the development expectations of the sector.

The landslide victory by the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in the 2002 elections was due not to any ideological or policy differences with opposition parties, but to the perception among a plurality of voters that the party delivered on its promise to end the war and therefore deserved re-election. The elections were in effect a referendum on the incumbent president and his ruling SLPP, with voters overwhelmingly concluding that Ahmad Tejan Kabba, the SLPP leader, was preferable to the legion of certified scoundrels seeking to replace him. Signs of the All Peoples Congress (APC), the party that was in power from 1968–92, making a political comeback galvanised otherwise unenthusiastic voters into supporting Kabba and the SLPP. In contrast to the APC, against whom the rebel war was launched, or the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), which initiated and prosecuted the insurgency, or the People's Liberation Party (PLP), whose earlier incarnation prolonged the war by colluding with rebels, Kabba and the SLPP claimed to have ended a war that was caused, launched and sustained by assorted elements of the political opposition. The SLPP, however, can ill-afford to bask in electoral triumph or ignore the festering problems of rampant official corruption and mass poverty that led to armed conflict in the 1990s. Tackling the problem of corruption and mass deprivation may hold the key to democratic consolidation, but it is doubtful whether the SLPP, as presently constituted, is capable of leading the fight against these scourges. The SLPP may be reaching out to become a national party but it still remains an unreconstructed patronage outfit that is unresponsive to popular currents and mass aspirations.

Nigeria's police and judiciary have failed to protect its citizens and have therefore lost all credibility. European principles of justice have likewise become discredited. Militias like the Bakassi Boys offer a popular alternative, which includes public executions and the use of the occult in fighting evil. But the growing fear of crime is only one reason why ‘jungle justice’ may spread. Governors and influential politicians help finance armed vigilante groups, and may make use of young men with machetes and pump-action shotguns to intimidate political opponents. As an ethnic militia that is ready to defend the interests of the ‘Igbo nation’, the Bakassi Boys have also been used to kill members of other ethnic groups. In many parts of Nigeria, ethnic and religious communities are preparing for ‘self-defence’, because they have no trust in the ability of democratic institutions to settle their conflicts.

The strange collusion between occult belief systems and different trans-national social networks, embedded in specific transformations of local and global modes of production, results in unique but reinforcing modifications of witchcraft belief, its underlying structures and its impact on the process of democratisation. The amazing range of possible results has been indicated by the analysis of two outstanding examples of witchcraft violence in South Africa in times of transition: in the former homelands of Venda and Lebowa, seemingly ‘traditional’ elements of witchcraft accusations, mediated by a misguided struggle for liberation, stimulated the sympathetic attention of stakeholders beyond the local setting. On the other hand, the occult base of violence in the Transkei became so blurred by involvement of ‘modern’ elements of globalised markets of violence that it was hardly visible any more, although under cover its repressive effects were still very much alive. These different roots of witchcraft violence had serious repercussions on conflict resolution and genuine reconciliation, the base for any sustainable democratisation and development.

The African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa extended the struggle against apartheid into the international arena when it was banned in 1960. This aspect of its policy became crucial and remained paramount until South Africa's first democratic elections were held in 1994. This paper focuses on the ANC's attempts to secure the support of the community of African states, and singles out three themes that were dominant in the period under review, namely acceptance by the African states; the modus operandi of their assistance; and their role in the negotiation process. The findings are based partly on new archival documentation, drawing two main conclusions. First, the ANC only won exclusive backing from African states after a lengthy struggle. Second, their diplomatic support proved to be a pivotal factor during the negotiations in South Africa after 1990, significantly contributing to the ANC's eventual victory in 1994.

The parliamentary elections of May 2002 in Burkina Faso saw the ruling party loose its exclusionary grip on power. For the first time since the restoration of democracy in 1991, the parliamentary opposition now represents a sizeable group. While it retains the majority, the ruling party has to share legislative power with the opposition. These elections marginally alter the structure of power in a deeply presidential system of government. Several institutional and electoral reforms have played a critical role in strengthening the mechanisms of ‘vertical accountability’ and representative democracy. By assessing recent electoral reforms in Burkina Faso, the article underlines the importance of the electoral system in multiparty elections and thus contributes to our understanding of the effects of changes in electoral rules on the distribution of political outcomes. In particular, it underscores the contribution that institutional engineering and electoral reform can make to further democratisation in a semi-authoritarian context. While many challenges to democratic governance and the rule of law remain, the new political landscape holds the promise of changes in the style of government and the emergence of more consensual modes of governance.

The article addresses possibilities and barriers to economic activity and development in the Oshana region of Northern Namibia. The focus is on the role of local embeddedness of economic activities in attaining economic development. A network perspective, based on theories of value chains that are embedded both in social relations and spatially, is selected as the analytical framework. The value chains of local black entrepreneurs in the study area are short. Moreover, the analysis reveals that social obligations may impede economic development, but that such practices are diminishing. The economic dominance and competition from South Africa is the main impediment to economic development in Northern Namibia. Local political embeddedness is shallow and political measures have not significantly reduced the implications of this dominance.

