2 See Williams, Eric, History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago (Port-of-Spain: PNM Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 257–259 Google Scholar. See also a summary of the efforts undertaken by the Trinidad Government in a speech by the then Premier, Dr. Eric Williams, to the Legislative Council, 28 August, 1959.

3 A.N.R. Robinson, The Foreign Policy of Trinidad and Tobago, paper presented at the Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, 29 May 1968. The Mixed Commission met in Port-of-Spain in November, 1967, and in Caracas in September, 1968.

4 For an introduction to Andean integration, see Rodrigo Botero, La Comunidad Económica Caribe-Andina (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1967).

5 In February, 1968, when answering a question from an independent member, the Leader of the Senate only indicated briefly that diplomatic approaches had been made to members of LAFTA and that an invitation to join the Central American Common Market had been received. See Debates of the Senate (Hansard) vol. 7, No. 10 (6 February 1968), pp. 612-614. Soon after, the Washington correspondent of a major Caracas newspaper reported that Trinidad was actively preparing to join the Andean Common Market. See “Trinidad Ingresaría en el Grupo Andino de Acelerada Integración”, El Universal, 17 Febrero 1968, p. 6. An announcement to this effect by an official of the Trinidad Government was made in Caracas on the occasion of the visit of a trade mission in September 1968. See “Trinidad Bids to Join Andean Pact”, Trinidad Guardian, 13 September, 1968, p. 2.

6 See Dell, Sidney, A Latin American Common Market? (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), particularly at pp. 70–94; 206-217Google Scholar.

7 Global trade decreased by 45.2 million dollars (U.S.) or 3.1% in 1967. See “A Monthly Report on Latin American Integration,” Comercio Exterior (Mexico), XIV, No. 11 (November, 1968), 7.

8 “LBJ looks forward to Barbados Visit,” Trinidad Guardian, 13 September 1968, p. 1. Within hours of the adoption of the Punta del Este Resolution, the Prime Minister had announced that Barbados would subscribe to the idea of a Latin American Common Market. See Sunday Advocate, 16 April 1967.

9 If this severance of trade relations actually occurred, Barbados would be plunged into a serious economic crisis. The other Commonwealth Caribbean countries have always presented their desire to establish new hemispheric links as an additional, not alternative, dimension of foreign policy. See, Government of Barbados, Address by the Rt. Hon. Errol W. Barrow at the Protocolary Session of the OAS Council Held in His Honour, 1968, p. 4.

10 See Hugh Shearer's report to the House of Representatives, Activities of the Ministry of External Affairs during the year 1966 and Forecast for 1967/68 (Ministry Paper No. 45, 28 July, 1967).

11 See below, pp. 258-259.

12 See Guyana Journal (Georgetown: Ministry of External Affairs, 1968) No. 2, pp. 73-76.

13 In 1963, when outlining the possible alignments of Trinidad and Tobago with particular blocs within the United Nations, the Prime Minister merely mentioned the Latin American group and elaborated in great detail on the importance of the African group. Cf. The Foreign Relations of Trinidad and Tobago, Speech to the House of Representatives, 6 December, 1963 (Port-of-Spain: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 5-10.

14 On the Act of Washington, see below pp. 258-259.

15 On this point, see the study by the West India Committee, The Commonwealth Caribbean and the European Economic Community (London, 1967).

16 Jamaica's position is explained by a stronger dependence on the British market than that of the other Caribbean States. See the statement of the Jamaican Prime Minister, Mr. Hugh Shearer, to the House of Representatives after a visit to Britain, France, Holland and Germany, 2 November, 1967.

17 For an analysis of the reasons for which even the beneficiaries of preferences should work towards the liquidation of such a system, see Alister Mclntyre, “Decolonization and Trade Policy,” The Caribbean in Transition (Puerto Rico: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1965), pp. 196-200.

18 See the reports of the Economic Commission for Latin America, for instance, the annual Economic Survey of Latin America, published by the United Nations, New York.

19 Meeting of American Chiefs of State, Declaration of the Presidents of America, Punta del Este, April, 1967 (Washington: Organization of American States, 1967).

20 This may be difficult in the short run since most Latin American countries have completed their import substitution programme. See Alister Mclntyre, op. cit. pp. 208-209. Mclntyre argues that the low degree of import substitution in the Commonwealth Caribbean makes regional integration among Caribbean countries more attractive than an association with Latin America.

21 See Frank Dowdy, “OAS vs ECM: Can We Manage Both?” Enterprise (Trinidad and Tobago Federation of Chambers of Industry and Commerce Inc., December, 1967), p. 19.

22 This is true even in the most recent past according to a report in the Venezuelan press. See “Agentes subversives entraron por Trinidad,” El Universal (Caracas), 10 November, 1968. On 24 September, 1967, the Minister of External Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago told the 12th Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, that Trinidad stood firmly with Venezuela in the conflict with Cuba.

