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The Colombian Battalion in Korea and Suez*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
Extract
An international organization is only as effective as the degree of support which its sovereign members are willing to give it. This axiom would probably not be disputed, except for the fact that the word “degree” has the inherent property of evaluation hidden in its meaning. This evaluation, since it deals with the mainstream of a nation's political life, is not capable of purely quantitative analysis. A nation's ideas on sovereignty are involved in international cooperation. Its foreign policy, be it passive, neutral, or aggressive, is certainly involved. Its domestic status in terms of tranquility or violence, poverty or plenty, is deeply involved. A world power is tempted to pre-empt an undue share of the credit for the success of an international organization, especially in the field of conflict resolution. The contribution of a single weak nation is often overlooked, and yet the sum of the weak nations' contributions may conceivably be the balancing factor among irreconcilable giants.
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- Copyright © University of Miami 1967
Footnotes
Author's note: Research for this article was performed at the U.S. Army School of the Americas Library, Ft. Gulick, Canal Zone, 1961-62; in Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín University and public libraries in 1962; at the University of Southern Mississippi Library in 1963; at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Library, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1967; and at the University of Florida Research Library in 1966-1967. It was inspired by the author's assignment as counterinsurgency instructor at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, giving instruction in Spanish to Latin Americans. The Colombian Army students appeared to be so dedicated, intelligent and professional that a research trip to Colombia became inevitable. Both Colombian military and university people aided in compiling the materials for a study on the Colombian Battalion and for another on the violencia.
All statements and opinions are taken from commercially available sources. The Department of the Army and the aforementioned universities are in no way responsible for the content of this article. The author wishes to express gratitude for research direction and scholarly commentary for the portions on international organization to Dr. Robert A. Brent, Department of History, University of Southern Mississippi, and for the portions on Colombian history to Dr. David Bushnell, Department of History, University of Florida.
References
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Article 42: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”
10 Houston, Latin America, p. 155.
11 Herring, Hubert A., Latin America, A History from Beginning to Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 584.Google Scholar The case occupied large front page columns in Colombian newspapers during several periods when Colombia was also involved in international security activities. Faith in international arbitration never wavered, even when momentary events appeared unfavorable to Colombia.
12 El Tiempo, June 29, 1950, p. 4. Colombia's leading newspaper, voice of the out-of-power Liberal Party, editorialized under “The Impossible Neutrality” that the U.S. Army was fighting the world's battle for democracy, as it had in World War II. and that Colombians must render support.
13 El Tiempo, July 8, 1950, p. 1. Creation of the U.N. Command captured the banner headline, and accompanying articles characterized the North Korean occupation of South Korea as a “reign of terror.”
14 El Tiempo, July 15, 1950, p. 1; and July 17, 1950, p. 8. A reserve captain of the Colombian Navy (Pablo Emilio Nieto) offered to recruit several thousand volunteers; estimates ran to 10,000 men who would serve if called.
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16 El Tiempo, November 1, 1950, p. 1; and Semana, September 30, 1950, p. 7.
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19 Time, February 19, 1951, p. 36. Urdaneta Arbeláez was serving at that period as Minister of War, with primary attention devoted to the swelling guerrilla war in the eastern plains of Colombia.
20 United Nations Bulletin, July 1, 1951, p. 7; and El Tiempo, May 12, 1951, p. 1. News was received that month that the Almirante Padilla was doing coastal blockade duty on the Korean west coast in formation with the British cruisers HMS Ceylon and HMS Kenya, the Canadian destroyer HMS Sioux, and the U.S. frigate USS Glendale. El Tiempo, May 17, 1951, p. 1.
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23 United Nations Bulletin, August 1, 1951, p. 96; and August 15, 1951, p. 150. Colombia sold no strategic resources to any Communist nation during the Korean War era.
24 United Nations Bulletin, September 1, 1951, p. 245.
25 United Nations Bulletin, April 15, 1954, p. 305.
26 Isaza, Eduardo Franco, Las guerrillas del llano (Bogotá: Librería Mundial, 1959), fly leafGoogle Scholar; and SORO, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Colombia, p. 390. Available written sources on this point are sketchy and highly partisan, at best.
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31 Arciniegas, Germán, The State of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 161.Google Scholar An El Tiempo editorialist, Enrique Santos, jibed on September 20, 1950, that the government should send 10,000 “wild beasts” (a reference to National Police called chulavitas in that era) to Korea, enhancing the war effort and hastening the pacification of rural Colombia simultaneously. “Caliban,” El Tiempo, September 28, 1950, p. 4.
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34 Camacho-Leyva, Factores, p. 54.
35 Fluharty, Vernon L., Dance of the Millions (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1956) p. 112.Google Scholar The abnormally long “lame duck” period arose after the Congressional Liberal majority advanced the election six months in the vain hope of winning.
36 Herring, Latin America, pp. 518-519. This excellent textbook summarizes the impugnation of Gomez’ motives but omits the popular support aspect.
37 Alexander, Robert J., Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, New Jersey: The Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 251–252 Google Scholar; and Mejía, Gabriel, “Uno de los bomberos estuvo en la guerra contra chinos communistas”, Revista Bomberos de Medellin, p. 192.Google Scholar
38 Mejía, “Uno de los bomberos”, pp. 190-192.
39 Ruiz Novoa, El Batallón, pp. 1-5; and El Tiempo, February 4, 1951, p. 1.
40 The fact that hemispheric military defense plans pre-dated the Korean involvement is adequately covered in Berle, Adolf A., Latin America, Diplomacy and Reality (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 88–96 Google Scholar; and Dreier, John C., The Organization of American States and the Hemispheric Crisis (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 26–31.Google Scholar
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50 Russell W. Ramsey, “Colombian Infantry Faces Insurgency,” Infantry, Nov.-Dec. 1964, pp. 4-7. This article develops the thesis that a combination of Korean War experience plus protracted anti-violence operations have made the Colombian Army one of the most progressive and combat-wise small armies in the world.
51 This idea is the thesis of a work called Arms and Politics in Latin America by Edwin Lieuwen of the University of New Mexico. He postulates that the hemispheric defense program was actually window dressing for a broader program of political unity. The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America by former U. S. Representative David O. Porter and Robert J. Alexander carries this thesis to the extreme by implying that U.S. policy intentionally fomented dictators to please certain domestic interest groups.
52 Newsweek, September 11, 1950, p. 40. “The Unified Command also insisted that minimum army contingents should be reinforced battalion strength with supporting artillery; and with engineer and ordnance units able to function as such. It also generally insisted that the contributing government should provide reinforcements adequate to maintain the initial strength of each unit. These requirements increased the efficiency of the military operation, but they undoubtedly discouraged broader participation by governments that were either unable or unwilling to contribute on this scale.” Russell, Ruth B., The U. N. Experience with Military Forces; Political and Legal Aspects. (Washington: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1963), p. 35.Google Scholar
53 “Battling the Bandits,” Time, November 9, 1962 (Latin American edition), pp. 17-18.
54 The apparent cohesion and potential weight of the veterans were observed in Bogotá in September, 1962, at which time a reunion of the veterans of Leticia and Korea drew several hundred men to the capital city.
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