1 The problem had concerned the present Brazilian state of Acre, which the Brazilian imperial government had recognized as Bolivian territory by the Treaty of Ayacucho (27 March 1867), signed during the Paraguayan War when Brazil had been courting traditionally unfavorable Bolivian public opinion. Alvaro Lins called the treaty “perhaps the most generous … which Brazil, during the Empire, signed with its neighbors.” Further, since the area was then unexplored, its limits were left vague, to be ratified later in accordance with “limits more natural and convenient to each nation.” Acre, however, was “entirely inhabited by Brazilians,” who by 1880 had established a thriving rubber production. In 1899 Bolivia decided to turn over the exploitation and administration of Acre to the Bolivian Syndicate, a company backed by United States and British capital. The inhabitants of Acre stubbornly resisted Bolivian attempts to enter the region. Brazil, in order to compel Bolivia to protect Brazilian citizens in Acre, soon suspended Bolivia's shipping rights on Brazilian rivers. Negotiations, led by the Baron of Rio-Branco, culminated in the 1903 treaty ( Lins, Alvaro, Rio-Branco [Rio de Janeiro: José Olympo, 1945]), 1:366-74Google Scholar; 2: 401-34.

2 Ibid., 2: 434-35; Ireland, Gordon, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 48–49 Google Scholar; Bello, José Maria, História da República, 5th ed. (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1964), p. 230 Google Scholar; [Refinaria e Exploração de Petróleo União S.A.], Petróleo Boliviano e Mercado Brasileiro (São Paulo, 1956), p. 13. Brazil, in the 1867 Treaty of Ayacucho, had already promised to build the Madeira-Mamoré railroad: Lins, Rio-Branco, 2: 435.

3 Ireland, , Boundaries, pp. 52–53 Google Scholar; Petróleo Boliviano e Mercado Brasileiro, p. 13; Ambassador Raul Fernandes to Chamber of Deputies, 16 May 1955, Diario do Congresso, 31 May 1955, cited in ibid., pp. 35-36.

4 The New York Times, 27 February, 17 March 1938; Petróleo Boliviano e Mercado Brasileiro, pp. 13-14; Fernandes, Ambassador, Petróleo, pp. 36–37 Google Scholar. The treaty stipulated that each country would allot $1,500,000 to the survey; Ambassador Fernandes said that Brazil did so but that Bolivia offered maps of the region confiscated from Standard Oil, for which Bolivia had paid $950,000 (Standard Oil had apparently spent $17,000,000 in compiling them). The text of the Treaty for the Extraction and Development of Bolivian Petroleum may be found in Petróleo, pp. 27-28. The sides of the treaty zone (on the east and west) were not delineated.

5 James, Preston, Latin America, 3rd ed. (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1959), pp. 226-27Google Scholar; Osborne, Harold, Bolivia; A Land Divided, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 60 Google Scholar.

6 The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey obtained a concession in the Camiri region, in the vicinity of the Parapeti River (it would later become one of Bolivia's major producing zones) in 1922. Until 1937, when the operation was expropriated, the highest crude production was approximately 450 barrels per day. Jersey Standard also built two small topping plants, which had a combined capacity of 450 b.p.d. in 1935. See Alexander, Robert J., The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 160 Google Scholar; Zondag, Cornelius H., The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65; The Revolution and Its Aftermath (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 112 Google Scholar.

7 General Barbosa, Júlio C. Horta, opening address to CNP, 12 September 1938, “Sessóes Realizadas,” in CNP Relatório, Io trienio, 1938-41 (Rio de Janeiro, 1941), p. 4 Google Scholar; Wirth, John D., The Politics of Brazilian Development (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 149–50 Google Scholar. Wirth notes that the two chief executives of YPFB were “disgruntled former officials of Standard of Bolivia … [who] wanted old scores with Standard to stay settled.“

8 In 1941 Brazil discovered that Argentina had a similar railway concession (to be paid off over a period of time by Bolivia) which passed through the Brazilian treaty zone to Santa Cruz. In answer to a Brazilian protest, Bolivia replied that Argentina had no rights to oil within Brazil's concession, since the latter had legal control by virtue of its prior claim. By 1952 some delineation had been made of the zone's east and west sides, but it was not precise; a “Reversal Note” (meaning an exchange of diplomatic notes between two countries dealing with a single topic) to this effect was exchanged in 1952: Fernandes, Ambassador in Petróleo Boliviano e Mercado Brasileiro, pp. 37–38 Google Scholar; Brasil, Cámara dos Deputados, Anais da Cámara dos Deputados, 1960, 9: 608-9. In 1951 and 1952 President Getúlio Vargas reported that exploratory drilling was about to begin, and diplomatic notes were exchanged to that effect in 1952 and 1953. See Vargas, Getúlio, O Govérno Trabalhista do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympo, 1952), 1: 93 Google Scholar; Vargas, , O Govérno Trabalhista do Brasil: Os Problemas de Base da Economía Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympo, 1954), 2; 133-34Google Scholar; the New York Times, 7 January, 13 August 1953. By January 1953, only fifty miles of track remained to be laid, the New York Times, 7 January 1953.

