Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, is one of the most accomplished and diversely talented jurists in the recent history of the federal courts. Philosopher, theologian, historian, and poet, Noonan has been, first and foremost, a scholar of the law. He has devoted his professional career to a truth which we frequently lose sight of: the law, so seemingly complete in itself as a system of thought and expression, is an essential branch of general literature. A science, however inexact, the law is a humanistic pursuit as well, and no one in the past four decades has pursued the law with such humanistic fervor—a humanism enlivened by religion—as John Noonan.

Stereotypes tend to perpetuate images far outdistanced by events. Massachusetts, founded by the Congregationalist English, had by the early nineteenth century become a Unitarian stronghold and a mecca for immigration from Ireland and Canada. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the new Catholic archbishop of Boston could announce (in 1908) that the Catholic Church in Massachusetts had assumed the mission of the Puritan Church. By the time Noonan came of age, the divisions of the nineteenth century surfaced chiefly in the superficialities that often serve as voting guides: Massachusetts would elect a good Catholic to statewide office in preference to a Protestant, but a good Protestant in preference to a bad Catholic. Ethnic differences had become blurred by economic changes; religion was important, but subordinate to civic responsibilities.

Through a number of profound studies the Honorable John T. Noonan Jr. (on Scholastic Analysis of Usury, on Contraception. A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and the Canonists, on Abortion and marriage tribunals) has made visible how relevant the study of the historical context is for any scientific approach to burning issues of “natural law.” What was said by Christian churches on ethical questions makes sense for us only if we give full attention to the historical context. This is also a principle for the study of ethical questions in the Bible. While the biblical scholars concentrate mainly on what a teaching meant in illo tempore hermeneutics turns its main attention to the present contest of reflexions.

The role of sharing experience and reflexion so central in natural law questions, as Noonan sees it, is also central for the worldwide ecumenical learning community of all Christian churches. And this is for the Christian churches an absolute condition for their dialogue with all people of our time; for Christians a prerequisite for their becoming light for the world, salt for the earth.

Two thousand years ago a Jewish lawyer demanded a definition of the term “neighbor.” … Whether the tale of the Samaritan answered his perplexities we cannot say. But he would surely have been astonished had he been informed that there were two answers to his question, one if he was asking as a lawyer, another if he was asking as a layman. To him, neighbor was neighbor and duty, duty. Perhaps this ancient lawyer's tale has a moral for law and lawyers today.

With the publication of After Virtue in 1981, Alasdair Maclntyre revolutionized the study of post-Enlightenment moral philosophy by insisting that it repent of its current pretensions to a view from eternity and confess its temporal roots in the long and motley history of human reflection about the good life. Almost a quarter of a century earlier, John T. Noonan, Jr., a young Harvard-trained legal scholar who possessed a doctorate in philosophy from Catholic University, had waged a similar battle against the widespread misconception of the medieval concept of usury as monolithic, self-contained, and immutable.

Working with medieval authors who were themselves largely insensitive to the idea of historicity, writing in the context of a pre-Vatican II Catholicism still imbued with the abstract and ahistorical spirit of nineteenth century neo-Thomism, Noonan demonstrated in his first book that the concept of usury was in fact a fusion of concrete theological, ethical, economic, and legal concerns which were not stagnant, but organically developing. In so doing, he gave Catholic Christianity a more adequate conception of its past. More than that, he gestured optimistically toward its future. Tracing how the absolute prohibition of usury, defined as any lending of money at interest, was circumscribed, attenuated, and finally abandoned by succeeding generations of moral theologians and canon lawyers, Noonan underscored that the Church could and did change its mind about important moral issues which were held to implicate unalterable strictures of the natural law. Revealing that an increased willingness on the part of moralists to acknowledge that moral experience of Christians professionally involved in the practices of commerce and banking had fueled the evolution of the usury doctrine in past centuries, Noonan nourished the hope for a stronger voice of lay experience in ecclesial discussions of moral issues throughout the years to come.

The question of the sources of legal normativity continues to haunt legal theorists to this day. While it is largely uncontroversial that modern legal systems claim to produce normative propositions, whether or not there are independent reasons to obey the law remains a contested issue. Those views, as varied as they may be, appear to largely agree that the law is a social phenomenon of definite ontological presence. In this article, I argue, through an analysis of the theories of three prominent ninth- to eleventh-century Muslim jurists, that early Muslim theories of lawmaking did not incorporate any ontologically coherent concept of law. Rather, lawmaking was understood as the case-by-case formulation of legal opinions by individual jurists who were presumed to be driven by the same moral drive, and therefore occupy the same moral order, as all subjects of law. In spite of this ad hoc epistemological view, Islamic jurisprudence conceived of legal pronouncements as fully normative. The normativity of those unstructured ad hoc individual pronouncements, I maintain, is the result of the centrality of moral purpose to early Muslim theories of law. It was the presumption of a common moral drive that gave the legal system structural coherence and allowed the advancement of those pronouncements as normative claims. Whereas recent historical and anthropological work shows that moral motivation was central to the manner in which sharīʿa operated as a system of social regulation, this article argues, along the same lines, that the pietistic drive was both conceptually and structurally indispensable for the normative coherence of early Islamic jurisprudence.

