One of the most difficult and frustrating challenges to US foreign policy in the post-World War II period has been coping with third world revolutions, particularly those in the Caribbean Basin. Whether the revolution has been in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Grenada, relations with the US have always deteriorated, and the revolutionary governments have moved closer to the Soviet bloc and toward a Communist political model. Both the deteriorating relationship and the increasingly belligerent posture of the US have conformed to a regular pattern; so too have the interpretations of the causes and consequences of the confrontation.

US government officials and a few policy analysts tend to view the hostile attitudes and policies of the revolutionary governments as the cause of the problem.

“Being in Sugar is like collecting Confederate currency”. This assessment, offered by anthropologist Sidney Mintz (1985), is shared by many sugar industry observers, insiders, and, increasingly, by many Caribbean officials. King sugar, instrumental in shaping the diverse political, economic, and social histories of the Caribbean since colonial times, confronts a seemingly intractable crisis: a severe, and sustained, disequilibrium between global demand and supply which makes export of sugar very unattractive. Except in those cases where preferential arrangements exist between producers and consumers-the Lomé Convention, the US sugar quota system, and the Soviet guaranteed purchase of Cuban sugar-world prices for sugar are at a record low, well below production costs.

Is Socialism a means to eliminate or reduce dependency and its alleged concomitants? According to a number of authors, including those of the most influential recent approaches to the study of Latin American politics and development, it is. Indeed, for most of these authors socialism is the only desirable or acceptable way to address the problems of dependent capitalism. For them, capitalism is inherently exploitative and repressive; socialism is the only desirable or acceptable path to a more autonomous, egalitarian, free and just society (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: ix-xxiv, 209-216).

As some of the foregoing implies, and as is obvious to anyone familiar with the literature, for many authors the truth or falsity of this view is not a matter amenable to resolution by anything so mundane as reference to historical experience. For such analysts, this view is true by definition. The analyst using this perspective first “assumes” it to be true and then “demonstrates” that it is true by citing data that support it (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: x).

On 25 November 1985 the Republic of Suriname celebrated ten years of independent statehood. That decade witnessed a number of unexpected and quite extraordinary events in the former Dutch colony. Since the last free parliamentary elections in 1977, the country has endured: a military coup d'etat (1980) the arbitrary arrest and detainment of leaders of the “old” political parties (1980); the nullification of its constitution and civil rights (1980) and the imposition of a “state of emergency” (1982); the appointment by the military high command of five civilian cabinets (1981,1982,1983,1984, and 1985); a foreign and domestic policy that has swung erratically between far left and center; a cordial relationship with Cuba unceremoniously broken by Suriname following the US-led invasion of Grenada; the tragic and colossally stupid murder of 15 (possibly more) prominent Surinamers opposed to the revolution (1982); the suspension of more than US$1.5 billion dollars of Dutch foreign aid (1982); seven alleged counter-coups, one of which supposedly enjoyed the support of the CIA and several American mercenaries (1980-1984); deteriorating relations with the Netherlands, to the point where there is no ambassador in the Hague; a rather visionary attempt to dismantle the ethnic structure of pre-revo party politics by creating “one national party;” a cozy relationship with Libya under the guise of “cultural exchange;” and the rapid deterioration of a once booming economy. Now in 1986, in the midst of a dialogue with the “old” political parties, there is robust talk of a return to civilian government.

Important changes occurred in El Salvador between the parley of government and guerrilla representatives at La Palma (15 October 1984) and the exchange of kidnapped government officials for imprisoned and wounded guerrillas (24 October 1985). During that year Salvadoran politics entered into the endgame of a political transition that may yet culminate in a democratic consolidation. Reaching the endgame stage of the transition hinged on the outcome of the March 1985 election, which gave the Christian Democratic administration of José Napoleón Duarte a clear majority in the Legislative Assembly and control of most municipal governments. The election completed the process of investing formal-legal power in a government committed to democratization. Equally important, it strengthened the credibility and legitimacy of that government, both domestically and abroad. However, that third consecutive electoral victory by the Christian Democrats did not, of itself, guarantee the consolidation of a democratic regime. The election simply created a more favorable climate in which the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) and others could do so, but formidable political obstacles still remain.

On January 15,1985, Brazil elected a new president, 74 year-old Tancredo Neves, a moderate career politician who had been one of the important leaders of the opposition to the military regime which took power in 1964. Tancredo died before assuming office, but the elected Vice-president elect, José Sarney, took over the Executive Office on March 15,1985, bringing to an end 21 years of military rule. Arguably, the transition in Brazil is the most important of the recent transitions in South America (Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia), given the country's size, population, and influence, and given the fact that Neves' election marked the demise of the most successful and long-lived bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in the region. As a result, the nature and implications of the Brazilian transition will have considerable significance for understanding the political reality of the region during the next several years.