1. U.S. Supreme Court Information Sheet, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/north&southwalls.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).

2. The inclusion of an image of the Prophet Muhammad was the subject of a controversy a number of years ago, with a number of Muslim groups expressing outrage at both the inclusion of a sword in the image, because Islam is often maligned as having been “spread by the sword,” and the image itself, which they felt violated Muslim tradition that strongly discourages any pictorial representation of the Prophet, because such images might threaten the Muslim commitment to a strict monotheism. The controversy was generally laid to rest, in part through a farwa by Sheikh Taha Jaber al-Alwani finding the representation a “positive gesture toward Islam” that did not violate Islamic law, al-Alwani, Taha Jaber, Fatwa Concerning the United States Supreme Court Frieze, 15 J.L. & Religion 1, 27 (2000–2001)Google Scholar, and by the agreement of the Supreme Court to alter the wording of its tourist information to include an explanation that: “The figure is a well-intentioned attempt by the sculptor to honor Muhammad, and it bears no resemblance to Muhammad. Muslims generally have a strong aversion to sculptured or pictured representations of their Prophet.” See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/north&southwalls.pdf. I do not know if any Jews have protested the decidedly Christian slant of the description for Moses, which uses the term “Old Testament” instead of the more politically correct “Hebrew Bible.”

3. See Ashburn, Daniel G., Appealing to a Higher Authority?: Jewish Law in American Judicial Opinions, 71 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 295 (1994)Google Scholar (discussing explicit use of Jewish law as authority in American judicial opinions).

4. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966). But not all judicial opinions portray Jewish law in a favorable light. See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 118 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1960) (describing “early Hebrew criminal law” as an obsolete and unenlightened form of justice).

5. 337 U.S. 1, 69 (1949).

6. Qadi (also spelled kadi or cadi) is the Arabic term for a judge who hears cases and is empowered to make decisions that are legal binding on the parties before him. See, e.g., Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law 300 (Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1964)Google Scholar; see also “Glossary of Islamic Legal Terms,” 1 J. Islamic L. 89, 98 (1996)Google Scholar.

7. The German sociologist Max Weber popularized the concept of “kadijustiz” in Economy and Society, published posthumously in 1922, in which he characterized Islamic law as a system that “knows not rational rules of decision whatever.” 3 Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology 976 (Max, & Roth, Guenther & Weber, Claus Wittich eds., Fischoff, Ephraimet al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968)Google Scholar.

8. There are, unfortunately, no reliable estimates for either the historic or current size of the Muslim population in the United States. The U.S. Census Bureau does not collect information on religious affiliation, and estimates range wildly, from 1.1 million to 7 million. See, e.g., Kosmin, Barry A. & Keysar, Ariela, American Religious Identity Survey 2001, http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research_briefs/aris/key_findings.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2010)Google Scholar (putting the number at 1.1 million in 2001); Council on American-Islamic Relations, About Islam and American Muslims, http://www.cair.com/Aboutlslam/IslamBasics.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2010) (stating “[t]here are an estimated 7 million Muslims in America,” without giving further details or noting whether that estimate includes Canada as well). See also Smith, Tom W., The Muslim Population of the United States: The Methodology of Estimates, 66 Pub. Opinion Q. 404 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 931 A.2d 1123, 1124 (Md. App., 2007) (divorce decree under Pakistani law); In re Ramadan, 891 A.2d 1186, 1190 (N.H. 2006) (Lebanese divorce decree); CPS Int'l, Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18, 34 (Tex. App. 1995) (Saudi law applied to tort claims).

10. See, e.g., El-Farra v. Sayyed, 266 S.W.3d 792 (Ark. 2006), Abd Alia v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. App. 2004); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003); Amro v. Iowa Dist. Ct. Story County, 429 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 1988), Hamzavi v. Ahmad, 1999 WL 33452466 (Mich. App. 1999); see also Amayri v. Adam, 149 P.3d 548 (Table) (Kan. App. 2007) (wife refused Islamic arbitration).

11. In contrast to the five cases mentioning Islamic arbitration, a Westlaw search yields nearly 225 cases referring to the parties utilizing batei din tribunals, although some of them deal with tribunals outside of the United States, such as in Israel or the United Kingdom. See www.westlaw.com, search term ((beis, bes, beth, bat, bait, bais, bayt/3 din) (rabbinic!/3 tribunal court Mbitration panel)) (223 cases; last search Feb. 8, 2010).

