The state system during the so-called ‘cold war’ rested on a paradox. Peace and stability in the developed countries was accompanied by scores of ‘hot’ wars in the Third World, fuelled and at times created by the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies. Each superpower had a high incentive to arm client states and rebel armies, in return for political loyalty and access to primary products. Nowhere did the logic of this system have such negative effects as in Africa. There, the result was the militarisation of states, the escalation of wars, and the strengthening of authoritarian forms of rule.

South Africa's security establishment, specifically the South African Defence Force (S.A.D.F.), illustrates important linkages between national security and political reform. The military and police influence reconciliation, for better or for worse, in all post-conflict states, especially those experiencing an interregnum between authoritarianism and hoped-for democracy, and in which no undisputed ‘winner’ has yet emerged. Alexis de Tocqueville noted long ago that ‘the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways’, Reform and political change, as Samuel Huntington observes, ‘may contribute not to political stability but to greater instability …[and] encourages demands for still more changes which can easily snowball’. Both suddenly unrestrained popular demands and forces loyal to the ancien régime (including the military) may threaten the process and outcome of reform.

Eight years of reconciliation, policy reform, and economic recovery have now followed 20 years of dictatorship, corruption, civil war, and economic decline in Uganda. This stems from the interaction between a government which has created a benign environment for development, and donors who have provided generous support conditional on compliance with a standard package of structural adjustment policies involving changes in macro-economic management. These include the removal of price distortions on foreign exchange, capital, and essential commodities, improved fiscal and financial discipline, the reduction of marketing monopolies and state controls, and civil service reform. Government has set up participatory political structures at national and local levels, restored law and order, and taken many of the unpopular decisions required to enforce the changes demanded by adjustment policy.

The rôle of foreign assistance in the development process is not only complex, because exogenous donors infuse ideas and capital into diverse and dynamic socio-economic settings, but also contentious, because the impact can alter the development prospects of recipient states and communities. Different perceptions and ideological underpinnings shape the parameters in which programmes are finally implemented, and the views of those most directly concerned affect the outcome of the intervention, often in ways unforeseen by the donor or state. The process of accumulation can be altered, whilst some classes and institutions may be strengthened over others.

Are there lessons Africa can learn from Taiwan and the other East Asian newly industrialising countries (NICs)? Evaluating the relevance of their experience is fraught with difficulties inherent in making comparisons across regions, during different periods of time, with different preconditions. Clearly, developments in Africa have to be based on local institutions, values, and resources. Yet Taiwan's successful combination of industrialisation and growth with equity reflects goals that are important for African policy-makes. The country's G.N.P. per capita increased from $143 in 1953 to $7,284 in 1990. Even during the 1980s, its economy grew at an average annual rate of 8·2 per cent as against only 0·5 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1980–7. Taiwan's sustained growth has been widely shared by all income groups, with the top fifth of households only receiving 4·5 times as much as the bottom fifth. By way of contrast, in Côte d'Ivoire (1986–7) and in Botswana (1985–6), the share of the top 20 per cent was respectively almost ii and 24 times that of the bottom 20 per cent.

During the era of the All People's Congress (A.P.C.), 1968–92, the state machinery and resources of Sierra Leone were used to promote the interests of a relatively small number of persons rather than those of the general public. A system of patronage thrived under this ruling party primarily because membership of particular groupings was a more acceptable qualification for position than an individual's actual capabilities. The ensuing intrigues deterred development in the country because members of cliques were only accountable to their leader and his top officials.