Ever since the signing of the Camp David accords and the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of March 1979, rumours and predictions have abounded of a diplomatic rapprochement between Israel and Black Africa. Israel's unique relationship with those states, which commenced immediately following their independence and ended with a dramatic rupture during the last months of 1973, has continued on a discreet and unofficial basis since then. This article seeks to provide a greater understanding of the present relationships between Israel and Black Africa, and its future possibilities, through an examination of the forces and trends which have determined its course during the past two decades.

Virtually all analyses of Lesotho's political framework have agreed that strong elements of national identity have neither forestalled domestic conflict nor served to promote a unified assault on awesome economic problems. Hence many writers imply that a major asset, rarely found in independent Africa, has been wasted.1 Roger Leys has perceptively applied dependency theories of a ‘labour reserve’ economy to Lesotho,2 and spends considerable effort on historical analysis aimed at demonstrating the duration and pervasiveness of this process of systematic underdevelopment. In his conclusion he suggests that ‘the long and courageous battle of the Basotho to assert their dignity and worth is in fact a resource and political weapon of incomparable significance in the long-term battle for the liberation of southern Africa.’ Leys infers that national and class identities are interrelated, and possibly reinforcing, when he says that ‘the history of the struggle of the Basotho people and the very degree of their integration into the black working class of South Africa is a formidable weapon.’3

Changes in the nature of federal financial relations were among the most striking features of the nearly 14 years of military rule in Nigeria. At the time of the January 1966 coup there was a great imbalance in the size of the four Regions, with a consequential built-in tendency for political instability. At the resumption of civilian rule in October there were 19 States of relatively balanced size, with an important rôle for the Federal Government as a mediator between them as well as an initiator of change.

A striking commentary on Tanzania: two respected scholars, having studied the same country, having relied largely on the same data, reach opposing conclusions. There is not only disagreement here, but confusion on the nature of change in Tanzania. There is also misunderstanding of the processes of change in the Third World more generally. The first task in the analysis of the recent Tanzanian experience, therefore, is to free ourselves of encumbrances. To make sense of what has happened we must first sort through some of the major confusions and distractions that unfortunately permeate the literature.

Ethiopia has long been regarded as the only African state, along with Liberia, to have escaped the ravages of European colonialism, the epitome of African independence and self-determination.1 It was also considered a stable, relatively integrated, and viable political community amidst a continent of new states characterised by chronic instability.2 But by 1974, most if not all of these myths were in the process of being broken, as Ethiopia struggled for its very existence against pressures from within and without that threatened to dismember the Empire.