∗ As to the objection that minds differ so widely, ami that consequently no two minds view the same thing in the same light–if it be true, then there is an end of all science, that of the mind included, and we may at once endorse the lines of our Poet Laureate:— Google Scholar

Much less this dreamer, deaf and blind, Google Scholar

Named man, may hope some truth to find Google Scholar

That bears relation to the mind. Google Scholar

For every worm beneath the moon Google Scholar

Draws different threads, and late and soon Google Scholar

Spins, toiling out his own cocoon. Google Scholar

No one will deny that minds differ widely from each other, but then they resemble each other widely too, and that–whichis the all important point-in the most necessary and fundamental attributes. The more necessary and fundamental an attribute of mind, (Indeed of anything: it is a law of nature) the more extensively it is possessed, and the more permanent it is; but the lesi necessary and fundamental an attribute of mind the more uncertain is its possession, and the more changeable its nature. To contend that because minds differ there can be no mental science is on a par with maintaining that because no two blades of variegated grass can be found to resemble each other perfectly, they have not the least resemblance. This objection then we cannot but deem frivolous and unreasonable. Google Scholar

∗ By external observation we come to know the uniformities of human conduct: by reflection on our own consciousness, and by the study of psychology proper we become able to account for those uniformities, or become possessed of a knowledge of those laws from which we could deduce how men in certain circumstances would be most likely to act, and indeed how men in every circumstance ought to act. External observation can gather from past uniformities only what uniformities are likely to occur in future; but psychology can deduce from the laws of the mind how the coming generation can improve on the observances of the past one–can in short anticipate the approaching destiny of our race. The mere observer is apt to maintain that nothing is, or 4 to come, but that which has been: the psychologist cnnnot avoid inferring hat the past and present experience of mankind, in relation to future experience, s but the boy who is to be the father of the man. Google Scholar

† We here gratefully acknowledge our obligations to the labours of others in the field of psychology, more especially to the writings of the late Sir Wm. Hamilton, and those of Mr. J. S. Mill, writings of a very opposite character it is true, but on that account more edifying; but our deepest obligations are due, we must maintain, to our own consciousness. Google Scholar

∗ Whatever the mind is conscious of. Google Scholar

∗ We are here anticipating a distinction which we shall be compelled to discuss rather fully as we proceed. We assert that sound is not a sensation, but we are well aware how ambiguous and misleading the term sensations is, and that some persone will insight that the reports of the senses are sensations. But they will insist also that pain and pleasure are sensations, that the disgust at tending some tastes and scents, and the pleasure attending others are sensations, so that in fact they make the term sensation perform a variety of offices. Some times it has to stand for perception, sometimes for a phenomenon that has no emotion or feeling in Its nature, sometimes for a phenomenon which is exclusively of that character. The reader will not surprized then if we declare that we have almost as great a horror of the word sensation as Reid had of the word idea. Google Scholar

∗ Thoughts certainly crowd upon the mind at times faster than we can find the power to attend to them. The practiced speaker while his attention is engaged with the thought he is on the point of uttering, has nevertheless before his mind the thoughts which are immediately to follow. Google Scholar

∗ We fail to discover in our own consciousness, that muscular action is made known to us as a sensation or emotion. We are cognizant of it as an unemotional object, sui generis, which cannot be expressed in simpler terms than muscular action or exertion, because not resolvable into anything else. Google Scholar

The fact that bodily exertion is delightful when muscular energy is in a state of high pressure, but painful when the same energy has become very weak, does not constitute it an object of the sensitive kind, more than the zest and eagerness with which the intellectual faculties work when fresh, and the difficulty and reluctance with which they work when jaded, places them in the category of the mental emotions or sentiments. Google Scholar

† Of course the sensationalists will object to this division, and maintain that for us nothing it external, but only appears to be. We shall endeavour to shew by and bye, that what appears to intuitive consciousness to be external, but is pronounced by reason to be internal, must be called quasi-objective; but that what appears to intuitive consciousness to be external, and is pronounced by reason to be in reality what it is apparently, must be called–if we are to distinguish in language what is clearly distinct in fact–objective or external. Google Scholar

‡ Sir W. Hamilton, Edition of Reid's Works, p. 551. Google Scholar

∗ See Lewes' Biographical History, Library Edition, p. 449, and Bain on the Senses and the Intellect. p. 337. Google Scholar

∗ In some internal perception?, we shall have to shew further on, that the object and cognition are confused. Google Scholar

∗ This is the declaration of consciousness. If yon ask whether this deliverance is trustworthy, then you raise the further question is consciousness veracious. Is consciousness veracious, for every argument which we have advanced is worthless, except the integrity of consciousnessis unassailable? We cannot avoid concluding, but this is not the place for stating our reasons, that consciousness must be pronounced thoroughly trustworthy, when the conditions of veracity are strictly fulfilled. But it is only when these are most rigidly complied with, that we can insist upon the thorough integrity of our intellectual nature. The replies which every tyro or loose thinker draws out from his consciousness, cannot, of course, be deemed infallible. Those replies only which are in strict accordance with the laws of consciousness as a truth organ can be pronounced beyond the reach of question. Google Scholar