* Several friends and colleagues commented upon, criticized, and thus helped to formulate the ideas expressed in this paper. I owe my gratitude to José María Aragao, Marcelo Aftalion, Ricardo Cappeletti, and Felix Peña at the Instituto para la Integración de América Latina (Buenos Aires), Ricardo Lagos Escobar at the Instituto de Economía of the Universidad de Chile, Daniel M. Schydlowsky of Harvard University, Ary Bouzan and Gustavo Sa e Silva at the Escola de Administracao de Empresas de Sao Paulo (Fundacao Getulio Vargas). The author is grateful for the financial assistance of the Social Science Research Council that facilitated research in Latin America.

1 The April, 1967, Punta del Este meeting of the presidents of the Western Hemisphere underscored the weight of this problem. Integration was the simple major issue discussed, as a vehicle toward economic development and social progress.

2 The alternatives in terms of the specific characteristics of multi-national enterprises are numerous:

• (a)

  (a) an enterprise established with the public capital of two or more countries of the zone (i.e., Latin American Free Trade Association or the entire Latin American realm);

• (b)

  (b) an enterprise with the public capital of one and private capital of another;

• (c)

  (c) an enterprise of one country of the zone with public capital participation and private capital from outside the zone;

• (d)

  (d) enterprise with private capital of two or more countries from within the zone;

• (e)

  (e) enterprise with private capital from within and outside the zone;

• (f)

  (f) enterprise with majority foreign capital participation (this could be divided into “one country dominant” setting or “dispersed” foreign capital participation).

In addition, the nature and degree of association could also serve for the purposes of classification. It could entail the (1) association of capital from various sources; (2) the association of capital on the one hand and “know-how” on the other, (3) the association of natural resources with capital, and (4) an association with market guarantees and arrangements.

3 See Etzioni, Amitai, Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965).Google Scholar

4 An interesting case is the attitude of Argentina under the present regime of President Onganía. The Onganía government paid some lip service to the necessity of integrating Latin American economies, while stressing the need for national (and national regional) planning and development as a priority. Similarly, the government's stand on multi-national projects is cautious except when the need for cooperation or the benefits of it are clearly evident, as for example in the case with the multi-national project on the exploitation and development of the potentials of the Río de la Plata.

5 The discussion below is based upon the author's research in Chile and in Argentina during 1966-1967. For a further discussion of the role and image of the técnico, see the author's “The Role of Young Educated Elites in Political Development,” II Politico, XXXI, No. 1 (1966), 74-92.

6 Recent studies noted that practically every Latin American country has a “weaker-aggressor” neighbor; i.e., Chile has Bolivia, Peru has Ecuador, etc., and for the weaker ones there exists the image of a “strong neighbor aggressor”—a pathetic picture of the nineteenth century nationalism combined with aggressive tendencies in the service of diverting attention from burning sociopolitical issues. For an excellent analysis, see Simon Shwartzman and Manuel Mora y Araujo, “Imágenes de estratificación internacional en América Latina,” Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología, II (July, 1966), 179-204.