In the summer of 2011, Dutch teacher Duran Renkema was dismissed from the orthodox Reformed school in Oegstgeest because he had left his wife and family, and decided to openly live together with his boyfriend. In the court case that followed, the judge ruled that the publicly funded denominational school did not have the right to dismiss a teacher who otherwise functioned well, merely because of his sexual identity. In collecting funds so it could take the case to the Equal Treatment Commission, the Dutch gay rights organization Coc emphasized that this was the first time that a teacher at a religious school publicly dared to contest his dismissal.

Although the teacher himself also initially threatened to put the issue before the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC), he later withdrew the case, stating, “my family, partner and I need rest to come to terms with what happened.” He indicated that he hoped that “the discussion and dialogue in the Reformed churches will not come to a halt here, but that they will take this opportunity to show the gay community in the Netherlands that the message in the Bible is one of love.

While histories of ideas in premodern perspectives habitually understood history as divisions of fixed periods, modernists tend to narrate these histories in terms of flowing streams curving through timelines, intersections, and junctions. Crucial moments, accordingly, are turns and returns, shifts and orientations. I am not sure what it takes to diagnose and proclaim an intellectual turn or how to affirm or refute such a phenomenon, but I take the audacious risk and argue that the last couple of decades have seen a “legal turn” in the study of religions—a renewed focus on legal aspects of religion that includes legal concepts, theories, and practices.

If one might be permitted a somewhat reductionist synoptic contrast between the three Abrahamic religions, Islam could perhaps be placed midway between what might be termed a legalistic Judaism and a theological Christianity. That is because it is a virtually unquestioned assumption in modern Islam that theology and legal reasoning in Islam are permissible only to ascertain God’s will expressed in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. In other words, generally accepted Islamic scholarship holds that these primary sources constitute the authentic and foundational sources of law and religious and legal practice are organically linked to them. Thus, it is widely accepted that no human jurisprudential innovation that explicitly contradicts the Qur'ān and the Sunnah has ever managed to be incorporated into the body of literature that governs Muslims' practices and worship.

Palliative care is an interdisciplinary approach to caring for individuals and families who are suffering with serious illness. Medical and psycho-social-spiritual symptoms and needs are assessed and addressed. Much of palliative care is about working with patients and families to bring their context to light, that is, to understand not only their medical situation but also their wishes, values, cultural background, previous experiences, and quality of life. As palliative care clinicians, we have seen how popular understanding and misunderstanding about what it means to “honor thy mother and father” can influence medical decision making. Whether or not adult children of patients have familiarity with the honor commandment, the biblical text “honor thy father and mother,” or whether they identify with a particular religious tradition, this theme plays a central—and often unaddressed—role as adult children strive to make decisions with and for a seriously ill parent. In this article we examine the commandment to honor one's father and mother by exploring its religious, spiritual, textual, and cultural origins, as well as subsequent Jewish commentary. We also contextualize the honor commandment in the palliative care setting through clinical case studies that illustrate the concerns of adult children who wish to honor their parents but are perplexed or conflicted about what this mandate means in the face of difficult medical and psycho-social-spiritual circumstances.

The decisionistic strand in Jewish legal philosophy is often neglected by scholars focused on the more common rational explanations for Jewish law. This article brings attention to decisionism in Jewish legal thought by analyzing the legal philosophy of Shneur Zalman of Lyady, the founder of the Habad Hasidic movement. The author uses the legal and political thought of Carl Schmitt—arguably modernity’s most influential decisionist—to help elucidate Shneur Zalman’s decisionistic legal thought and thereby put into sharper focus an otherwise underappreciated current in Jewish legal philosophy.