23 The motives of OAS membership are in themselves worthy of a separate study and will not be further explored here.

24 Charles Fenwick argues that “From the discussions attending the possible membership of Canada in the Organization, it would appear that membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations would not be an obstacle. On the occasion of Jamaica's independence, August 6, 1962, the Secretary-General of the O AS sent his congratulations and expressed the hope that emergence as a new State may be a first step which could ultimately lead to its incorporation in the American community of nations.” See The Organization of American States (Washington, 1963), p. 83. The cable of congratulations was actually a compromise after a heated debate in the Council had persuaded the Secretary-General not to accept the invitation of the British Government to attend the independence celebrations personally.

25 Trinidad Guardian, 7 October, 1964. The Act of Washington was adopted in December, 1964. Already on 6 December, 1963, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago had said that “ … there has been … a certain resentment that our rights were being tampered with, that our rights as a member of the American family are not recognized, and that we have to depend upon what ultimately appears to be something as of grace, instead of, as we insist, on something as of right.” The Foreign Relations of Trinidad and Tobago, Speech to the House of Representatives (Portof- Spain: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 15.

26 See Connell-Smith, Gordon, The Inter-American System (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 298 Google Scholar. The three major claims were restated in an appendix to the Final Act.

27 See ibid, p. 192.

28 The Venezuelan Decree of 9 July, 1968, annexes a belt of sea lying along the coast of Guyana between the Essequibo River and Waini Point. See Guyana/Venezuela Relations (Georgetown: Ministry of External Affairs, 1968), p. 20.

29 Article 25, section 2. See Guyana Journal (Georgetown: Ministry of External Affairs, 1968), No. 1, pp. 29-31, on the protest made by the Guyana Government in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

30 Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, established by General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII), and 1956 (XVIII).

31 According to the Trinidad Guardian of 29 October, 1968 (“W.I. States Take Offence in UN”), the Deputy Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Cameron Tudor, said: “… it would be most unfortunate if countries like mine, eager to cooperate with our neighbours on the mainland and in the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, were to gain the impression that there are signs of systematic discrimination against those countries which do not belong to the Iberian tradition.” The Barbados Advocate- News of 28 October (“Barbados in UN Issue”), not representing an official view, went much further: “Informed Caribbean sources, pointing out that this was not the first occasion that the 22-nation group had been divided between its old white Spanish-speaking countries and the newly independent English-speaking black countries, said it was quite possible that four Caribbean countries might soon leave the regional group and join the Afro-Asian group.” To support its argument that there is discrimination within the Latin American group along linguistic and racial lines, the commentator points out that Haiti and Brazil were not consulted when the appointment was made. In the case of Brazil, this may be due to the fact that “ … it was sympathetic towards Guyana in its dispute with Venezuela.”

32 See Wohlegemuth-Blair, Patricia, The Ministate Dilemma (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967)Google Scholar, who suggests a population of less than 300,000 people as a criterion to define the mini-state.

33 See Comisión Americana de Territorios Dependientes, Memoria/Informe, 2 vols., (La Habana, 1949).

34 Final Act of the American Committee on Dependent Territories, signed at Habana on 21 July, 1949 (Washington: Pan American Union, 1949), Congress and Conference Series No. 60, p. 10.

35 One might add to this the present protectionist policies adopted by Latin American countries as well as a host of other factors which are impediments to the integration of Latin America itself. These elements cannot be adequately dealt with here. See Sidney Dell, A Latin American Common Market? (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Miguel Wionczek (Ed.), Latin American Economic Integration (New York: Praeger, 1966).

36 Trinidad: The Balance of Payments of Trinidad and Tobago 1956-65 (Portof- Spain: Central Statistical Office, 1968) and Overseas Trade 1956, 1961, 1965 (Port-of-Spain: Central Statistical Office, 1957, 1962, 1966).

Jamaica: External Trade of Jamaica 1956, 1961, 1965 (Kingston: Department of Statistics, 1958,1962,1966).

Barbados: Overseas Trade—1961 and 1965 (Bridgetown: Statistical Service, 1962 and 1966).

Guyana: Annual Account Relating to External Trade, 1956, 1961 (Georgetown: Department of Customs and Excise, 1957, 1962).

For more details on Caribbean-Latin American Trade, see Alister Mclntyre “Aspects of Development and Trade in the Commonwealth Caribbean”, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, X, No. 2 (October, 1965), 149-150; 161-162.

37 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade Expansion and Economic Integration among Developing Countries, TD/B/85, 2 August, 1966.

38 See Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson, “Institutional Arrangements and the Economic Integration of the Caribbean and Latin America.” Paper presented at a Conference on International Relations at Mona (Jamaica), April, 1967, mimeographed, p. 13.

39 For the functioning of the East Caribbean Currency Board, see Thomas, Clive, Monetary and Financial Arrangements in a Dependent Monetary Economy (Mona: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1965), pp. 15-36 Google Scholar.

40 For details on division of power between Britain and the Associated States in the field of foreign affairs, see Margaret Broderick, “Associated Statehood-A New Form of Decolonisation,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 17, Part 2 (April 1968), 375-383.

41 Under the new arrangements made in London in December, 1968, Britain may withdraw from the Agreement in 1974 if she joins the European Economic Community, but not without endeavouring to seek other means to fulfill her present obligations. The Financial Times, 4 December, 1968, p. 4.

42 See H.J. Maidenberg, “Venezuela and Brazil Fight for Influence over Guianas,” The New York Times, 25 November 1968, pp. 69, 74.