While African civil society seemed a beacon of hope for democracy in the early 1990s, by the end of the decade many scholars had come to view it as extremely weak, lacking a domestic constituency and therefore any significant political or civic impact. Critics have been particularly concerned about urban-based ‘democracy and governance’ NGOs' limited influence on and connection with the rural majority of the citizenry. This article examines this question in Kenya, looking at four NGOs that have used civic education and paralegal programmes to establish a rural presence. Based on a survey of participants, it concludes that although the programmes are relatively new, they have begun to have a measurable impact on citizen understanding of politics, and have given the NGOs a noticeable rural presence. They have done so, however, by relying on ethnic, clan, partisan and other ‘non-civil’ networks to build supporters.

This paper examines the impressive victory by President Paul Biya and his ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) in the 2002 Cameroon legislative election, especially in the light of the near collapse of the regime and the party in 1992, when it almost lost its parliamentary majority. It argues that several factors contributed to this turn of events including the president's skilful use of his power of incumbency to forestall the democratic process, the ineffectiveness of the opposition parties, and the lack of sustained support for genuine democratic change in Cameroon by France and other Western industrialised nations.

In Zimbabwe today, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF colleagues are busy expropriating white-owned farms, and claiming the moral high ground while they do so. Indeed, many observers, inside Zimbabwe and elsewhere, take it for granted that, whatever Mugabe's excesses, there is justice in his cause. But is there? This paper examines three moral arguments that Mugabe and his supporters advance to justify their land policies: that the peasants need the land, that the war of liberation was fought for the land, and that Zimbabweans are only taking back land that was originally stolen from them. The last of these arguments, which rests on an implicit entitlement theory of justice, is the strongest, and this essay therefore scrutinises it closely. It argues, however, that despite their emotive appeal, all three arguments are flawed beyond repair. Debunking them should help pave the way for a more sensible and more viable approach to the land question in Zimbabwe.

This article analyses a longstanding ethno-political conflict between Kusasis and Mamprusis in Bawku in north-east Ghana. A double argument is pursued. First, while communal conflict and violence challenge the state and expose its incapacity, the conflicts (played out over chieftaincy, party politics, land, markets, names of places etc.) at the same time invoke a powerful idea of the state as the most significant institution to qualify claims as rights or discard them as illegitimate. Second, the broad variety of social conflicts has effectively been cut to fit an ethnic distinction. Thus, the various conflictual issues have ‘confirmed’ and structured each other. The antagonisms have been crystallised and a pattern entrenching conflict between the two groups has been perpetuated. The article draws historical lines from the 1930s to the present, linking national policy to local politics and political culture with a particular focus on the political manifestations vis-à-vis the state and the use of ‘history’ to justify claims.

The Mbeki government's failure to take action against the blatantly undemocratic behaviour of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, despite its commitment to the peer review mechanism proposed under the New Partnership for African Development, is highlighted by South Africa's armed intervention into Lesotho to quell post-electoral disturbances in 1998. Although initially accompanied by immense controversy, the South African military and diplomatic involvement was to prove crucial to a restructuring of Lesotho's previously recalcitrant Defence Force, and to the promotion of inter-party negotiations that led to the adoption of a new and more appropriate electoral system. Alongside other international pressures, these initiatives led to a further election in 2002, whose undoubtedly legitimate outcome appears to have laid firm foundations for democratic consolidation and stability. Despite this ‘unlikely success’, and despite its formal commitment to an idealist foreign policy, the South African government has consciously downplayed its role in promoting democracy in Lesotho. The article argues that this is because of the exceptionality of that country, and South Africa's reluctance to have the use of force used as a precedent by its critics for cajoling it into adopting a more activist stance for dealing with the more complex situation in Zimbabwe.

This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the situation of the pastoral Fulbe in the two neighbouring West African countries of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. The migration of the Fulbe into the northern parts of both countries is quite a recent phenomenon. In spite of the similar social, economic and environmental conditions in both countries, the two governments responded differently to Fulbe migrations. Generally, the Ivorian government was more receptive of the Fulbe while the Ghanaian authorities have been hostile to them. The paper also discusses interethnic relations between the Fulbe and the indigenous farming groups. Finally, responses of both governments to farmer–herder conflicts are examined and some general reflections on how West African states are dealing with the issue of pastoral migration are provided.

The second Kenya debate has prompted a close examination of the role of an ethnic business community – Indians/Asians – in the country's industrial development. While this community does own up to three-quarters of the country's medium and large-scale manufacturing firms, a narrow focus on manufacturing understates the contribution which Africans have made to the economy. A progressive rural business class is more likely to re-invest in profitable farming activities and to branch out into agro-processing, transport and trading than to undertake risky investments in urban manufacturing. As a result, historical ethnic-sectoral cleavages will tend to be reinforced. The article provides new calculations on the extent of African involvement in manufacturing, and reviews an ancillary literature which uses institutional and socio-economic analysis to understand differences in Kenya's business communities.

There is much disagreement about the effect that income distribution has on economic growth. This study uses high-quality household-expenditure-based data to estimate this effect for a sample of sub-Saharan African states. It uses an ordinary least squares (OLS) technique to estimate the effects of income inequality in a standard reduced-form growth regression for a set of cross-section data for the period 1986–97. It finds that higher levels of inequality seem to impinge negatively on growth prospects over the medium term, but that this effect is weak and that the finding of a negative relationship is not robust. It then tests whether this negative consequence of inequality for growth is attributable to inequality's effect on political instability, as the literature suggests. The evidence indicates that high levels of inequality do not affect political instability in any statistically significant manner for the countries in the sample, but that they do negatively affect the risk perceptions of potential investors, and so may contribute to lower growth prospects.