The concept of multifactor portfolio efficiency plays a role in Merton's intertemporal CAPM (the ICAPM), like that of mean-variance efficiency in the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. In the CAPM, the relation between the expected return on a security and its risk is just the condition on security weights that holds in any mean-variance-efficient portfolio, applied to the market portfolio M. The risk-return relation of the ICAPM is likewise just the application to M of the condition on security weights that produces ICAPM multifactor-efficient portfolios. The main testable implication of the CAPM is that equilibrium security prices require that M is mean-variance-efficient. The main testable implication of the ICAPM is that securities must be priced so that M is multifactor-efficient. As in the CAPM, building the ICAPM on multifactor efficiency exposes its simplicity and allows easy economic insights.

Using approximately 10,000 firms jointly covered by Compustat and CRSP from 1974–1993, we find substantial differences in the SIC codes designated by the two databases. More than 36 percent of the classifications disagree at the two-digit level and nearly 80 percent disagree at the four-digit level. We examine the impact of these differences upon financial research in several ways. First, we show that the classification of utilities, financial firms, and conglomerate acquisitions are affected by the choice of CRSP vs. Compustat SIC codes. Second, we show that industry classification matters in financial research by illustrating that size- and industry-matched comparisons are more powerful than pure size matches. Third, we test the specification and power of Compustat vs. CRSP classifications by simulating a typical financial experiment in which sample firms are matched to control firms by industry. We find that: i) Compustat matched samples are more powerful than CRSP matched samples in detecting abnormal performance; ii) nonparametric tests outperform parametric tests; and iii) four-digit SIC code matches are more powerful than two-digit SIC code matches. These results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of extreme values, and hold for both NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq firms.

This paper studies the efficacy of pension fund activism by examining all firms targeted by nine major funds from 1987 to 1993. I document a movement away from takeover-related proxy proposal targetings in the late 1980s to governance-related proxy proposal and nonproxy proposal targetings in the 1990s. For the vast majority of firms, there are no significant abnormal returns at the time of targeting. The subset of firms subject to nonproxy proposal targeting, however, experiences a significant positive wealth effect. There is no evidence of significant long-term improvement in either stock price or accounting measures of performance in the post-targeting period. Collectively, these results cast doubt on the effectiveness of pension fund activism as a substitute for an active market for corporate control.

This paper develops an intertemporal model of international capital market segmentation. Within the model, under various forms of segmentation/integration, the equilibrium asset prices and allocations, the risk-free interest rate, and the intertemporal consumption behavior and welfares of two countries are derived and compared. It is shown that the equilibrium interest rate is increased on integration, and that integrating markets may be significantly welfare decreasing for one of the countries. Conditions that may lead to a decrease in welfare are investigated. The conclusions as to the effects of segmentation on asset prices in the mean-variance model of the existing finance segmentation literature are also shown to break down in an intertemporal model.

Previous empirical research has established that dividend changes are associated with significant abnormal returns. This association is rationalized on the basis that the dividend announcement acts as a signal of future earnings. Another body of research has documented the existence of intra-industry transfers of information where news about one firm is extrapolated to other companies in the same industry. Earnings information transfers have been found to be positive in nature, with good news about one company leading to stock price increases for rival firms. Linking dividend signaling and information transfer, tests were constructed to ascertain whether the dividend change of one firm is associated with the stock price performance of other companies in the same industry. The results indicate there is some small positive information transfer. The magnitude of information transfer is related to the degree of the dividend surprise, the recent dividend history of the other companies, and correlations in stock returns between the dividend announcer and the other companies. Information transfer is found to affect earnings and earnings growth estimates of the other firms and this leads to revisions in their stock prices.

This paper investigates the relation between the form of compensation and the manager's decision horizon. It finds that while all-cash contracts induce managers to underinvest in the long term, all-stock contracts induce overinvestment in the long term. It shows that compensation contracts consisting of both cash and restricted stock can produce efficient investment, thereby providing a rationale for the existence of both cash and stock incentive schemes in executive compensation packages. This explains why the adoption of either type of incentive scheme results in a positive stock price reaction. In addition, the paper derives the following testable hypotheses: i) the proportion of the stock compensation is decreasing in the precision of the manager's ability and increasing in the precision of the firm's cash flows; ii) firms compensate their managers with proportionately more stock in profitable years and proportionately more cash in leaner years; and iii) the greater the growth opportunities, the higher the proportion of stock compensation.