This article presents a case study of the influence of Muslim and Christian logicians on medieval Jewish law. The case in question is why it is a punishable offense for Jews to eat mammals that do not have either sign of purity—that is, neither have split hooves nor chew their cud—and the article examines the answers given by three medieval Jewish sages: Rashi, Maimonides, and Naḥmanides. The Written Law of the Torah explicitly allows the consumption of mammals, such as cattle, with both signs of purity. It also explicitly prohibits the eating of mammals, such as camels or pigs, with one sign but not the other. It does not, however, appear to explicitly prohibit the consumption of mammals, such as horses, with neither sign. Using a fortiori logic, Rashi derives a punishable prohibition against eating horses from the prohibition against eating camels and pigs. Maimonides ascribes this prohibition to the Oral Law of the Talmud. Naḥmanides, by contrast, attributes it directly to the Written Law without relying on either a fortiori logic or the Oral Law. This article argues that this solution was available to Naḥmanides because he adopted inclusive disjunction from Christian logicians, but it was not available to Maimonides because he adopted exclusive disjunction from Muslim logicians. The choice between inclusive and exclusive disjunction is shown to continue to be of importance in modern American law.

The contemporary treatment of rape in the penal codes of Muslim nations has come under increasing scrutiny over the last two decades, as several high-profile cases have arisen in which women have claimed sexual assault but been unable to bring sufficient proof of non-consent. In some cases, claimants have subsequently been punished for fornication (zinā) because their accusations were seen as constituting confession to consensual illicit sex, while in other cases, a resulting pregnancy has been taken as evidence of the same. These cases have illustrated the particular problems that stem from defining rape as a coercive variant of fornication, or zinā.

These cases have largely arisen in the context of national efforts to Islamize the legal code by bringing laws into line with perceived sharī'a guidelines. This slew of cases has prompted journalists, human rights groups and Muslim reformers to ask whether contemporary “Islamic” rape laws are really continuous with the classical Islamic juristic tradition, or whether they may in fact represent distortions of that tradition. A central point of debate has been over whether Islamic juristic discourse truly placed rape—that is, a man's unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman against her will—under the category of zinā, or not.

Critiques of animal sacrifice in India have become increasingly strident over the past fifteen years. In the state of West Bengal, many of these critiques center on Kālīghāṭ, a landmark Hindu pilgrimage site in Kolkata where goats are sacrificed daily to the goddess Kālī. However, while similar critiques of this practice have resulted in many Indian states pushing to ban it—or enforce previous bans of it—no such legal action has been issued in West Bengal. Instead, in 2006, the Calcutta High Court ruled that this practice must be visually concealed at Kālīghāṭ. Drawing on modernist notions of cleanliness and public space, the bench argued that the blood and offal produced by this practice creates an inappropriate visual experience for visitors at a major pilgrimage and tourist site in this city. In the act of concealing sacrifice, the Calcutta High Court follows suit with courts across India in deeming the practice unmodern. Yet the Court's orders are defied daily by practitioners at Kālīghāṭ who seek physical and visual access to sacrificed animals and their blood. They believe Kālī desires that blood, and bestows her power and blessings through it. Fault lines in Hindu conceptions of power are dramatized here. The power of the courts is pitted against the power of the gods as Hindus debate the potency, necessity, and modernity of this practice.

In the past several decades there has been a growing movement within the Jewish community to improve the self-image and status of women in Halachah (Jewish law). There is no doubt that this movement was largely affected by the women's liberation movement that has been taking place since the beginning of this century. Despite the assertion of many rabbis and scholars that the role of women in traditional Judaism has been noticeably superior to that of other contemporary civilizations, critics frequently point to the many religious activities from which women continue to be excluded. In the past, women were not accepted as witnesses in a trial; did not inherit equally with their male siblings; were not required or expected to perform the daily religious duties assigned to men; and had to sit separately from the males in the congregation. Only recently have Jewish women been ordained as rabbis and relied on as cantors; allowed to serve on congregational boards as presidents of congregations; granted equal access to study, and allowed to perform all mitzvot; counted in a minyan, the quorum needed for a public worship service, and called to the pulpit for aliyot during the Torah service; and able to ignore the formal requirement of providing a get, the bill of divorce, although it can still be requested.