12. For Judaism, this grounding scripture is the Torah, which refers in its most narrow sense to the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, known as the Pentateuch or the Five Books of Moses. This written scripture (Torah shebikh 'tav) is supplemented with an “Oral Torah” (Torah sheb 'al-peh), which according to tradition was given to Moses at Mount Sinai and passed down orally and debated by the sages through the ages, until compiled in written form as the Mishnah in approximately the second and third centuries of the Common Era. See Feldman, David, The Structure of Jewish Law, in Birth Control in Jewish Law 6 (Jason Aronson Inc. 1998)Google Scholar.

For Islam, this grounding scripture is the Qur'an, which is understood by Muslims to be the literal and final word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and which was compiled in written form in the decades after the Prophet's death. This scripture is supplemented by the sunna (“practices”) of the Prophet Muhammad, who is seen as the ideal man and model for all Muslims. Eyewitness accounts about the Prophet's words and actions were passed down orally, and within two centuries after the founding of Islam (late 8th and early 9th century C.E.), these prophetic sunna came to be considered an authoritative source for law. See Hallaq, Wael B., The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law 108 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005)Google Scholar.

13. See, e.g., An-Na'im, Abdullahi A., Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law 11 (Syracuse Univ. Press 1990)Google Scholar; 1 Elon, Menachem, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles 4 (Auerbach, Bernard & Sykes, Melvin J. trans., Jewish Publication Soc'y 1994)Google Scholar.

14. See Elon, supra note 13, at 7 (explaining how even in periods and places where rights of Jews were limited, Jews were generally granted authority to adjudicate civil law matters).

15. See id.

16. The Talmudic ban against using the “courts of Akkum” has been interpreted as a prohibition against secular or other non-Jewish courts. See Rabbi Simcha Kraus, Litigation in Secular Courts, http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/litigation_in_secular_courtsl.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). Furthermore, a Jew who brings an accusation against another Jew before a secular court is seen as violating the supreme prohibition of chillul ha-shem, or the desecration of God's name, by exposing the alleged wrongdoing before non-Jews, bringing shame upon the entire Jewish community. Id.; see also Goldstein, Israel, Jewish Justice and Conciliation: History of the Jewish Conciliation Board of America, 1930-1968, and a Review of Jewish Judicial Autonomy 3–4 (Herzl Press 1983)Google Scholar.

17. Elon, supra note 13, at 16; see also Fried, Ginnine, Comment: The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Beth Din Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 633, 636–37 (2004)Google Scholar.

18. Broyde, Rabbi Michael J., Informing on Others for Violating American Law: A Jewish Law View, http://www.jlaw.eom/Articles/mesiralaw2.html#l (last visited March 14, 2010)Google Scholar; see also Elon, supra note 13, at 56, 66-67 (describing the various rationales preferred for the doctrine of dina de-malkhuta dina, including the concept of the “king's law”); Schachter, Rabbi Herschel, Dina De'malchusa Dina: Secular Law As a Religious Obligation, 1 J. Halacha & Contemp. Soc'y 103 (1981)Google Scholar.

19. Traditionally, a Jew who failed to abide by the prohibition and brought suit against another Jew in a secular court faced the threat of cherem (excommunication) and shtar siruv (a type of contempt order issued by a beth din that can lead to a person being ostracized by the Jewish community.) See Fried, supra note 17, at 638-39, 651. While the harshness (and usefulness as a threat) of this punishment has diminished greatly over the centuries, there are still Jewish communities where this sort of social pressure can be of at least limited effectiveness. Id.

20. Id. at 639.

21. See Fadl, Khaled Abou El, Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries, 1 Islamic L. & Soc'y 2 (1994)Google Scholar (giving an excellent and detailed overview of the approaches of the various schools). For a modern argument that Muslims living in non-Muslims states are “bound by the terms of their contract except in a specific case where they would be forced to act against their conscience,” see Ramadan, Tariq, Western Muslims and the Future of islam 94 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (emphasis in original)Google Scholar.

22. See Quraishi, Asifa, Interpreting the Qur'an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 67, 73 (2006)Google Scholar.