9 Alexander, , Bolivian Revolution, pp. 160-62Google Scholar; Zondag, , Bolivian Economy, pp. 112-13Google Scholar.

10 The New York Times, 8 January 1955; Ludolf, Mario Leáo, Da Conveniencia da Exploracáo do Petróleo Boliviano (Rio de Janeiro: Confederagáo Nacional Da Industria, Conselho Económico, 1959), p. 11 Google Scholar; Petróleo Boliviano e Mercado Brasileiro, p. 34.

11 Petróleo Boliviano, p. 34.

12 Filho, João Café, Do Sindicato ao Catete: Memorias Políticas e Confissóes Humanas (Rio de Janeiro; José Olympo, 1966), pp. 445, 447-48Google Scholar.

13 Torres, Lucio Glauco, “Petróleo da Bolívia,” O Observador Econômico e Financeiro 279 (May 1959): 52 Google Scholar; Café Filho, Do Sindicato, 452; Távora, Juarez, “Quem Matou Vargas; Notas á Margem do Tema,” Manchete 822 (20 January 1968): 127 Google Scholar.

14 Zondag, , Bolivian Economy, pp. 113-14Google Scholar; Alexander, , Bolivian Revolution, pp. 164-66Google Scholar. Gulf Oil Company, through a wholly-owned subsidiary, Bolivian Gulf Oil Company (BOGOC), acquired the largest number of concessions (by 1967 more than 4,000,000 acres) and had the greatest success of any of the firms in discovering oil. Under terms of its contract (drawn up late in 1956), the company paid Bolivia 11 percent royalty in oil from production plus 19 percent development tax. See “Gulf Bolivian Subsidiary Will Conduct Exploration,” World Oil 143, no. 6 (1956): 227; “Gulf Seeking New Fields in Bolivia as Oil is Exported,” ibid. 164, no. 2 (1967): 95; Mauri, Enrique T., “Bolivian Oil Interest Warming Up,” ibid. 145, no. 1 (1957): 183-84Google Scholar.

15 Filho, Café, Do Sindicato, pp. 450-52Google Scholar; Torres, , O Observador Económico e Financeiro (May 1959), p. 52 Google Scholar; Petróleo Boliviano e Mercado Brasileiro, pp. 34-35.

16 O Jornal 8 December 1956; Última Hora, 12 January 1957.

17 O Jornal, 11 December 1956. This newspaper, which had commented on Petrobras, espoused “orthodox” economics and private enterprise. The Bolivian Petroleum Code (decreed on 26 October 1955) stipulated, by Article 16, that “no foreign state, ostensibly or discreetly, may obtain a petroleum concession in Bolivia.” See Petróleo Boliviano e Mercado Brasileiro, 29; the New York Times, 19 January 1957. General Henrique Teixeira Lott, then minister of war, pointed out that “it would seem absurd … that we should have a foreign orientation on different bases than those which we have adopted for our internal orbit.” See Filho, Café, Do Sindicato, p. 451 Google Scholar.

18 The New York Times, 19 January, 24 February 1957; “Brasileiros no Petróleo da Bolivia,” O Observador Económico e Financeiro 252 (February 1957): 83-84; “A Setback for Petrobras?,” Petroleum Week, 19 July 1957, in Mascarenhas, Anderson O., Roboré, um Torpedo contra a Petrobras (São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1959), pp. 157-61Google Scholar. Foreign capital—in this case Gulf Oil Corporation— was interested in building a pipeline from the treaty zone to Santos, but existing Brazilian legislation would not permit such activity by a foreign company; the New York Times, 14 August 1956.

19 “A Setback for Petrobrás?,” in Mascarenhas, , Roboré, pp. 157-61Google Scholar; the New York Times, 22 July 1957. The newspaper also noted that “Bolivia had become the hottest oil area in South America after Venezuela and that foreign companies were actively competing for concessions” since liberalizing her oil policy in November 1956 (when Congress implemented the 1955 code).