Law and religion have been dealt with by legal scholars, theologians and those working in the social sciences and humanities for years. Traditionally, studies of law and religion in the legal literature have been devoted primarily to consideration of church and state issues raised by claims based on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. These issues find their way into the law school curriculum in courses on Constitutional law where the perspective taken is distinctly legal. In such courses the focus is on religious freedom and the proper relation of the state to organized religion as a matter of Constitutional law. These concerns have provided the major focus for studies of law and religion.

In the past ten years a new interest in the study of law and religion has emerged. Notable evidence of this is the formation and subsequent activities of the Section on Law and Religion of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), the creation of the Council on Religion and Law, the development of a special Task Force on Ethics and Law within the Society of Christian Ethics along with an increase in scholarly writing and the creation of new journals.

Western bookstores today are full of small boxes that advertise “Voodoo Revenge Kit” on the front. Their short descriptions encourage anyone who wishes to harm a cheating lover and curse a difficult boss to buy this product. Companies now sell t-shirts, mugs, buttons and key chains with “voodoo dolls,” and bound figures with needles through the heart. Novels, newspapers, and movies have, for over a century, produced representations of human sacrifice, cannibalism and devil worship as rituals central to the practice Obeah, Vodou and Santeria. U.S. televangelist Pat Robertson even remarked that the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010, was God's retribution on Haitians for practicing voodoo and making a “pact with the devil.” Remarkably, few people recognize that these depictions are, to a large degree, linked to slavery and racism, which continue to leave their stain on the past and present laws of American and Caribbean nations.

Jesus' Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading opens with a startling claim. The increasing number of legal scholars who have begun exploring the relationship between Christianity and American law in the past several years have neglected to consider the insights of Jesus himself. “[N]otably absent from this literature,” Professor Saiman writes, “is any extensive examination of Jesus, and his views about jurisprudence and legal theory. Despite the overall diversity of his writings, there is little discussion about what Jesus thought about law, lawyers, legal rules and the legal order.” What, the article asks, does Jesus' own legal theory look like?

“Reformation denial” has become the new fashion among Western historians today. A generation ago, the sixteenth century Protestant Reformation was almost universally regarded as a formative era in the development of Western ideas and institutions. Today, it is regularly described as an historians' fiction and historical failure. Martin Luther, John Calvin, Thomas Cranmer, and other sixteenth century figures certainly called for reforms of all sorts, recent interpretations allow. But they inspired no real reformation. Their ideas had little impact on the beliefs and behavior of common people. Their policies perpetuated elitism and chauvinism more than they cultivated equality and liberty. Their reforms tended to obstruct nascent movements for democracy and market economy and to inspire new excesses in the patriarchies of family, church, and state.

The figures of both Moses and Muhammad stand in the United States Supreme Court, included among the great lawgivers of history depicted in two friezes along the North and South walls of the Courtroom. Moses, who is seen carrying the Ten Commandments, is honored as the “prophet, lawgiver, and judge of the Israelites,” with the Supreme Court's tourist information sheet explaining that “Mosaic Law” is “based on the Torah, the first five books of the Old Testament.” Muhammad is described as the “Prophet of Islam” and carries both a sword and the Qur'an, the “primary source of Islamic law.”

Yet the parallel depictions of these two prophets in the U.S. Supreme Court belie the very different respect that the laws they are associated with have received in the U.S. judicial system. Jewish law or legal principles are generally cited by courts with approval, often to add perceived moral and ethical authority to a court's decision. For example, in the U.S. Supreme Court's well-known Miranda v. Arizona decision, the Court declared that the privilege against self-incrimination was an ancient right, with analogues that could be found in the Bible, quoting the great medieval Jewish scholar Maimonides for support: “To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a divine decree.”