Lithuania formally distinguishes between what it terms “traditional,” “state-recognized,” “registered,” and “unregistered” religions. Though constitutionally Lithuania is a secular state and all religions are declared equal vis-à-vis the state, religious communities recognized as “traditional” have, nonetheless, been favored by the state. They have been granted preferential treatment both in the legislation and extralegal handling by various state actors and institutions. At the same time, traditional religious communities are formally equal among themselves and vis-à-vis the state. However, the size of their membership puts them into two distinct camps. While the Catholic community constitutes 77 percent of the country's population, the remaining eight traditional religious communities together hardly make up 6 percent, of which 4 percent are Orthodox, with Lutherans, Calvinists, Greek Catholics, Old Believers, Judaists, Karaites, and Sunni Muslims making up the remaining numbers. This article focuses on one of the smaller traditional religious communities, Sunni Muslims, and through this example seeks to show looming complications arising from the current legal system for the governance of religion in Lithuania, which, as a country, starts inter alia being affected by the appearance of revivalist and other “nontraditional” forms of Islam on its territory. The article argues that with the changing makeup of the Lithuanian religious landscape—not related only to Islam—the current system of the governance of religion is not only outdated but also unsustainable and needs to be thoroughly overhauled to come more in line with the developing social reality.

The article comparatively maps state involvement in the establishment of filiation and the placement of destitute children into new families. It first reports findings from an expert survey that investigates four key areas of state involvement—the legal framework, the role of courts and ministries, guardianship regulations, and financial support and services for destitute children—across fourteen jurisdictions, twelve Muslim-majority countries, and two Muslim-minority countries. Overall, the placement of children into new families remains a sensitive issue because it is linked to different communities “claiming” the child. In principle, the states surveyed do not allow the creation of new families across religious lines. Using Jordan as a case study, the article then focuses on the implications of one particular survey finding: non-Muslims in Muslim-majority countries sometimes cannot have children placed into their homes. This finding is based on qualitative data collected in Jordan on adoption (tabannī) in the Greek Catholic community. The article argues that in settings of legal pluralism, state involvement affects different religious communities in different ways. In Jordan, due to structural factors, the state shapes Islamic family law differently than the family laws applied by Christian communities. This leads to the unequal development of different bodies of religious law and thereby to the unequal treatment of Muslim and Christian citizens.

While the last and most recent of the revealed religions is generally considered to be Islam, religious scholars are gradually recognizing that a religion founded later in the modern era, the Bahā'ī Faith, displays all the characteristics of a universal religion. Whereas scholars working in the field of Islamic Studies tended in the past to treat this religion under the sub-heading “Islamic sects,” and Religious Studies scholars for many years paid little attention to it, more recent research counts the Bahā'ī Faith as one of the world religions.

The present study aims to provide an overview of the revealed law of the Bahā’ī Faith, which is of interest for students of both legal history and religious studies. We are entering virgin territory here, as no attempt has yet been made at a systematic jurisprudence, nor has a tradition of Bahā’ī jurisprudence been established that might compare with the Islamic Usūlu’l-figh. Since the foundations and principles of this law can be understood only within their theological context, and knowledge of this context is rare outside the Bahā’ī community, some basic background information about the faith will be provided first.

Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports … let it simply be asked where is the security for prosperity, for reputation, for life— if the sense of religious obligation desert … and let us with caution indulge the proposition that morality can be maintained without religion. George Washington—Farewell Address

There is often a message in a title. The title chosen for the Symposium, “The Religious Foundations of Civil Rights Law,” is no exception. Though the initial impression of its meaning will vary in accordance with the interests of the individual reader, the basic message of the Symposium is a simple one: law and religion are fundamentally related.

The eradication of apartheid in South Africa is a major item on the agenda of the international community. The apartheid system fundamentally threatens international peace and security. Moreover, human rights violations in South Africa indict a system of governance fundamentally incompatible with even the most limited interpretation of international law and morality under the United Nations Charter. Thus, the international community is being pressed to weave collaborative strategies to bring South Africa into compliance with contemporary international obligations and expectations.

In the international system, states and other actors commonly employ the bases of power at their disposal in logistic strategies designed to influence others to behave in ways deemed more consistent with their own interests or the common interest of mankind. The strategies invoked may be coercive or persuasive and may involve the use of military force, economic policies, diplomacy or ideology. With regard to apartheid, an increasing international consensus is emerging that the use of economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa might best facilitate a political transformation from a racial oligarchy to a democratic state.