23. See Hallaq, Wael B., Juristic Authority vs. State Power: The Legal Crises of Modern Islam, 19 J.L. & Religion 243, 244 (2003–2004)Google Scholar.

24. See, e.g., Al-Alwani, Taha Jabir, Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections (Alawiye, Zaynab, Khan, Shiraz & Shaikh-Ali, Anas Al eds., Shamis, Ashur A. trans., HIT 2003)Google Scholar; Malik, Maleiha, Accommodating Muslims in Europe: Opportunities for Minority Fiqh, 13 Isim Newsletter 10–11 (2003), available at http://religionresearch.org/martijn/isimreview (last visited Apr. 12, 2010)Google Scholar; see also Fadl, Khaled Abou El, Striking a Balance: Islamic Legal Discourse on Muslim Minorities, in Muslims on the Americanization Path? 47 (Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck & Esposito, John L. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000)Google Scholar; but see Khan, Asif K., The Fiqh of Minorities—the New Fiqh to Subvert Islam (Masieh, Dawud ed., Khilafah Publications 2004)Google Scholar (arguing against the need for special approach to Muslim minorities).

25. Eid, Talal Youssef, Marriage, Divorce, and Child Custody as Experienced by American Muslims: Religious, Social, and Legal Considerations (2005) (unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Harvard Divinity School)Google Scholar (on file with Harvard University Library) (discussing problem of “talaq abuse” and usefulness of shari 'a courts in providing resolution).

26. See Abdal-Haqq, Irshad, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 1 J. Islamic L. 1, 57 (1996)Google Scholar.

27. See The Fiqh Council of North America, http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).

28. This was where the secular court sent the arbitration proceedings in Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003), which involved the enforceability of a marriage contract. Note also, that there is a Fiqh Council of North America; however this organization was established primarily to provide legal advice “for facilitating Islamic ways of life” in the secular North American context and provides fatwas addressing specific issues rather than providing a dispute resolution forum. DeLorenzo, Yusuf Talal, The Fiqh Councilor in North America, in Muslims on the Americanization Path? 79 (Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck & Esposito, John L. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)Google Scholar.

29. See Al Huda Center, http://www.alhudacenter.org/service.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). An arbitral award by this arbitration service was upheld on appeal on procedural grounds in Abd Alia v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).

30. See Hirshman, Linda R., The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1305, 1309–12 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Grossman, Michael C., Note, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review, and Due Process, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 169, 172–73 (2007)Google Scholar.

31. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).

32. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 62728 (1985) (“[A] party does not forgo … substantive rights …; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”).

33. See Grossman, supra note 30, at 176-77.

34. 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 1983) (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 92 U.S. 440(1969)).

35. Stein v. Stein, 707 N.Y.S.2d 754, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).

36. See, e.g., Mayer-Kolker v. Kolker, 819 A.2d 17, 20 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003).

37. See, e.g., In re Ismailoff (Golan), No. 342207, 836 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Table), 2007 WL 431024 (N.Y. Sur. Feb. 1 2007).

38. See Fried, supra note 17, at 654 (citing a case in which a court denied an injunction to stop custody proceedings in the beth din in order to avoid possibly violating the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment, and instead directed the petitioner to invalidate the proceeding after it had been completed).

39. See Grossman, supra note 30, at 208.

40. Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); see also, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1)(i-iv) (2009); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-9-13(b)(1-4) (2009).

41. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425, 432 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).

42. For a helpful, albeit somewhat dated, outline on the enforceability of beth din decisions, see Resnicoff, Steven H., Outline Re: The Secular Enforceability of Bais Din Judgements, http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/resnil.html (last visited March 14, 2010)Google Scholar.

43. Waldron v. Goddess, 461 N.E.2d 272, 274 (N.Y. 1984). See also Rainwater v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 190, 192 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that the starting point in determining whether parties agreed to arbitration as binding process is the agreement itself since the agreement to arbitrate is a contract and must be interpreted like any other contract).

44. See Spilman v. Spilman, 710 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).

45. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Seville Syndicate, Inc., 314 N.Y.S.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). Most states have held that common law arbitration survived the enactment of state arbitration statutes. See Rau, Alan Scottet al., Arbitration 58–59 (2d ed., Foundation Press 2002)Google Scholar (explaining the continued survival of “common law arbitration” as generally ensuring enforcement of arbitration agreements only “as long as consent to arbitrate has not been revoked and the parties have proceeded without objection to an award” (citations omitted)).