Michael Perry has written a nuanced, insightful, provocative, often sensible, frequently convincing, and ultimately perplexing book. I am not sure what his thesis is. Since he titles the book as a series of “inquiries,” perhaps he doesn't have a unified thesis, or need one. And as an extended set of ponderings over the complexities of defining and defending human rights, this book certainly “works.”

The book's apparent thesis is set out in the introduction and repeated frequently thereafter: that it is not possible to understand talk about human rights, such as that contained in the International Bill of Human Rights, in secular terms. Instead, “the idea of human rights is … ineliminably religious.” This is so because the idea of human rights requires affirming that each person is “sacred” in relation to a holistic view of the world and its meaning, so that there are certain things that should not be done to and that should be done for any person. The only sort of view of the world and of the person within it that can ground the idea of human rights is a religious view, Perry suggests; there is no secular equivalent.

The end of the 20th century demonstrates not only a series of encounters between different religious and ethnic traditions but also between such traditions and secularism. An example for the latter is the cultural phenomenon of Jewish Religious Law vis-a-vis Modernization and Postmodernism. The following may therefore be seen as a case study illustrating the problems and options arising in such encounters during the next century.

Jewish religious law (halakhah) is that part of Jewish tradition, defining a Jew's duties towards God and fellow human beings. It is part of a more comprehensive concept, the divine teaching (torah), including narratives (agadah) as well as law (halakhah), and morals (derekh ‘erets) as well as matters of faith ('emunah). This teaching is contained not only in the Pentateuch and in Holy Scripture, but even more so in the oral traditions of the sages. Morals and faith are therefore complementaries to Jewish religious law, and rules of the second order to control it.

In affirming that the First Amendment Religion Clauses are one of America's great contributions to Western civilization, the Williamsburg Charter appropriately looks to our nation's rich heritage of religious liberty. Like the Declaration of Independence, the Charter is a consensus document that recognizes human dignity and the importance of moral values that transcend the state. It eloquently invokes many of the historic principles that influenced the Founders in creating the republic, including inalienable rights, liberty of conscience, government by popular consent, the danger of centralized governmental power, the role of religion as a source of civic virtue, and the evils resulting from an established church. The Charter also emphasizes the close connection between civil and religious liberty.

This study seeks to forge a new avenue of legal scholarship on the modern religious movement known as Hasidism. The paper focuses on Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liady (ca. 1745–1812)—Hasidic master, religious thinker, and jurist. Much has been written on Shneur Zalman, his formidable leadership in the face of strident opposition and his groundbreaking religious philosophy. His legacy continues to animate contemporary Judaism, primarily through his spiritual heirs—the Lubavitch Hasidic community—and through his Hasidic thought known as Chabad. The present study maps out an aspect which has been widely neglected, but is nonetheless crucial to understanding this religious leader: Rabbi Shneur Zalman's legal activity. The first part of the study surveys existing research, assessing what has been achieved thus far, and what tools are available for further research. The second part of the essay highlights salient questions to be considered as part of a judicial biography, offering preliminary answers to these questions. The article concludes with the contention that without serious analysis of Rabbi Shneur Zalman's legal writings—or for that matter, legal writings of Hasidic masters in general—any intellectual history of this religious movement will be incomplete.

This article argues that it is unconstitutional for state charter school programs to preclude faith-based schools from obtaining charters. The first section describes the “school choice” movement of the past fifty years, situating charter schools in that movement. The current state of play of school choice is documented and the roles of charter schools, private schools (primarily faith-based schools), and public school choice options are elaborated. The second section argues that based on the current state of the law it should not be unconstitutional, under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, for states to elect to make faith-based schools eligible for charters, and, therefore, the current practice of formal discrimination on the basis of religion against families and school founders who want faith-based charter schools should be deemed unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Put differently, this is not the sort of issue in which the “play in the joints” between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses should apply so as to give states the option of restricting charter schools to secular schools.