1 An analysis of Peru's failure to have a basic social revolution is presented in David Chaplin, “Peru's Postponed Revolution,” World Politics, XX (April, 1968).

2 Thomas Fox and S. M. Miller, “Occupational Stratification and Mobility: Intra-Country Variations,” in Studies in Comparative International Development I, No. 1 (1965), 1.

3 Ibid., p. 3.

4 Ibid., p. 8.

5 See Francois Bourricaud, “Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy,” Studies in Comparative International Development, II, No. 2, (1966).

6 Censo Nacional de Población (Lima: Dirección Nacional de Estadística, 1966), I, tomo IV, Tables 8 and 18.

7 Censo Nacional de Población y Ocupación 1940 (Lima: Dirección Nacional de Estadística, 1944), I, 69, 360, 606-7.

Censo Nacional de Población—Resultados Finales de Primera Prioridad, 1961 (Lima: Dirección Nacional de Estadística, March, 1964), p. 230, Table 11.

9 An additional problem in Peru was the institution of acciones al portador or bearer stock through which the ownership, and hence dividend recipients, of ‘anonymous societies” remained unknown. (It appears that this form of tax evasion is to be eliminated in 1968.)

10 Bourricaud, “Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy,” p. 27.

MacLean y Estenos suggests that the absence of independent guilds (the Indians were used for artisan work or such goods were imported) is one factor accounting for the nonbourgeois character of Peru's middle class. Roberto MacLean y Estenos, Sociología peruana (Lima: 1942) p. 118.

We could add the absence of a “free city” tradition. Lima has always been dominant over Peru but until recently subservient to a land-owning plutocracy.

11 “In Puno, what matters is not what a person does … not his professional success but his facility, his style, his participation in clubs. It is important to ‘cut a good figure’ at parties. The technical competition so admired in our industrial society is little appreciated.” Francois Bourricaud, “Algunas características originales de la cultura mestiza en el Perú contemporáneo,” Revista del Museo Nacional, XXIII (1954), 165.

12 MacLean y Estenos, op. cit., p. 118.

13 Chaplin, David, “Industrialization and the Distribution of Wealth in Peru,” Studies in Comparative International Development, III, No. 3 (1967)Google Scholar.

14 Ratinoff, in his survey of middle-class ideology in Latin America, sees several stages to this de-radicalization. At first, the rising middle class is in favor of limits on individual freedoms—especially property rights since they are interested in undercutting the power of the plutocratic elite. Later, when their position is more firmly established, they favor a return to individual property rights. Luis Ratinoff, “La clase media en América Latina,” Revista Paraguaya de Sociología, Año 2 (Sept.-Dec, 1965), pp. 16-18.

15 Censo de Manufactura—1963 (Lima: Dirección Nacional de Estadística, 1965), p.v.

16 Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, “The Interindustry Propensity to Strike— An International Comparison,” Chapter 14 in Arthur Kornhauser et al., Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).

17 Banfield, Edward, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Chicago: Free Press, 1958)Google Scholar.

18 George Kubler, “The Indian Caste of Peru, 1795-1940” (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology, Publication No. 14, 1952). p. 1.

19 Ibid., p. 40.

20 The situation in Peru seems to be strikingly like that of the landed gentry in nineteenth century China as described by Chung-li-Chang. He found that this class of elite landowners: 1. Could not earn enough from their land through a tenantsharecropper system to radically enlarge their land-holdings. On the contrary, money had to be diverted into land from outside sources to effect such economic mobility. Therefore they found political posts indispensable to agricultural success. In this way, they could (a) evade taxes, (b) use the police to collect land rents, and (c) divert public funds to private advantage. (Peru's landed elite has long “accepted” public posts as deputies, senators, and departmental prefects, but not in the disinterested spirit popularly attributed to England's landed aristocracy. Chang also found that: 2. Large estates could not be held together from one generation to the next due to the prohibition of entail and primogeniture—consequently China also experienced a high rate of social mobility at the gentry level. In both cases very few families succeeded in developing the Rothschild or DuPont “clan spirit” that has for so long balanced kinship ascription with the practical requirement for administrative efficiency for the sake of the family enterprise. Chung-li-Chang, The Income of the Chinese Gentry (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), pp. 127-28.

Lenski has also noted a high level of agrarian elite turnover in studies on medieval Europe. See Lenski, Gerhard E., Power and Privilege (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 239 Google Scholar.

21 Stone, Lawrence, “Marriage among the English Nobility in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, III (January, 1961), 182–206 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Gabriel Escobar M., La estructura política rural del departamento de Puno, published doctoral thesis in Anthropology (Cuzco: Universidad Nacional de San Antonio Abad del Cuzco, December, 1961).

23 Francois Bourricaud, “Castas y clases en Puno,” Revista del Museo Nacional, XXXlI (Lima, 1963), 208-321.

24 See Patch, Richard, “La Parada,” American Universities Field Staff Report, XIV, Nos. 1, 2, 3 (1967)Google Scholar, for a case of a Puno middle-class family slipping to a lower class status in Lima.

25 See Leeds, Anthony, “Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Model and Case History,” American Anthropologist, XVI, No. 6 (Part 1, December, 1964)Google Scholar for an excellent description of the operation of this same prebendary patronazgo (patronage) system in Brazil. Ratinoff generalizes Leeds’ findings to all of Latin America (Ratinoff, op. cit.). Although, like many of my Latin American colleagues, Ratinoff manages to maintain an utterly abstract level of discourse throughout without once mentioning a single concrete case of his propositions, I believe that he had Peru and the APRA party very much in mind.

26 Between 1930 and 1952 only 1,757 foreigners were naturalized. Anuaria Estadística del Perú (Lima: Dirección Nacional de Estadística, 1951-1952), p. 385.

27 Arturo Nieves Ayala, El Perú y la inmigración de post guerra (Lima, 1946), p. 45.

28 Gabriel Escobar, M., “El mestizaje en la region andina: el caso del Perú,” Revista de Indias (Madrid, January-June, 1964), pp. 197–220 Google Scholar.

29 Felix Cosío, “Realidad y ficción de las comunidades indígenas,” Perú Indígena, II (June, 1952), 214.

30 Gabriel Escobar M., La estructura política rural del departamento de Puno, pp. 27-28.

31 See Chaplin, “Industrialization and the Distribution of Wealth in Peru.”

32 Marx, Karl, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943), pp. 135-37Google Scholar. Marx also observed that the benefits to the peasantry of such a division of land had to be transitory—enough to buy support and time for one regime; but, subsequently, equally great poverty would result. Latin American land reformers should not expect this conservatizing effect to last indefinitely. An increase in fertility from the earlier marriages that such ready land makes possible alone can undermine the benefits of such a reform.

33 William C. Thiesenhusen, “How Big is the Brain Drain?” (Madison: Land Tenure Center Paper No. 29, University of Wisconsin, January, 1967), pp. 20-22.

34 This deprecation of whatever is national extends even to one class of prostitutes in Callao, Lima's port, who assert that they will accept only foreign sailors as customers.

35 Isidoro Alonso et al, La iglesia en el Perú y Bolivia, Estudios Socio-Religiosos Latino-Americanos (Madrid: Federación Internacional de los Institutos Católicos de Investigaciones Sociales y Socio-Religiosas [FERES], 1962).