The South African commitment to racial separation is well-known. The deep historic roots of apartheid, the religious fervour with which it is justified by its proponents, and the rapidly growing weight of criticism by which it is condemned throughout the world have served to make it a familiar ideology and policy. Less well-known is the extent to which separation in a relatively superficial, transient context – in stores, theatres, parks, some hotels and restaurants – has been eroded in recent years. Least familiar, despite the substantial propaganda of apologists for the system, is the transmutation of the negative commitment to apartheid into an affirmative effort to foster and guide what the Government labels ‘separate development’. One of the most significant achievements thus far of this policy was the birth on 26 October 1976 of Transkei, presented to a doubting world by its South African parent as a sovereign, independent nation in which its African citizens could work out their destiny, just as the dominant white population of the Republic of South Africa assert an entitlement to realise their own.

There is a well-known story that is regularly acted out in many countries of the world. An individual suddenly wins a large fortune – from a lottery or horse race – and is catapulted from rags to riches. After a few years of dissipation, the money has been squandered, the physical and mental health of the nouveau riche broken, and the glorious future of unlimited possibilities constricted into a bleak vista of regret and recrimination. At the moment of exhilaration, what the person concerned – understandably enough – failed to recognise was that the danger such sudden wealth represented was no less great than the dazzling promise.

National governments, politicians, policy-makers, and planners have become increasingly concerned with the manner in which human populations have been distributed among the component parts of many nations in the Third World, and especially with the three key processes of mobility, fertility, and mortality. As alterations in birth and death rates tend to have far stronger national than regional components, and as such changes can only affect relative population distribution over a very long period of time – in the absence of catastrophic wars and famines – the regulation or influencing of migration is the most effective way of changing the distribution of people between regions or between rural and urban sectors. Such alterations may be seen as desirable for a variety of reasons, including the need to overcome present (or future) imbalances between the distribution of population and resources, and to assist in the implementation of certain national socio-economic goals.1

For better or worse, Africa is coming of age. The golden epoch of high hopes for pan-African co-operation and unity has passed. In its place is coming a new era of confrontation, ideological conflict and even ‘African imperialism’ that threatens everything pan-Africanists believed in and were crusading for… at the dawn of [the] continent's independence from colonial rule. The change in the nature of pan-African politics from lofty idealism to hard-nosed realpolitik is nowhere more evident than in the present paralysis of the Organisation of African Unity. The Angolan crisis and now the Spanish Sahara dispute have laid bare the new realities of the African continent in a revealing and even devastating manner. – The Montreal Star, 16 March 1976.

The exchange rates of several African countries have historically been specified as units of certain ‘master currencies’ of former imperial powers, notably the pound sterling and the French and Belgian francs. The fact that these countries might notionally be said to have belonged to ‘common currency areas’, the Sterling Area and the French and Belgian franc zones, has variously been commended and criticised. To some observers, the break-up of such monetary groupings, following the establishment of national currencies by some African governments shortly after independence, was a retrograde step. This process had offered no alternative basis for rationalising regional monetary and economic co-operation. Others have emphasised the limitations under such arrangements as regards national freedom of initiative in managing exchange rates – even though they would accept that some restrictions may not be inconsistent with the logic of common currency arrangements.

The theme of this article is the decline of customary law in Upper Volta where, like most countries in Africa, customary courts operate side by side with the modern, ex-colonial legal system.1 My study of Le Tribunal de Premier Instance in Bobodioulasso suggests that customary courts may not in fact apply customary law. An examination of the criteria and the process by which decisions are reached here may help us to gain an insight into the function the Court serves for the community.

For two hectic months in 1972 an I.L.O./U.N.D.P. mission gathered in Nairobi to deliberate on the employment problems facing Kenya. The report which was published before the end of the year received a good deal of publicity,1 much of it complimentary, and served as a blue print for subsequent I.L.O. employment missions to other developing countries.2 Six years later it seems opportune to review briefly those of its recommendations which were specifically aimed at the agricultural sector, and to assess the extent to which they have influenced the policies of the Government.

Company dividend policy involves the periodic determination of the proportion and stability of a firm's distributable earnings payable to its equity shareholders. The variables which influence the decision, especially in developed economies, have been highlighted by the pioneering work of J. Lintner,2 and by the research findings of other scholars.3

Rumour and gossip have been noted in a wide range of sociological studies as performing significant functions: for the informant and the recipient, and for the relationship between them, as well as for the society in which they live.1 Although many items often appear to be insignificant, they may be part of a complex web of information and speculation which is a vital element in a particular community. Social scientists might be described as ‘scandal mongers’ par excellence since they live professionally off the minutiae of gossip which they manage to gather: they read political memoirs or listen to uninformed discussion and random recollection, because this material may contain important information about social behaviour.