Ezekiel's lament emphasizes that oppression in general, and especially oppression of the needy and the distressed, is always an extremely immoral and illegal act. In the Bible, “oppression” describes the unilateral taking of another person's property or depriving her of her rights. Yet, sometimes even an apparently voluntary agreement might be oppressive. Preventing oppression, therefore, has became one of the declared aims of contractual doctrine, as in the well-known American doctrine of unconscionability.

Unconscionability and oppression are broad concepts that describe a wide-ranging array of cases and situations. Not surprisingly, therefore, despite the formidable and complex body of legal writing on the unconscionability doctrine, a great deal of ambiguity remains as to its theoretical basis, as well as its practical content.

In this article I seek to enrich the modern Western discussion by analyzing Jewish law doctrine which addresses the issue of oppressive exploitative contracts, an approach which is both unique and to date largely neglected by scholars in the area. This Jewish law doctrine developed in response to a specific kind of oppressive contract, in which a semi-monopolistic party exploits the distress of a needy party in order to demand an above-market price (hereinafter referred to as oppressive-exploitative contracts).

Like many others, I believe that the information revolution is a constitutive moment in human history, and not only because of the development of technologies that change our habits and improve the quality of our lives. More than anything else, it is because the information revolution profoundly and dramatically changes our self-concept. That revolution is changing our understanding of the place we occupy in the universe (the erosion of anthropocentrism), forcing us to rethink our uniqueness as human beings and our human essence. I believe that the preconditions of our existence are changing dramatically nowadays, and consequently, our notions of belonging and identity require revision.

The moral force and capacity for inspiration of both religion and politics alike arise in part from the sense that they authentically map the world as we find it, yielding claims about how it should be. This paper asks what role we might imagine for law in this “hyper-real” world of religion and politics, arguing that law can display distinctive virtues linked to its capacity for strategic agnosticism about the real. Applying Sunstein's idea of “incompletely theorized agreements” to the politics of religious freedom, the paper examines the role of law as a tool of adhesion in two very different constitutional settings—Canada and Israel—and argues for modesty as a functional virtue in law and legal process. Viewed in this way, law draws its worth from its tolerance for ambiguity, its sub-theoretical nature, and its pragmatic proceduralism, seeking to sustain political community in the presence of normative diversity, rather than speaking truth to difference.

In October 1846, the men and women of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in St. Louis (African Church) met to consider whether they would remain with the Methodist Episcopal Church (MEC) or align with the recently-formed Methodist Episcopal Church, South (MECS). Two years earlier, in 1844, amid growing conflict over the question of slavery within the national Methodist Church, its General Conference had adopted a Plan of Separation that provided for the withdrawal of the southern Methodists and the creation of their own ecclesiastical government. The Plan provided that each Border State congregation would have the right to determine for itself by a vote of the majority with which of the two churches it would affiliate.

After the southern conferences had organized the new MECS in May 1845, the trustees of the all-white Fourth Street Methodist Church (Fourth Street Church), whose quarterly conference exercised nominal authority over the African Church, informed the black congregants that they could retain their house of worship only if they voted to join the southern Methodists. Throwing caution to the wind, and putting at risk a decade-and-a-half of patient efforts to achieve formal congregational independence within the Methodist Church, the black congregants voted decisively, by a 110 to 7 margin, to remain affiliated with the Northern Conference.

When Ronald Dworkin was to deliver his 1988 Tanner Lecture on Human Values at Stanford University, he was introduced by the university's president, Donald Kennedy. Kennedy offered an appreciative account of Dworkin's background and achievements, noted the title of the upcoming talk, then gathered up his notes and turned the podium over to the speaker. Dworkin proceeded to give a two-hour oration on the foundations of liberal equality, breathtaking in its detail and logical rigor and flowing eloquently without a hitch or hesitation. Just as he was concluding, Kennedy rushed up to the dais and exclaimed to the audience: “Please forgive me, I just realized that when I picked up my notes, I also inadvertently picked up Professor Dworkin's manuscript.” Without missing a beat, Dworkin had delivered his entire lecture from memory.

In 2021, the debate about the spaces in which Europe’s Muslim citizens should be permitted to wear religious veils was reanimated by the introduction of new prohibitions introduced in Switzerland and France, and the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in joined cases C-804/18 and C-341/19. This article examines the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning veiling. We argue that veil bans reduce the ability of Muslim women to actualize themselves as citizens by limiting their capacity to develop their identity through autonomous action. As such, we argue, the right ultimately at stake—which should protect rights in respect of veiling—is the right to a private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and judicial and popular conceptions of veiling should be reoriented to accommodate this view. Doing so, we argue, highlights the full range of functions that veiling implicates—including religious but also secular identarian concerns and exposes how a usually expansive right has been curtailed in cases involving veiling.