This paper is an attempt to improve on the ability of financial management to arrive at a desirable or close to “optimal” cash balance for a firm at a point in time. There have been several comments on this subject in literature over the years including the contributions of Keynes, Hicks and Samuelson. In recent years Baumol and Beranek have presented us with more specific models. This paper tends to be more operational than the Baumol or Beranek presentations and hence tends perhaps to lose some of the sophistication of the more theoretical models; it attempts to present a reasonably operational method for providing for cash balances for transactions and precautionary purposes. But let us first examine these two models briefly.

The highly quantitative bond issue size decision is generally made in a somewhat qualitative manner. The subjective opinions of brokers and intuitive rules of thumb of financial officers are rarely, if ever, compared to the optimum issue size resulting from calculations incorporating the costs of issuing bonds, and the costs of carrying extra cash. Unfortunately performance measurement in this area is very difficult, thus both good and bad decision processes tend to go unnoticed. It is possible to look at a financial decision which has been made, and, with the aid of hindsight, conclude it was a bad decision, but this proves very little. Some financial officers have done very well administering the Financial affairs of their corporations, but this does not indicate that the decision process cannot be improved. In a previous article the author of this paper investigated the question of the optimum size of bond issue.

This paper considers several related problems in the theory of optimal capital structure for corporations. It is divided into four sections, which may be briefly summarized as follows.

1. Modigliani and Miller (MM) proposed that under the assumption of perfect markets and in the absence of taxes on corporate income, the total market value of the firm is unaffected by leverage. They showed that the leverage irrelevance proposition holds for “non-growth” firms when all investors agree in their estimates of the expected amount and the risk of each firm's future earnings. In section I, we show that this conclusion is not affected by growth trends or heterogeneous investor expectations. However, our analysis uncovers several additional assumptions which must be made explicitly for MM's Proposition I to hold. These additional assumptions pertain to the effects of leverage on the firm's future financing needs and future investment decisions. The generalized state-preference framework used for this demonstration is retained for subsequent discussion.

Investment analysis, both for purposes of capital expenditures and for financial investments, is based on an evaluation of cash flows. This evaluation involves the application of interest rates in order to determine whether a given option–a series of cash flows–is profitable or not. For numerous reasons, primarily that of simplicity, it has been traditional to assume that the rates of interest used to measure the worth of an investment are constant. With this assumption it is possible to equate the two familiar investment criteria when investments are independent and outlays are not subject to expenditure constraints, i.e., when capital markets are taken to be perfect in the usual sense. An investment is profitable if its net present value is positive when discounting of cash flows uses the (assumed constant) cost of capital, or if its (assumed unique) internal rate of return is greater than the cost of capital. Equivalence of these two criteria is historically most frequently identified with Irving Fisher [3, 4], and his two-period analysis, portrayed graphically, is generally utilized to establish the correctness of the equivalence of the criteria.

The boom stock market is a well known phenomenon of our time. The investor (and public) interest in the market, however, does not seem to be shared by the monetary policy makers. Certainly, if we use the 1920's as the benchmark, the Federal Reserveexhibits considerably less anxiety over the present boom market than it did then.

The pros and cons of bank mergers and multiple-office banking are in the forefront of bank policy consideration today [8, p. 19] Commercial banks have Joined the industrial and merchandising files., as well as the transportation companies, to sweil a rising tide of merger; The Comptroller of the Currency has reported that nearly 2,000 banks with resources of over $40 billion, were acquired by other banks between 1950 and 1962, inclusive, [47, p. ll].

In attempting to analytically discover or test economic relationships, econometricians have available many computational techniques by which to estimate the parameters of their models. But different solution methods may give unbiased and consistent, biased and consistent, or biased and inconsistent estimates under varying assumptions. The model builder is vitally interested in how each of these procedures reacts under varying conditions that may impinge on his model, but which are conditions not assumed by the estimation technique.

The control of profit-making corporations long has been the subject of investigation and discussion, and in recent years same of this interest has shifted to the control of corporations by financial institution. Very little attention has been paid to the control of mutually-owned fiduciaries. This article reports a preliminary investigation of the control of associations in the savings and loan industry.

When a company enters into a bond indenture or loan agreement, certain restrictions usually are placed on it. These restrictions, known as protective covenants, may have a significant influence on profitability, making the bargaining strategy of the company very important. But to bargain effectively over the restrictiveness of the protective covenants, management must know the impact that the covenants have on profitability.

In recent years, corporations have repurchased increasing amounts of their own common shares. The dollar value of repurchases increased from approximately $600 million in 1960 to $1.7 billion in 1964. To put these figures in better perspective, corporate repurchases were more than 50 percent of the net purchases of pension funds and twice the net purchases of mutual funds. From the viewpoint of the individual company, General Motors is a. striking example. Repurchases by General Motors accounted for over 20 percent of the total trading volume in that stock in 1963.

