This paper examines time-series patterns of external financing decisions and shows that publicly traded U.S. firms fund a much larger proportion of their financing deficit with external equity when the cost of equity capital is low. The historical values of the cost of equity capital have long-lasting effects on firms’ capital structures through their influence on firms’ historical financing decisions. We also introduce a new econometric technique to deal with biases in estimates of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. We find that firms adjust toward target leverage at a moderate speed, with a half-life of 3.7 years for book leverage, even after controlling for the traditional determinants of capital structure and firm fixed effects.

Recently, there has been rapid growth in the assets managed by “hedged mutual funds”—mutual funds mimicking hedge fund strategies. We examine the performance of these funds relative to hedge funds and traditional mutual funds. Despite using similar trading strategies, hedged mutual funds underperform hedge funds. We attribute this finding to hedge funds’ lighter regulation and better incentives. Conversely, hedged mutual funds outperform traditional mutual funds. Notably, this superior performance is driven by managers with experience implementing hedge fund strategies. Our findings have implications for investors seeking hedge-fund-like payoffs at a lower cost and within the comfort of a regulated environment.

This paper tests international asset pricing models using firm-level expected returns estimated from an implied cost of capital approach. We show that the implied approach provides clear evidence of economic relations that would otherwise be obscured by the noise in realized returns. Among G-7 countries, expected returns based on implied costs of capital have less than one-tenth the volatility of those based on realized returns. Our tests show that firm-level expected returns increase with world market beta, idiosyncratic volatility, financial leverage, and book-to-market ratios, and decrease with currency beta and firm size.

We consider asset pricing in a monetary economy where liquid assets are held to lower transaction costs. The ensuing model extends the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the consumption CAPM by deriving real money growth as an additional factor determining returns. Empirically, the two model versions compare favorably to other theoretical asset pricing models along several dimensions, supporting the traditional intertemporal asset pricing perspective. A value premium arises because value firms are sensitive to liquidity shocks but growth firms are not. Although no alternative factor drives out the money growth factor, the conditioning CAY factors of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) add explanatory power.

Previous empirical studies on the “rationality” of economic and financial forecasts generally test for generic properties such as bias or autocorrelated errors but provide only limited insight into the behavior behind inefficient forecasts. This paper tests for a specific form of forecast bias. In particular, we examine whether expert consensus forecasts of monthly economic releases are systematically biased toward the value of previous months’ releases. Such a bias would be consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) or could arise from professional forecasters’ strategic incentives. We find broad-based and significant evidence for this form of bias, which in some cases results in sizable predictable forecast errors. To investigate whether market participants’ expectations are influenced by this bias, we examine interest rate reactions to economic news. We find that bond yields react only to the residual, or unpredictable, component of the forecast error and not to the component induced by anchoring, suggesting that expectations of market participants anticipate this bias embedded in expert forecasts.

In this paper, we examine how stock option usage affects total corporate payout. Using fixed-effects panel data estimators on various samples of ExecuComp firms from 1993 to 2005, we find the higher the executive stock options, the lower the total payout, ceteris paribus. We also find some evidence that firms increase payouts through repurchases in order to offset earnings per share dilution that occurs due to usage of executive and non-executive stock options. However, incentives from not having dividend protection for options appear to dominate those from antidilution, resulting in lower total payout for firms with higher options usage.

We investigate the (sell-side) analyst rankings of Institutional Investor (I/I) and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), using data from 1993–2005. We find that factors with a primary component of recognition are the most important determinants of the rankings, although performance measures are statistically significant determinants in some cases. The single exception to this finding is with existing WSJ stars, where industry-adjusted investment-recommendation performance is the only significant determinant of repeating as a star. Further, in the year after becoming stars, the recommendations of WSJ stars are significantly worse than those of nonstars; and the recommendations and earnings forecasts of I/I stars, as well as the earnings forecasts of WSJ stars, are not significantly different from those of nonstars. We conclude that these rankings are largely “popularity contests.”

Eleven percent of the largest public U.S. firms are headed by the CEO who founded the firm. Founder-CEO firms differ systematically from successor-CEO firms with respect to firm valuation, investment behavior, and stock market performance. Founder-CEO firms invest more in research and development, have higher capital expenditures, and make more focused mergers and acquisitions. An equal-weighted investment strategy that had invested in founder-CEO firms from 1993 to 2002 would have earned a benchmark-adjusted return of 8.3% annually. The excess return is robust; after controlling for a wide variety of firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and industry affiliation, the abnormal return is still 4.4% annually. The implications of the investment behavior and stock market performance of founder-CEO firms are discussed.

We analyze the intertemporal stability of excess returns to technical trading rules in the foreign exchange market by conducting true, out-of-sample tests on previously studied rules. The excess returns of the 1970s and 1980s were genuine and not just the result of data mining. But these profit opportunities had disappeared by the early 1990s for filter and moving average rules. Returns to less-studied rules also have declined but have probably not completely disappeared. High volatility prevents precise estimation of mean returns. These regularities are consistent with the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (Lo (2004)), but not with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.