46. See. e.g., Meisels v. Uhr, 547 N.Y.S.2d 502, 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Hellman v. Wolbrom, 298 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (holding that a proceeding before a rabbi was not arbitration where, inter alia, the agreement was oral).

47. See. e.g., Tal Tours Inc. v. Goldstein, No. 5510-05, 808 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Table), 2005 WL 2514967 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 7, 2005) (arbitration was commenced when one party requested the Beth Din of America to issue a hazmana, invitation to appear, and the other party accepted it).

48. Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); see also Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (clause in engagement contract specifying that any disputes be settled “in accordance with the ‘regulations of Speyers, Worms, and Mainz’” held insufficient to compel arbitration before beth din).

49. In re Ismailoff (Golan), No. 342207, 836 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Table), 2007 WL 431024 (N.Y. Sur. Feb. 1, 2007).

50. 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 1983).

51. See, e.g., Mayer-Kolker v. Kolker, 819 A.2d 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); but see Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (holding that the court could, without infringing on husband's constitutional rights, order him to specifically perform securing get as part of ketuba).

52. Pinson v. Pinson, No. 14424/06, 824 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Table), 2006 WL 2569965, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 7, 2006) (quoting Blum Folding Paper Box Co. v. Friedlander, 27 N.Y.2d 35, 38(1970)).

53. 542 F. Supp. 1207, 1209 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).

54. See, e.g., Mikel v. Scharf, 432 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd 444 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).

55. See, e.g., Pinson, 2006 WL 2569965, at *5 (alleging that a brother and rabbi induced him to sign Hebrew agreement under false pretenses); see also In re Arbitration Between Chgarney (Glicksman), 2002 WL 107175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2002) (remanding case to the trial court for a factual determination of whether a party was misled into signing an arbitration document in Hebrew that she could not understand and whether such agreement would be enforceable).

56. Pinson, 2006 WL 2569965, at *5 (quoting David Siegel, N.Y. Practice § 589, at 1034 [4th Ed.]).

57. Id. at *5.

58. See, e.g., Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that absent a provision in the arbitration clause itself, an arbitrator was not bound by principles of substantive law or by rules of evidence, but could apply his own sense of law and equity to the facts); see also Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516 (UAW), 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that an arbitrator need not follow all the niceties observed by federal court in handling evidence, but need only grant parties a fundamentally fair hearing).

59. Kovacs, 633 A.2d at 304-05 (noting that the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized the validity of arbitration proceedings that did not comply with state's arbitration act, so long as procedures were agreed to and provided basic fairness and due process).

60. See Ghertner v. Solaimani, 563 S.E.2d 878, 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (noting “the results of a Bet Din, conducted pursuant to the Georgia Arbitration Act, are enforceable pursuant to that Act”); Mikel, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 605 (noting “there are state, civil, procedural rules for arbitration to which the rabbinical courts, as an arbitration forum, must also adhere”).

61. BDA Guide to Rules and Procedures § 3(c), http://www.bethdin.org/docs/PDF2-Rulcs_and_Procedures.pdf (last visited May 8, 2010).

62. Id. at § 3(b).

63. Id. at § 3(a).

64. See, e.g., Meisels v. Uhr, 79 N.Y.2d 526, 536-38 (N.Y. 1992) (discussing challenge to beth din award premised on the fact that the agreement did not grant peshara authority and the beth din decision therefore exceeded its authority).

65. BDA Guide to Rules and Procedures § 3(d); see also id. at § 3(e) (allowing parties' explicit or implicit acceptance of common commercial practices to provide the rules of decision).

66. See, e.g., Kingsbridge Ctr. of Israel v. Turk, 469 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (N.Y. Sup. 1983).

67. See supra § II.B.

68. The “manifest disregard” standard is not used in all states, see, e.g., Hunter, Keith Indus, v. Piper Capital Mgmt., 575 N.W.2d 850, 855 (Minn. App. 1998) (reftising to adopt the doctrine of manifest disregard in Minnesota), and where it is used that standard is “reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator's extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles,” Synagogue v. Harris, 2007 WL 825619 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (citing Nat'l Assn. Gov. Employees v. Bridgeport, 912 A.2d 539 (Conn. App. 2007)).

