Between 1933 and the end of World War II, Argentina became the home of some 43,000 Jewish refugees from Nazism, almost all of them of German, Austrian, or West European origin. Measured against the country's total population, 13 million in 1931, 16 million according to the 1947 census, Argentina received more Jewish refugees per capita than any other country in the world except Palestine (Wasserstein, 1979: 7,45). This did not occur by design of the Argentine government; on the contrary, its immigration policies became interestingly restrictive as the years of the world crisis wore on.

In practice, however, Argentina was unable to patrol effectively its long borders with the neighboring republics of Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay. The overseas consuls of these nations, especially the first three, did a brisk and lucrative trade in visas and entry permits for persons desperate to escape the Nazi terror.

The 1891 civil war that led to the downfall of President José Manuel Balmaceda is without doubt one of the most visible episodes of Chilean history. Already the subject of a voluminous bibliography by 1894 (Echeverría y Reyes, 1894), the “revolution's” importance to historians of Chile actually increased over time as a new generation of scholars came to view it not merely as a discrete event of limited intrinsic interest but as an important key to understanding Chile's subsequent political and economic development. In retrospect, the conflict came to be seen as a “crucial watershed” in Chilean history (Blakemore, 1974: 243), marking the replacement of a presidential system—1833-1891—notable in nineteenth-century Latin America for political stability, by a parliamentary system—1891-1924—notorious for political and monetary disorder.

The question of state insolvency has been a recurring problem in modern history. Defaults have plagued investors and damaged many nations' credit on international money markets. Other nations have suffered due to investor anxieties resulting from defaults by their neighbors. Politicians, diplomats, financiers, and investors have differed greatly in their proposed solutions to the problems of national fiscal failure. The experience of Mexico in its postrevolutionary era is a classic example of the myriad problems faced by those who assist in the financial rehabilitation of the distressed nation, as well as by those who seek to protect investors.

The first half-century after Mexico won its independence was characterized by almost constant domestic strife, frequently humiliating international relations, and a tendency toward fiscal irresponsibility. It was not until Porfirio Díaz seized the presidency from Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada in 1876 that Mexico experienced a degree of domestic tranquility which earned it the tolerance begrudgingly granted by powerful states to their weaker but stable brethren.