Executives in a wide variety of formal organizations frequently face decisions involving changes in capacity of service capabilities. Usually these changes mean increases in manpower and/or capital expenditures for new facilities, but due to seasonality, or a decline in business, a decision may also involve the determination of whether to reduce the available capacity. These decisions generally are made by comparing the cost (or savings, which is a negative cost) of changing the service capability with the corresponding costs or risks of not being able to properly meet service requirements. In this paper, the problem described is one in which services are provided, and the cost, or risk, of not being able to meet service requirements is expressed by means of a queuing equation.

During the past few years several money demand functions have been estimated for the United States. Although these functions may differ on the precise specification of the independent variables, most agree on their crude identity. Thus almost all functions include an income or wealth constraint and an interest rate price. Such functions have been applied exhaustively to data for various periods in United States history, both for the long run and for the short run. With few notable exceptions, the results differ more in degree than in substance. The quantity of money demanded is estimated to be a positive function of the constraint and a negative function of price. The studies have, however, overlooked an important body of possible collaborative evidence–that for other industrial countries. It may be reasonable to assume that the same basic forces underlie the demand for money in all industrial countries, it is of interest to contrast money demand functions for these countries with those obtained for the United States. This paper estimates demand functions for leading industrial countries and evaluates the results. No new theory is developed; rather, existing models are fitted to additional data to test their applicability to other countries.

Applied economics consists of the application of the general principles of economics to a particular situation in order to provide an explanation of the behavior of economic agents in that situation. However, the degree of specificity of any explanation depends upon the particular uses to which the explanation is to be put. Thus, in applied economics one may wish to explain the behavior of the agents who operate a particular enterprise. Or, one may wish to provide a. broader frame of reference to explain the behavior of agents who operate a. type or class of enterprises. By utilizing the analysis of the general economic theory of the firm one may introduce the additional constraints under which, for example, a public utility operates, and thereby derive a. theory of public utilities. Or, in the same way, one may wish to construct a, theory of transport firms, or a theory of retail firms, or a theory of manufacturing firms.

The continuing discussion on the cost of capital and related Issues has tended to focus on the capital market conditions, necessary to guarantee the validity of particular conclusions Works by F Modlgllani and M. H. Miller [4, 5, 6] and J Lintner [2], for example, are developed in this manner. The following discussion is developed from the standpoint of a firm borrowing funds in an uncertain world. An example expressed in terms of an individual borrower begins the analysis. The aim is to suggest a different approach to the capitalization and costing of contractual obligations (debt) than those current in both the theoretical and applied literature. A model is developed which expresses the cost of debt to the borrower as a function of both the expected rate and the promised rate of the debt contract. Using this analytic structure, the relationship between the two rates and the Implications of using either one as the cost of debt to the firm are explored. An hypothesis as to the behavior of the borrower (management and shareholders) provides a third expression for the cost of debt which is suggested to be superior to either alternative.

One of the difficulties of evaluating formula plans by testing them in the light of past experience is the fact that there is no index of bond experience which simulates typical portfolio performance. Bond indices are stated in terms of yields with constant maturities, but the capital values of bonds vary according to their maturities given the same yield. Cottle and Whitman used elaborate techniques to make their bond portion of the total portfolio realistic, but were only partially successful. This writer also attempted to eliminate the problem of simulating the bond portfolio in a previous paper by assuming that the defensive portion of the portfolio was invested in a Savings and Loan account receiving the national average return. This procedure thus ignored the problem of bond maturities and variation in capital values due to changes in interest rates.

Economists have long been creating models by which to describe optimum behavior for firms to maximize profits. The rigor and inclusiveness of such models have increased steadily in recent years. In the field of commercial banking, however, this has not generally been the case. Concerning the topic of asset management, the typical analyst discusses the decisions to be faced by the bank manager, the reasons for the problems involved, and considerations to include in the solution of such problems. Often, specific rules-of-thumb for the handling of individual asset accounts are advocated.

The hypothesis that corporate directors determine dividend payments by applying target payout ratios and related parameters to current and past earnings has gained widespread acceptance in recent years as a generally applicable account of dividend policy. One reason for the acceptance of this view appears to be its success in predicting the behavior of aggregate measures of dividends in time series regression analyses. The interpretation of these findings as supporting the target payout hypothesis may well be incorrect since the behavior of aggregate magnitudes need bear no direct and close relationship to the behavior of individual firms. This paper attacks the target payout hypothesis on two grounds: it shows that the behavioral characteristics of the firm assumed by the hypothesis have no satisfactory basis in managerial motivation; and it presents data relating to the dividend policies of individual firms for which the hypothesis fails to account.