69. Many state arbitration statutes include the following language: “A party has the right to be represented by an attorney and may claim such right at any time as to any part of the arbitration or hearings which have not taken place. This right may not be waived. If a party is represented by an attorney, papers to be served on the party may be served on the attorney.” See, e.g., N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7506(d) (2009); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-9-8(c) (2009).

70. Mikel v. Scharf, 444 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).

71. Fried, supra note 17, at 645-46 (citing Deut 48:20).

72. Id. at 646-47.

73. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7506(d); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-9-8(f).

74. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Seville Syndicate, Inc., 314 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N-Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).

75. Stein v. Stein, 707 N.Y.S.2d 754, 759 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).

76. Id. at 759 & n. 2.

77. Id. at 759.

78. See, e.g., Ghertner v. Solaimani, 563 S.E.2d 878, 881 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding award even though the judges had disposed of their notes).

79. See, e.g., Mikel v. Scharf, 432 N.Y.S.2d 602, 607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd 444 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (citing numerous instances in which it found that a rabbinical court “deviated from its own Din Torah precepts”).

80. Id.

81. Fein v. Fein, 610 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).

82. Id. at 1006.

83. Id.

84. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Popack, 998 P.2d 464, 468 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (citing other cases, including batei din decisions).

85. See, e.g., Golding v. Golding, 176 A.D.2d 20, 22-23 (N.Y.A.D. 1992). In New York, at least, the potential for duress by withholding a get has been mitigated by the passage of the “Get Law,” which requires a person seeking a civil divorce to submit a sworn statement that he or she has removed all potential barriers to his or her spouse's remarriage. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 253 (Thomson Reuters, Westlaw through L.2010, chapters 1 to 46 & 52); see also Segal v. Segal, 650 A.2d 996 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994) (although settlement agreement reached before a beth din was not per se invalid, because it was one-sided and obtained in exchange for granting wife a Jewish divorce, it was unenforceable as a product of duress).

86. See, e.g., Tal v. Tal, 601 N.Y.S.2d 530, 534 (N.Y. Sup. 1993) (stating “unsupported allegations of fraud, duress, or coercion do not form the basis for vacating an agreement where the agreement itself is not manifestly unfair”).

87. See, e.g., Stein v. Stein, 707 N.Y.S.2d 754, 759 n. 2 (N.Y. Sup. 1999) (stating that the wife's allegations of duress “present issues of fact that are not subject to resolution in the absence of a hearing in which testimony can be given under oath”).

88. Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).

89. See id.; see also Mikel v. Scharf, 432 N.Y.S.2d 602, 605-06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (noting that while the party was pressured as a result of siruv to participate in beth din proceedings, such “pressure is not duress”).

90. 656 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. 1997).

91. 606 So.2d 1275, 1276 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).

92. Id.

93. Id. at 1277.

94. See, e.g., Meisels v. Uhr, 79 N.Y.2d 526, 536 (N.Y. 1992).

95. 432 N.Y.S.2d 602, 607, 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd 444 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).

96. No. 9074/02, 2008 WL 880184, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Mar. 20, 2008); compare Kingsbridge Ctr. Israel v. Turk, 469 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (confirming beth din's decision because there was “nothing irrational” in its award which altered terms of a contract between disputants).

97. See, e.g., In re Arbitration Between Charney (Gliksman), No. 748/01, 2002 WL 107175, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2002) (noting the “well settled rule in New York that the ‘distribution of a decedent's estate is precluded from submission to arbitration on the grounds of public policy’” (citations omitted)); Matter of Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); In re Will of Jacobovitz, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 530 (N.Y. Sur. 1968) (holding that a will could not be subject to arbitration in rabbinic tribunal as “any attempt to arbitrate such issue is against public policy”).

98. General trends indicate that courts are willing to enforce arbitration agreements between spouses related to alimony, and generally for child support as well, but they are divided as to the validity of arbitration for custody or visitation issues. Jenkins, Elizabeth A., Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provisions for Arbitration of Disputes as to Alimony or Support Payments or Child Visitation or Custody Matters, 38 A.L.R.5th 69 (1996)Google Scholar.

99. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 774 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).

