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New data on Dutch and British GDP/capita show that at no time prior to 1750, perhaps not before 1800, did the leading countries of northwestern Europe enjoy sustained strong growth in GDP/capita. Such growth in income per head as did occur was highly episodic, concentrated in a few decades and then followed by long periods of stagnation of income per head. Moreover, at no time before 1800 did the leading economies of northwestern Europe reach levels of income per capita much different from peak levels achieved hundreds of years earlier in the most developed regions of Italy and China. When the Industrial Revolution began in Britain, it was not preceded by patterns of pre-modern income growth that were in any way remarkable, neither by sustained prior growth in real incomes nor exceptional levels of income per head. The Great Divergence, seen as the onset of sustained increases in income per head despite strong population growth, and achievement of incomes beyond pre-modern peaks, was a late occurrence, arising only from 1800.
By offering a particular interpretation of the new evidence on historical national accounting, Goldstone argues for a return to the Pomeranz (2000) version of the Great Divergence, beginning only after 1800. However, he fails to distinguish between two very different patterns of pre-industrial growth: (1) alternating episodes of growing and shrinking without any long-term trend in per capita income and (2) episodes of growing interspersed by per capita incomes remaining on a plateau, so that per capita GDP trends upwards over the long run. The latter dynamic pattern occurred in Britain and Holland from the mid-fourteenth century, so that Northwest Europe first edged ahead of the Yangzi delta region of China in the eighteenth century.
As contribution to the debate about the interpretation of the process of economic growth before the Industrial Revolution, we discuss two concerns about the currently available estimates of historical national accounts and the way in which these estimates should be interpreted. Firstly, we argue that estimates of the long-term trends of economic growth should make use of all information contained in time series of Gross Domestic Product (GDP henceforth), and therefore use standard regression analysis to establish those trends. Secondly, we point to the problem that the time series of historical GDP are based on very different estimation procedures, which probably affect the outcome in terms of the level of GDP per capita in the period before 1850. Both concerns imply that we do not entirely agree with Jack Goldstone’s views of pre-industrial growth. In particular, his conclusion that growth was cyclical before 1800 is inconsistent with the available GDP estimates, which point to sustained growth, albeit at a very low rate.