20 Última Hora, 16-22 July, p. 31; 4-6 September, 30 October, 1, 5 November 1957; O Estado de São Paulo, 4 October 1957; the New York Times, 6 October, 2 November 1957; O Semanario 21-28 February 1957. Senator Lourival Fontes (PTB), former press secretary to Vargas and a strong nationalist, accused Henry F. Holland, former United States Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and subsequently an attorney for several United States groups with interests in Latin America, of interference in the Brazilian-Bolivian negotiations: New York Times, 6 October 1957. Ultima Hora, 4-6 September 1957, charged that Holland and the “trusts” had written Bolivia's 1956 petroleum law. Zondag (p. 113) says, “The United States Operations Mission to Bolivia made available to the Bolivian Government the services of a United States consulting firm for the purpose of drawing up a new petroleum code.” Alexander (pp. 168-169) notes that Holland held his State Department post while the code was being drawn up; within a few months he appeared in Bolivia as a lawyer for oil interests seeking concessions there. It would be easy to conclude that the United States had pressured Bolivia into an oil policy favorable to the “trusts” and U.S. interests.

21 The New York Times, 2 November 1957.

22 Última Hora, January 1959 (the newspaper ran a series of articles throughout the month on the negotiations, expressing the hope that the 1938 treaty would be implemented); Torres, , O Observador Económico e Financeiro (May 1959), p. 52 Google Scholar; Filho, Cafe, Do Sindicato, pp. 452-53Google Scholar.

23 The clauses were known as “Reversal Notes.“

24 “Bolivia,” World Oil 149, no. 3 (1959): 131-32; Filho, Café, Do Sindicato, pp. 452–453 Google Scholar; Ludolf, , Da Conveniencia, pp. 13–14 Google Scholar; O Jornal, í April 1958; Folha da Manha, 10 July 1958; Torres, , O Observador Económico e Financeiro (May 1959), p. 52 Google Scholar. The question of how the anticipated oil was to be transported to Brazil was not resolved: a pipeline seemed the least expensive means, but Brazil probably could not have expended the necessary capital on such an ambitious project and she could not allow any foreign concern to build one; Brazil favored using the railway.

25 Última Hora, 30-31 January, 7 February, 2 April 1958; Torres, , O Observador Económico e Financeiro, p. 52 Google Scholar.

26 Última Hora, 13 September 1958; the New York Times, 13 September 1958. Última Hora, 25 April 1958, had warned about national companies acting as fronts for the “trusts” in Bolivia. The companies that submitted proposals were: União Brasil-Bolivia de Petróleo S.A. (a subsidiary of Refinaria e Exploração de Petróleo Uniao S.A.); an unnamed consortium headed by Oscar Herminio Filho; Petróleo Andino S.A., (“Petrolansa“); Petróleo da Bolívia S.A. (“Petrobol“); and two others still in the process of organization.

27 Última Hora, 23 September 1958. The president of the BNDE was Robert de Oliveira Campos, an “orthodox” economist who already had been a target for the nationalistic press as an “entreguista,” selling out Brazil to foreign interests.

28 Última Hora, 22 October, 6 November 1958.

29 Skidmore, Thomas, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964; An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 174-80Google Scholar.

30 Última Hora, 12-14 January 1959; Torres, , O Observador Económico e Financeiro (May 1959), p. 52 Google Scholar. The three companies were União Brasil-Bolívia de Petróleo S.A., Brabol, and Petrolansa. The first company had arranged with the Anderson Clayton group to “swap” dollars for cruzeiros (a fortuitous meeting of two complementary needs); the second had a connection with DeGolyer & Mac-Naughton Co., Pan American Land and Royalty Co., and Intercontinental Financial Co.; and the third had arranged a loan of $9,000,000 from a syndicate of four U.S. companies (Tennessee Gas, Union Oil and Gas, Lion Oil, and Murphy Corp.), repayable in dollars after production had been initiated.

31 Última Hora, 15, 17 January 1959.

32 Jornal do Comercio 21 January 1959. Celso Furtado, later to become a controversial figure in Brazil and to lose his political rights after the 1964 revolution, was at the time a director of the BNDE and supported Campos’ policy.

33 Última Hora, 22, 27-31 January 1959; the New York Times, 29 January 1959; “Petróleo Boliviano,” O Observador Económico e Financeiro 275 (January 1959): 3, 13-14. At this time a columnist in Última Hora (22 January 1959) raised the problem of a pipeline from Bolivia. After noting the legal difficulties involved in building the pipeline and the financial restraints facing Petrobrás, the columnist said that if oil should be found and a pipeline built by Petrobrás, it would be carrying oil belonging to a private company, probably under the control of the “trusts.“

34 Fontes, Lourival, Política, Petróleo e Populacáo (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1958), pp. 55–56 Google Scholar. On this theme see also Silveira, Joel and Coutinho, Lourival, Historia de urna Conspiragao (Bolivia, Brasil e Petróleo) (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Coelho Branco, 1959)Google Scholar, passim.

