The purpose of this article is largely methodological, in that it aims to sketch an analytical approach to the question of differentiation rather than to provide an empirical analysis. There are clear reasons for approaching the issue in this way. We need to know what the term ‘working class’ means, whether there are divisions within it which significantly influence the behaviour of those affected by them, and the forms which these divisions take. In other words we want to know whether it is stratified. To assume that it is so is to take as given the answers to questions which should be asked. We need to know whether social relationships in any situation are arranged into strata and, if they are, whether they have consistent relationships and are ranked in terms of superiority according to some pre-selected criterion. It is because these questions are not usually asked that studies of social stratification largely consist of fitting empirical data into a predetermined mould. To start by questioning the existence of differentiation is a very modest, cautious approach.

Certain problems and prospects of economic development are common to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. Any discussion of the Maghreb must consider the restrictive influence of the limited size of the national markets. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in Libya with its population of only about 1, 800,000. Naturally, it is the spending or consuming capacity of that population rather than its actual size which is the limiting factor. Studies by Chenery, amongst others, suggested a national product of $30,000 million as the minimum optimal market size for an economy, with a $300 income per capita.1 Furthermore, the lower the average income per person, the higher the total national product needed to support efficient manufacturing plants and, particularly, an industry producing capital goods. By the mid- 1960s the independent countries of Africa together had a ‘continental product’ of about $40,000 million, and a population of about 300 million, often with extremely low income per capita. In short, the entire independent continent provides market conditions of just about the minimum optimal size for rapid development; the market of any subcontinental group, and obviously of any individual economy, is less than a quarter of the optimum size. When one considers countries like Chad, Malawi, and Togo, it is a case of national market sizes smaller than those of medium-sized European cities.

Within five years, some of the cadets to whom these remarks were addressed helped overthrow Kwame Nkrumah. Despite the warning, ‘Politics are not for soldiers’, the armed forces in Ghana – as in 14 other African states – assumed full political control. The military thus changed in Africa from relatively insignificant relics of colonial administration into prime arbiters of political disputes – settling arguments, in many instances, by the direct seizure of power. Praetorianism had reached south of the Sahara.

Few events alter the socio-economic structure of a country as radically as the convulsions and displacements concomitant with war and political upheaval. In Nigeria the two coups d'état of 1966 and the civil war of 1967–1970 have had a profound effect on economic activity, and in turn have been affected by economic variables. In this study the political variable will generally be treated as independent and the economic variable as dependent, despite the fact that in the period after independence in 1960, tendencies towards political and economic disintegration reinforced each other.1

In March 1970 Mr Justice P. D. Anin was named by the Ghanaian Presidential Commission, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, to head a five-man Commission of Enquiry into Bribery and Corruption. Not only was it authorised ‘to study the area, prevalence, and methods of bribery and corruption in Ghanaian society’, but also to determine whether there were factors in the society which contributed to this. ’As a people, do we frown upon and resist bribery and corruption or do we tend to regard them as natural and inevitable?’, asked Anin at the first meeting of the Commission of Enquiry on 29 June 1970, adding: ‘Do we draw a line between the ‘customary drink’ under our traditional practices, and bribery and corruption of public officers and others holding positions of trust?“ The answers to these questions, it was hoped, would lead to recommendations for the eradication of these ‘social evils’.

In the early 1960s pan-Africanism was thought by many scholars and leaders of government to be the force which would bring political harmony coupled with rapid economic development. During the last decade a number of regional and sub-regional organisations were developed as first steps towards greater African unity. In English- speaking Africa the East African Community formed by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda exemplified, with all its frustrations and aspirations, this type of grouping. In French-speaking Africa the limited success of the Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique central, its successor the Union des états d'Afrique centrale, and the Union douanière de l'Afrique occidentale has raised serious questions of whether these organisations, at this point in history, can attain their goals of regional economic integration and development.

The Generalized System of Preference is composed of various schemes under which donor countries, or regions, offer non-reciprocal and general tariff reductions on the imports of semi-manufactured and manufactured goods from developing countries. The G.S.P. differs from preferences previously granted to African countries by European nations in two ways: first, the preferences granted relate to a broad range of articles rather than relating to specific primary commodities; and secondly, they are non-reciprocal and do not bind developing countries to grant trade preferences on selected imported goods in order to receive them on some of the commodities and food-stuffs that they export.

Controversy continues as to the effectiveness of foreign aid and hence whether it is a suitable activity for public financing. Frequently the discussion is in general terms, and country studies are uncommon. Thus, Dr Ozay Mehmet's appraisal of the ‘Effectiveness of Foreign Aid- the case of Somalia’, in this Journal, IX, I, May 1975, pp. 35–47, is Very welcome, particularly since lessons from Somalia's experience are probably applicable elsewhere in Africa. Nevertheless, some of his conclusions mislead on important and au courant issues. Hopefully this commentary will help set the record straight.

Most of the co-operative societies registered up to s 964, the year of Zambia's constitutional independence, were producer marketing organisations. By that date, 220 societies of all types were on the official register, claiming a total of 43,697 members and a paid-up share capital of K1.7 million.1

After independence the ruling United National Independence Party made it clear that the majority of Zambians should be involved more fully in economic and social development than they had been hitherto. Co-operative organisation was seen as a strategic way of bringing more Africans into industry, commerce, and non-subsistence farming; ten or more people could apply for registration as a society, and thus qualify for financial assistance from the Government. President Kaunda launched this ‘revitalised’ postindependence co-operative movement personally in January 1965, and called on the unemployed to put their various skills to work on planned agricultural and construction projects: ‘The money is there and the know-how…You an form these co-operative societies anywhere in Zambia and we shall assist you in getting on’.2 He specifically encouraged the formation of vegetable, egg, beef, milk, and road-making co-operatives.

Opening the working conference entitled ‘Towards Comprehesive Development in Zululand’, which was held in Durban, from 9–11 February 1972, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority, told the 100 delegates that the subject of their discussions was more correctly called KwaZulu. And the map specially prepared by Alan Best (Boston) reminded them that this comprised at present no fewer than 29 areas scattered through the length and breadth of Natal, see p. 302. ‘These ghetto areas’, said the Chief, ‘are overdue for some attention whether one wants to see them as part of the rest of South Africa or as independent states.’