100. See, e.g., Neuwirth v. Neuwirth, No. 25257/04820, 820 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Table), 2006 WL 1697175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 2006).

101. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Popack, 998 P.2d 464, 468-69 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

102. 633 A.2d 425, 430-31 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).

103. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 774 N.Y.S.2d 48 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); see also Gottesman v. Gottesman, 735 N.Y.S.2d 113 (N.Y.A.D. 2002) (remanding to beth din to recalculate amount of child support).

104. Hirsh, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 50.

105. Rakoszynski v. Rakoszynski, 663 N.Y.S.2d 957, 961 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).

106. Id.

107. Id.

108. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.

109. See infra text accompanying notes 120-21 for a discussion of classical shari'a law approaches to the validity of anticipatory clauses.

110. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7 (discussing negative view of “kadi justice” supposedly dispensed by Islamic legal system).

111. Reliance on religious and, more especially, cultural norms may also be a cause of concern, if it leads a Muslim tribunal to deprive a person of legal and civil rights. See discussion infra § III.C.

112. See al-Hibri, Azizah, Muslim Women's Rights in the Global Village: Challenges and Opportunities, 15 J.L. & Religion 37, 46 (2000–2001)Google Scholar.

113. Id. at 47-48.

114. McMillen, Michael J.T., Contractual Enforceability Issues: Sukuk and Capital Markets Development, 7 Chi. J. Int'l L. 427, 434–35 (2007)Google Scholar.

115. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 24, at 18-19, 41.

116. See, e.g., Pearl, David & Menski, Werner, Muslim Family Law 17 (3d ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1998)Google Scholar.

117. Id. at 64.

118. Badawi, Zaki, Muslim Justice in a Secular State, in God's Law Versus State Law: The Construction of an Islamic Identity in Western Europe 78 (King, Michael ed., Grey Seal Books 1995)Google Scholar.

119. See Muhammad, Amina Cisse, The Sister-Wives: A Look at Polygyny, 4 Azizah: The Voice for Muslim Women 46–50, available at http://www.azizahmagazine.com/side-bkissue-vol4is4.htmlGoogle Scholar; see also Hagerty, Barbara Bradley, Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly Engage in Polygamy, NPR (05 27, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=90857818 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010)Google Scholar (noting that an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 Muslims in the United States do practice polygamy, despite state laws prohibiting it).

120. See, e.g., the anticipatory arbitration clause included in a business contract in Abd Alia v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004):

Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with or relating to this Agreement or any breach or alleged breach hereof shall, upon the request of any party involved, be submitted to and settled by arbitration before the Arbitration Court of an Islamic Mosque located in the State of Minnesota pursuant to the laws of Islam (or at any other place or under any other form of arbitration mutually acceptable to the parties so involved). Any award rendered shall be final and conclusive upon the parties and a judgment thereon may be entered in the highest court of the forum, state or Federal, having jurisdiction. The expenses of the arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties to the arbitration, provided that each party shall pay for and bear the costs of its own experts, evidence, and counsel.

121. See, e.g., Schacht, supra note 6, at 146-47.

122. See, e.g., El-Ahdab, Abdul Hamid, Arbitration with the Arab Countries 23 (2d ed., Kluwer L. Int'l 1998)Google Scholar (noting that “when [arbitration clauses] were used in practice, the question of their validity was raised, due to their aleatory nature: the Shar'a forbids any contract or clause the purpose of which would be aleatory”). El-Adhab notes that classical Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, did not specifically discuss arbitration clauses or their validity. Id. at 26-27.

123. See, e.g., Women Living Under Muslim Laws, inKnowing our Rights: Women, Family, Laws and Customs in the Muslim World 28 (3d ed., Wluml 2006)Google Scholar.

124. See, e.g., id. (analyzing and summarizing Muslims laws affecting women throughout the Muslim world).

125. See, e.g., Feldman, Noah, Why Sharia?, N.Y. Times, 03 16, 2008, at MM 46, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16Shariah-t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=6Google Scholar.

126. For an example of this happening in a beth din context, see Sturman, Randy Linda, House of Judgment: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox Jewish Community, 36 Cal. W. L. Rev. 417 (2000)Google Scholar.