We argue that in the after-market trading of an IPO, the underwriting syndicate, by standing ready to buy back shares at the offer price (“price stabilization”), compensates uninformed investors ex post for the adverse selection cost they face in bidding for IPOs. This dominates ex ante compensation by underpricing. The reason is that stabilization exploits ex post information about investor demand whereas underpricing must be based on ex ante information. However, liquidity and syndication costs constrain the use of stabilization which, in equilibrium, generates some underpricing as well. We develop a model that formalizes this intuition and generates several empirical implications.

This paper documents a strong positive relation between the percentage of outside directors and the frequency of outside CEO succession. The likelihood that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO increases monotonically with the percentage of outside directors. This monotonic relation is observed for both voluntary and forced departures. Evidence from stock returns around succession announcements indicates that, on average, shareholders benefit from outside appointments, but are harmed when an insider replaces a fired CEO.

We observe significant post-split excess returns of 7.93 percent in the first year and 12.15 percent in the first three years for a sample of 1,275 two-for-one stock splits. These excess returns follow an announcement return of 3.38 percent, indicating that the market underreacts to split announcements. The evidence suggests that splits realign prices to a lower trading range, but managers self-select by conditioning the decision to split on expected future performance. Presplit runup and post-split excess returns are inversely related, indicating that our results are not caused by momentum.

This paper discusses performance measures for market and limit orders. We suggest two measures: one for precommitted traders (who must trade) and another for passive traders (who are indifferent to trading). We compute these measures for a sample of NYSE SuperDOT orders. The results suggest that the limit order placement strategies most commonly used by NYSE SuperDOT traders do in fact perform best. Limit orders placed at or better than the prevailing quote perform better than do market orders, even after imputing a penalty for unexecuted orders, and after taking into account market order price improvement. Unconditional order submission strategies that use SuperDOT to offer liquidity in competition with the specialist do not appear to be profitable.

If shareholders own diversified portfolios, and if companies impose externalities on one another, shareholders do not want value maximization to be corporate policy. Instead, shareholders want companies to maximize portfolio values. This occurs when firms internalize between-firm externalities. Any kind of externality, pecuniary or nonpecuniary, vertical or horizontal, suffices. What matters is simply that one company's actions affect another's value. Thus, besides the traditional benefit of risk reduction, portfolio diversification offers additional benefits to shareholders through helping internalize externalities. This paper documents the extent of diversification and cross-ownership of stocks among companies where these externalities are likely to be large and provides a capital market test of how merger offers vary with the extent of cross-ownership.

In this study, we examine the impact of security analysts' monitoring and marketing functions on firms' market value. We postulate that security analysts' monitoring of corporate performance helps motivate managers, thus reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. We also argue that the information intermediary function provided by security analysts helps expand the breadth of investor cognizance. Consistent with these conjectures, this study finds that analyst following exerts a significant and positive impact on firms' market value. We also find evidence that security analysts have a stronger incentive to follow stocks of high quality companies, since such stocks arc easier to market. Hence, the security analysis activities appear to be determined, in part, by the marketing considerations of brokerage companies.

This paper examines the use of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. These mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders; use of outside directors; debt policy; the managerial labor market; and the market for corporate control. We present direct empirical evidence of interdependence among these mechanisms in a large sample of firms. This finding suggests that crosssectional OLS regressions of firm performance on single mechanisms may be misleading. Indeed, we find relationships between firm performance and four of the mechanisms when each is included in a separate OLS regression. These are insider shareholdings, outside directors, debt, and corporate control activity. Importantly, the effect of insider shareholdings disappears when all of the mechanisms are included in a single OLS regression, and the effects of debt and corporate control activity also disappear when estimations are made in a simultaneous systems framework. Together, these findings are consistent with optimal use of each control mechanism except outside directors.

