^{page 241 note 1} There can be other reasons, of course, such as the attainment of politically defined goals and the manipulation of power.

^{page 242 note 1} Knight, J. B., ‘Rural–Urban Income Comparisons and Migration in Ghana’, in Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics (Oxford), 05 1972, pp. 199–229.Google Scholar

^{page 242 note 2} Gutkind, Peter C. W., ‘Tradition, Migration, Urbanization, Modernity and Unemployment in Africa: the roots of instability’, in Canadian Journal of African Studies (Montreal), 3, 1969, pp. 343–65.Google Scholar

^{page 242 note 3} Lerner, D., ‘Comparative Analysis of Processes of Modernization’, in Miner, H. (ed.), The City in Modern Africa (London, 1967), p. 24.Google Scholar

^{page 243 note 1} For example, in 1965 the average income per capita of Africans in Abidjan was almost twice the rest of southern Ivory Coast, almost three times the central, and almost 13 times the north. Joshi, H., Lubell, H., and Mouly, J., ‘Urban Development and Employment in Abidjan’, in International Labour Review (Geneva), 111, 1975, pp. 289–306.Google Scholar It should be noted that these figures exaggerate the differential somewhat as agricultural wages can be and are supplemented by subsistence activities.

^{page 243 note 2} Gutkind, Peter C. W., ‘The View from Below: political consciousness of the urban poor in Ibadan’, in Cahiers d'études africaines (Paris), 15, 1975, pp. 5–35.Google Scholar

^{page 243 note 3} The migration experience and transition to urban life can be successful in both the social and economic senses. However, for the majority such a movement is an invidious last resort; many have chosen not to participate, or have and then rejected it. There is also evidence that given viable economic alternatives at home, there is a strong tendency for migration not to occur.

^{page 244 note 1} The analogy of a lottery was first employed by Gugler, Joseph, ‘The Impact of Labour Migration on Society and Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa: empirical findings and theoretical considerations’, in African Social Research (Manchester), VI, 1968, pp. 463–86.Google Scholar

^{page 244 note 2} To cite figures on the rural–urban differential in but one West African country: in Nigeria, the Adebo Commission on Prices, Wages, and Costs in 1969 indicated that the minimum pay for urban workers was from 1·5 to 2·5 times the average income of farmers.

^{page 245 note 1} Todaro, M. P., ‘The Urban Employment Problem in Less Developed Countries: an analysis of demand and supply’, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, 1968.Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 1} Todaro, M. P., ‘Income Expectations, Rural–Urban Migration and Employment in Africa’, in International Labour Review, 104, 1971, pp. 398–400.Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 2} This Operesheni Rewgasura has recently been abandoned because of both its failure to remedy the situation and the criticisms it caused. See ‘Back to Back: a survey of Kenya and Tanzania’, in The Economist (London), 11 March 1978.

^{page 248 note 1} Klaassen, L. H. and Drewe, P., Migration Policy in Europe (Westmead, 1973);Google Scholar and Sundquist, J. L., Dispersing Population: what America can learn from Europe (Washington, 1975).Google Scholar

^{page 247 note 2} Bairoch, Paul, The Economic Development of the Third World Since 1900 (London, 1975).Google Scholar

^{page 252 note 1} For example, in Nigeria alone, half a million potential workers are being added to the labour force each year.

^{page 256 note 1} Riddell, J. B. and Harvey, M. E., ‘The Urban System in the Migration Process’, in Economic Geography (Worcester, Mass.), 48, 1972, pp. 270–83.Google Scholar

^{page 257 note 1} Leys, Colin, ‘The “Overdeveloped” Post Colonial State: a re-evaluation’, in Review of African Political Economy (London), v, 1976, p. 39.Google Scholar

^{page 257 note 2} Lipton, Michael, Why Poor People Stay Poor: a study of urban bias in world development (London, 1976), p. 13.Google Scholar

^{page 257 note 3} Produce tax has recently been abolished in Nigeria due to the large capital inflow from oil production.

^{page 257 note 4} There is a further dimension of the government's rôle in urban–rural disparities: consider, for example, Nigeria's Second National Plan, 1970–74, where only 10·5 per cent of the total development investment went into agriculture, with a further 2·3 per cent for livestock, forestry, and fishing.

^{page 258 note 1} As an example, the rôle of the Liberian Produce Marketing Company may be cited. According to New African Development (London), 11, November 1977, p. 811, the L.P.M.C. buys 100 lbs. of paddy rice at a controlled price of $12.00, and sells it at $22.00. In other words, Liberian farmers receive only 54·5 per cent of the selling price – small wonder that this staple foodstuff has to be imported and that production does not meet demand!

^{page 259 note 1} Leys, Colin, Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism, 1964–1971 (London, 1975), p. 262.Google Scholar

^{page 260 note 1} Ibid. p. 265.

^{page 260 note 2} Weeks, John, ‘Imbalance Between the Centre and Periphery and the “Employment” Crisis in Kenya’, in Oxaal, Ivar, Barnett, Tony, and Booth, David (eds.), Beyond the Sociology of Development: economy and society in Latin America and Africa (London and Boston, 1975), p. 98.Google Scholar

^{page 260 note 3} Goulet, Denis, ‘Political Will: the key to Guinea-Bissau's “Alternative Development Strategy”’, in International Development Review (Washington), 19, 4, 1977, pp. 2–8.Google Scholar