127. Beth Din of America, supra note 61, at § 3(b).

128. See, e.g., Pearl & Menski, supra note 116, at 18.

129. See Unif. Arb. Act § 15 cmt. 4 (2000) (specifying that “an arbitrator's refusal ‘to consider evidence material to the controversy’ is one of the grounds for which a court may vacate an arbitration award.”).

130. See supra § III.A.

131. See, e.g., Qadri, Shahzad Q., Shariah and Estate Planning, L. Trends & News, Vol. 4, No. 2 (03 2008), http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/newsletter/lawtrends/08-winter/estate-qadri-l.htmlGoogle Scholar (noting that Muslim in the United States are turning to estate planning practitioners in an effort to find harmony between the shari'a rules of inheritance and state law) (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).

132. Even more ominous than the existing public relations challenges faced by shari'a law are the draconian legal restrictions on anyone “advocating the installation of a Sharia law system in the United States,” as was proposed by Colorado Congressman Tancredo in a bill he entitled the “Jihad Prevention Act,” H.R. 6975 (110th Con., 2d Sess. 2008). If it had passed, this bill would have made “advocating the installation of a Sharia law system” grounds for the revocation of a person's naturalization, Id. The exact scope of this restriction was not spelled out in the bill, making it is unclear whether it was meant to apply only to those who advocate shari'a law as a replacement for the current civil law system, or more broadly to include those who seek to utilize shari'a law in the way discussed in this article.

133. Broyde, Michael & Alderstein, Yitzchok, There Can Be Only One Law of the Land, Forward, (06 20, 2008), available at http://www.forward.com/articles/12733/Google Scholar.

134. See Wente, Margaret, Life Under Sharia, in Canada?, Globe & Mail, 05 29, 2004, at A21, available at http://www.canadiancrc.com/Newspaper_Articles/Globe_and_Mail_Life_under_Sharia_Canada_29MAY04.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2010)Google Scholar. Of course the concept “chillul ha-shem,” see supra note 19, means, in effect, that to be a “good Jew,” Jewish women must utilize a beth din rather than a secular court; however, for some reason this is not seen as menacing.

135. BBC Interview with Archbishop of Canterbury (Radio 4 World at One Feb. 7, 2008) (transcript), http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1573 (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).

136. Supra note 125.

137. Id.

138. Id.

139. See supra notes 3-4.

140. See, e.g., Carter Coal Co. v. Human Rights Com'n, 633 N.E.2d 202, 206 (III. App. Ct. 1994) (citing definition of “retaliation” in Black's Law Dictionary 822 (5th ed. West Publ'g Co. 1979) referencing “Mosaic law”)Google Scholar.

141. Numerous passages in the Qur'an and hadith refer to the importance of da'wa. See, e.g., ['Ali, Abdullah Yūsuf, The Meaning of the Holy Qur'ān 16:126 (Amana Publications 2006)Google Scholar (“Invite to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching …”); Sahih Bukharī, Vol. 4, Book 52, No. 253, available at http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/052.sbt.html (“invite them to Islam, and inform them what is enjoined upon them …”).

142. See, e.g., Pipes, Daniel, The Islamic States of America?, FrontPageMagazine.com, http://www.danielpipes.org/article/2100 (09 23, 2004) (last visited Mar. 14, 2010)Google Scholar (warning of alleged U.S. Brotherhood's plan for achieving Islam rule in America).

143. See Ramadan, supra note 21, at 31 (noting that “many Muslim intellectuals to do not dare even to refer to the concept [of shari'a] for fear of frightening people or arousing suspicion of all their work by the mere mention of the word”).

144. Bakht, Natasha, Were Muslim Barbarians Really Knocking On the Gates of Ontario?: The Religious Arbitration Controversy—Another Perspective, 40 Ottawa L. Rev. 67, 69 (2006)Google Scholar (citing Razack, Sherene, Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men and Civilized Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced Marriages, 12 Fem. Leg. Stud. 129 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

145. See, e.g., Elkadi, Iman, Matters of the Heart—Discussions about Muslim Family Life, America's Muslim Family Magazine 26–29 (Winter 2007)Google Scholar (contrasting an unhappy outcome for a family where the wife in a divorce “fell into the trap” of bringing a civil divorce case seeking half of family assets with the harmony that resulted in a divorce where the wife “took only what was hers [according to shari'a] and laid no claim on [the husband's] property”).

146. Shachar, Ayelet, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.