We model and examine the impact of information releases on market uncertainty as measured by the implied standard deviation (ISD) from option markets. Distinguishing between scheduled and unscheduled announcements, we hypothesize that since the timing, although not the content, of scheduled announcements is known a priori, the pre-release ISD will impound the anticipated impact of important releases on price volatility and that the ISD will normally decline post-release as this uncertainty is resolved. Conversely, we hypothesize that the unexpected high volatility caused by major unscheduled releases will cause market participants to adjust upward their estimates of likely volatility over the remaining life of the option resulting in an increase in the ISD. Our evidence supports both hypotheses. The ISDs that we consider are from the T-Bond, Eurodollar, and Deutschemark options markets. We examine scheduled macroeconomic news releases such as the employment report and the PPI. We also find that the observed tendency for the ISD to fall on Fridays and rise on Mondays is due to the weekday pattern of scheduled news releases.

This paper analyzes the tradeoff between cost and risk of discretely rebalanced option hedges in the presence of transactions costs. I present closed form solutions for expected hedging error, transactions costs, and variance of the cash flow from a time-based hedging strategy similar to that analyzed by Leland (1985). Furthermore, I characterize the cost and risk of a move-based hedging strategy without resorting to Monte Carlo simulations. All results are sufficiently general to accommodate the use of a transactions costs adjusted hedging volatility and an asset rate of return that differs from the risk-free rate of return.

This paper reexamines how risk return relationships are affected by investor uncertainty about the exact parameters of the joint rate of return distribution. We attempt to clarify results relating to three central issues. First, we address the issue of diversification, focusing on an APT, factor model framework. Second, we discuss the observability of estimation risk and describe research experimental designs that should encompass the existence of estimation risk and reveal it in the data. Finally, we suggest exploiting contemporaneous return observations on high and low information securities to aid in the measurement of return parameters for low information securities.

The short-term rate of interest is fundamental to much of theoretical and empirical finance, yet no consensus has emerged on the dynamics of its volatility. We show that models which parameterize volatility only as a function of interest rate levels tend to over emphasize the sensitivity of volatility to levels and fail to model adequately the serial correlation in conditional variances. On the other hand, serial correlation based models like GARCH models fail to capture adequately the relationship between interest rate levels and volatility. We introduce and test a new class of models for the dynamics of short-term interest rate volatility, which allows volatility to depend on both interest rate levels and information shocks. Two important conclusions emerge. First, the sensitivity of interest rate volatility to interest rate levels has been overstated in the literature. While this relationship is important, adequately modeling volatility as a function of unexpected information shocks is also important. Second, we conclude that the volatility processes in many existing theoretical models of interest rates are misspecified, and suggest new paths toward improving the theory.

We develop a model of third party guaranteed debt and show that interest rate premiums are multiplicatively related to firm and guarantor risk. We apply the model to thrifts issuing CDs guaranteed by the FSLIC and then estimate firm probabilities of insolvency and guarantor risk across 20 observed months. This time period spans the insolvency of the guarantor followed by two recapitalizations. The relative stability in firm risk across time offers no evidence of generalized risk contagion among firms. We attribute elevated CD premiums and rate spreads to increases in guarantor risk rather than changes in firm risk.

Traditional measures of interest rate risk assume that prices of financial assets and liabilities are set in perfectly competitive markets. However, evidence suggests that many retail financial markets do not follow the competitive paradigm. In this paper, we employ a general contingent claims framework to value rents earned by banks in demandable retail deposit markets. Our analysis provides a natural and economically meaningful measure of interest rate risk for these imperfectly competitive markets. Using monthly survey data on NOW accounts and MMDAs, we estimate the value of retail deposit rents and deposit durations for more than 200 commercial banks.

Previous tests of stock index arbitrage models have rejected the no-arbitrage constraint imposed by these models. This paper provides a detailed analysis of actual S&P 500 arbitrage trades and directly relates these trades to the predictions of index arbitrage models. An analysis of arbitrage trades suggests that i) short-sale rules are unlikely to affect the cash-futures mispricing, ii) the opportunity cost of arbitrage funds exceeds the Treasury bill rate, and iii) the average price discrepancy captured by arbitrage trades is small. Tests of the models provide some support for a version of the arbitrage model that incorporates an early liquidation option. The ability of these models to explain arbitrage trades, however, is surprisingly low.