35 Última Hora, 24 January 1959. Magalhães, like Fontes, was a member of the PTB, which tended to have more nationalists within its ranks than the other major parties.

36 General Justino Alves Bastos became president of the club in June 1958 as a result of a growing wave of nationalism within the organization. See Ultima Hora, 27 June 1958. The Clube Naval, in a rare demonstration of independence from the Clube Militar, held a series of lectures in support of the Roboré Agreement; ibid., 14 February 1959.

37 Última Hora, 29 January 1959. From about 1957 until the 1964 revolution, to pledge support for Petrobrás seems to have served as a loyalty oath for radical nationalists. Albino Silva became president of Petrobrás in 1963, serving for several months.

38 Colonel Anderson Oscar Mascarenhas, “O Acôrdó de Roboré,” Revista do Clube Militar 152 (January 1959): 33–34 Google Scholar.

39 Mascarenhas, Roboré, um Torpedo contra a Petrobrás. The book included contributions from other radical nationalists, such as Gondin da Fonseca, Teixeira Lott, Osny Duarte Peireira and Gabriel de Rezende Passos. Mascarenhas exposed a “plot,” engineered by the “trusts” to destroy Petrobrás and all it represented for the independence of Brazil. The details are unimportant, but it is worth noting that the military had been, for Mascarenhas, the single entity which had been able to thwart the plot since its inception in 1950.

40 Mascarenhas, , Roboré, pp. 230-33Google Scholar; Rezende Passos, Gabriel de, Estudo sobre o Acordó de Roboré (Sao Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1960), p. 7 Google Scholar. Passos was minister of mines under Joáo Goulart until his death in 1962.

41 Última Hora, 7 March 1959. The CNP recommended that companies arrange for their foreign exchange either by the “swap” method, used by Uniao Brasil-Bolivia de Petróleo S.A. and the Anderson Clayton group, or by recourse to the open market.

42 Anais da Câmara dos Deputados, 1960, 345-53; Guilherme, Olympio, A Verdade sôbre Roboré (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Freitas Bastos, 1960), p. 81 Google Scholar. Guilherme wrote his pamphlet, calling for retention of the agreement, in answer to Passos’ work Estudo sobre o Acordó de Roboré.

43 Última Hora, 27 October 1960; Anais da Câmara dos Deputados, 1960, 19: 99-100. Passos had presented the bill on 15 June 1960: Anais, 1960, 9: 526-628.

44 Minister of Foreign Relations Arinos, Afonso, in Diário do Congresso Nacional (Seção II), 8 June 1961, p. 946 Google Scholar; Filho, Café, Do Sindicato, pp. 452-53Google Scholar. The reason for the long delay in securing congressional consideration was probably the dramatic success Petrobrás was enjoying in production, apparently reducing the significance of a possible Bolivian oil source.

45 Personal interview, Dr. Lauriston Pessóa Monteiro, Rio de Janeiro, 15 July 1970. Dr. Monteiro is a superintendent of Uniáo Brasil-Bolívia de Petróleo S.A.

46 Filho, Café, Do Sindicato, pp. 452-53Google Scholar; personal interview, Dr. Lauriston Pessóa Monteiro, Rio de Janeiro, 6 November 1967. Dr. Monteiro said he was optimistic about the gas possibilities of his company's concession. He also pointed out that all machinery needed in the Bolivian operation had been shipped from Santos by rail to the drilling site south of Santa Cruz; Brazilian industrial products could thus be carried to Bolivia in exchange for oil.

47 Michael Sieniawski, “Brazil again Eyes Oil from Bolivian Sources,” Christian Science Monitor, 11 February 1970; “Óleo Boliviano,” O Globo, 11 June 1970. Bolivia is reported interested in supplying Brazil's west, through a refinery in Corumbá, Mato Grosso. Personal interview, Dr. Lauriston P. Monteiro, Rio de Janeiro, 15, 19 June 1970; Monteiro, “Relatório Sucinto da Viagem de ObservacSo á Bolivia, Realizada entre os Dias 8 e 22 de Novembro de 1969,” unpublished report to Uniao Brasil-Bolivia de Petróleo S.A. (Rio de Janeiro, 1969), passim. Petrobrás remains unwilling to consider Bolivian oil and gas imports, citing reasons of “national security” and “political-economic problems.“