Civil society has been a central force in political and economic reforms. The activities and even proliferation of civil groups have been seen by several authors as vital to the democratisation project and its sustenance. Only a few scholars have pointed to the roles that civil groups may play in undermining democracy and national stability. In Nigeria, civil society was in the vanguard of the democratic struggle, but recent events are pointing to the negative roles played by some civil groups in the construction of platforms for ethnic militancy and violent confrontation with other groups and the state. Based on evidence from three cases of civil groups, the paper identifies goals, methods, strategies and tendencies that indicate intense primordialism, militancy and violence. The study finds that in plural societies, civil society may become so parochial, divisive, divergent and disarticulative that it actually undermines democracy.

This article considers the diplomatic strategies of African states within an evolving United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It proposes that the prominence of certain ideas about economic development rises and falls not so much as a result of the nature of the ideas themselves, but as a result of opportunities made and unmade by the world economy. The world economy in turn changes the work mandates of international economic organisations like UNCTAD. The trajectory of African diplomatic strategies is important because it calls into question recent literature in international relations theory focusing almost exclusively on the experiences of industrialised states. In the case of African ideas in UNCTAD, underlying variables associated with the world economy destroyed the remnants of the Group of 77 coalition which had served as an agent for African representatives in UNCTAD. African diplomats have tried to realise whatever objectives they can in the changed circumstances without necessarily changing their ideas about development.

Like many other Sub-Saharan African countries, Ghana implemented an orthodox Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), to resuscitate its ailing economy, in the early 1980s. Subsequently, there has been a dramatic expansion in the production and export of processed wood. Based on an empirical study of Ghana's formal wood processing industry, this paper discusses the various determinants that have combined to boost the export-oriented output in the industry, particularly in the first decade of the programme, and assesses the extent to which the SAP-based policy actions account for the change. The study concludes that adjustment played a major role in the change, and suggests that even though SAP supporters and critics disagree on the nature, dynamics and effects of the programme, government measures under the programme are an indicator of what real commitment on the part of African governments can do to engender production expansion in comparable African manufacturing industries.

Analysing the dynamics of agrarian change and economic diversification is central for understanding the current transformation of African countries under market reforms. This article examines the complex changes taking place in the densely populated Uluguru Mountains of Tanzania, and places the Uluguru case in the context of wider debates dealing with market liberalisation, economic diversification, poverty, and inequality. It argues that rural households are not ‘trapped in decline’ on the Uluguru Mountains, as depicted in previous literature. Under the harsh realities of farming in this area, households can improve their livelihoods in three ways – short of migrating and in addition to relying on remittances. These are to expand land cultivated in the surrounding plains, to experiment with alternative farming systems, and to increase non-farm income. Uluguru households are doing all of the above, with a certain degree of success. Economic diversification can thus play an important role in improving rural livelihoods in Tanzania and beyond, but this process is more likely to take place in locations with well-established economic ties and relatively good access to major markets.

State responsiveness to pressures from women's movements in Africa has been limited. However, where inroads have been made, associational autonomy from the state and dominant party has proved critical. The women's movement is one of the most coordinated and active social movements in Uganda, and one of the most effective women's movements in Africa more generally. An important part of its success comes from the fact that it is relatively autonomous, unlike women's movements in earlier periods of Uganda's post-independence history. The women's movement, in spite of enormous pressures for cooptation, has taken advantage of the political space afforded by the semi-authoritarian Museveni government, which has promoted women's leadership to serve its own ends. Leaders and organisations reflect varying degrees of autonomy and cooptation. Nevertheless the women's movement has had a visible impact on policy as a result of its capacity to set its own far-reaching agenda and freely select its own leaders.

What lessons on the broad issue of successful democratic transitions and consolidation can be drawn from the Senegalese experience? The most import ant inference from this case is that transition is a function not of one factor alone, or even one dominant factor, but a combination of dynamic changes including institutional design and modification, and the attitudes, values and beliefs of the population. In Senegal, modernisation and political culture change activated a movement towards the transition that only became possible as a result of institutional modifications. Institutional reform creates opportunities but does not ensure a successful transition. The issues of social capital, materialism/post-materialism, education, economic security, regime performance, value change, and confidence in institutions in general all come into play to varying degrees. The gradual creation of democratic institutions precedes and contributes to political culture change, independent of economic development. The article draws on survey data, a replication of the world values survey conducted in Senegal, and an analysis of institutional (electoral system) reforms over the last twenty-five years, with comparative data from other African countries.