What are the psychological mechanisms of racial “dog whistles” in American politics? Literature on race priming in American politics argues when race is primed implicitly, racial biases influence political evaluations, but when race is made salient, individuals can use controlled processing to inhibit automatic biases and abide by egalitarian norms. However, the neural mechanisms underlying these processes have yet to be examined directly. In a 2 × 2 within-groups experiment using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examine these neural mechanisms. We find brain areas associated with conflict detection, evaluative processing, and controlled processing are more active when race is primed explicitly rather than implicitly, as expected, although we do not find substantial brain activation associated with automatic responses to be more active during implicit than explicit primes. Results are discussed in terms of understanding how racial cues influence political evaluations while considering America’s ever-changing racial norms.

Scholars of International Organizations (IOs) increasingly use elite surveys to study the preferences and decisions of policymakers. When designing these surveys, one central concern is low statistical power, because respondents are typically recruited from a small and inaccessible population. However, much of what we know about how to incentivize elites to participate in surveys is based on anecdotal reflections, rather than systematic evidence on which incentives work best. In this article, we study the efficacy of three incentives in a preregistered experiment with World Bank staff. These incentives were the chance to win an Amazon voucher, a donation made to a relevant charity, and a promise to provide a detailed report on the findings. We find that no incentive outperformed the control group, and the monetary incentive decreased the number of respondents on average by one-third compared to the control group (from around 8% to around 5%).

What shapes voter perceptions of election outcomes? Recent disputes in Malawi and Kenya highlight the vulnerability of local vote counts to accusations of malfeasance, which often generate negative public perceptions of vote reliability. Election monitoring in these countries is thought to crucially affect both the quality of the election and voters’ perceptions of the same. To date, most research on this topic has focused on the effect of non-partisan electoral observers. However, in many countries, two other interest groups also monitor the vote-counting process: political party agents and government election officials. Does the presence of these actors also affect voter perceptions of election integrity? To answer this question, I conducted a conjoint experiment in Malawi and Kenya in which voters evaluate the reliability of vote counts from hypothetical polling stations where the presence of party agents, non-partisan observers, and election officials is varied. I find that the presence of each of these groups does indeed shape voter perceptions: voters are more likely to view vote counts as reliable when they are co-signed by a party agent, election official, or non-partisan observer. Further, these preferences persist regardless of the voters’ own party affiliation or trust in electoral institutions.

Opposition in autocracies often uses negativism against the regime to frame its principal message. This study is the first to experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of a negative campaign on a regime candidate’s vote share. For the field experiment conducted during the 2013 Moscow mayoral election, we published a newspaper criticizing the incumbent mayor. We distributed approximately 130,000 copies near the entrances of 20 stations on four randomly selected metro lines one month prior to the election. We found that the incumbent’s vote share was 1.7 percentage points lower at the voting stations where the newspaper was distributed. These votes go to other candidates who address issues raised by the negative campaign. Anti-regime campaigning does not suppress turnout or increase disapproval voting.

Conjoint experiments have enabled scholars to understand the preferences of citizens in a variety of political contexts. We propose a method to modify the standard text-only “box conjoint” to make the treatment higher in external validity with respect to a common target context. Citizens frequently encounter political information encoded as images and in particular in the form of politicians’ social media posts and profiles. We deploy “visual conjoint” experiments where subjects select between two images that encode the same explicit information as is standard in the box conjoint. We conduct an experiment in which we randomize the modality of a conjoint experiment where subjects evaluate the Twitter profiles of hypothetical candidates. We demonstrate that the visual conjoint more effectively encodes image-based information and social endorsement information. The visual conjoint also allows the salience of different attributes to vary naturally the way they do on social media, in contrast to the artificially enforced uniformity of the box conjoint.

Research on policy shifts has found that repositioning can be costly as it affects candidates’ perceived honesty, reliability, and competence. It remains unclear, however, whether a politician’s gender affects perceptions of repositioning. Research on gender stereotypes has found that while male politicians are viewed as more competent, decisive, and displaying strong leadership, female politicians are believed to be more honest. Applying expectancy-violation theory, I test the hypothesis that the reputational cost of repositioning is more pronounced for female politicians in a preregistered survey experiment fielded on a large convenience sample in Flanders, Belgium (n = 6,957). I find that while frequent repositioning is evaluated negatively, the negative effect of repositioning is not more pronounced for female candidates than for male candidates on most outcome measures.

Presidents possess vast authority over policies and outcomes. Recent studies suggest the public checks this unilateralism through expressive opinions and political participation. We reevaluate this accountability link with a preregistered panel survey that incorporates a number of design and conceptual improvements over existing experimental studies. Our findings reveal a more complex relationship between presidential actions and public opinion. We find no evidence that the public reacts negatively to unilateralism – and some evidence they react positively. Respondents, however, may punish an incumbent for failing to implement the proposed policy change. While such a result suggests that the public can hold presidents accountable, we close by discussing how a lack of information likely renders this check moot.

As many American states have considered policies consistent with democratic backsliding in recent years, political elites and scholars have speculated on the consequences of these policies for political behavior. We examine the effect of backsliding policies on Americans’ preferences over leisure travel destinations; because vacationing is transitory, this focus allows us to isolate the role of individuals’ democratic predispositions and values in preference formation from the implications of these policies on their self-interest that they would experience from living under those policies themselves. Through pre-registered conjoint and vignette survey experiments, we find that Americans, and especially Democrats, express less interest in vacationing in states that recently adopted backsliding policies. Our results spotlight an accountability mechanism by which Americans may sanction backsliding states, though the modest magnitude of these sanctions – less than 1% of backsliding states’ gross domestic products – may not deter backsliding behavior on their own.

Survey experiments often yield intention-to-treat effects that are either statistically and/or practically “non-significant.” There has been a commendable shift toward publishing such results, either to avoid the “file drawer problem” and/or to encourage studies that conclude in favor of the null hypothesis. But how can researchers more confidently adjudicate between true, versus erroneous, nonsignificant results? Guidance on this critically important question has yet to be synthesized into a single, comprehensive text. The present essay therefore highlights seven “alternative explanations” that can lead to (erroneous) nonsignificant findings. It details how researchers can more rigorously anticipate and investigate these alternative explanations in the design and analysis stages of their studies, and also offers recommendations for subsequent studies. Researchers are thus provided with a set of strategies for better designing their experiments, and more thoroughly investigating their survey-experimental data, before concluding that a given result is indicative of “no significant effect.”

What are the relative contributions of stereotypes about the race and deservingness of welfare recipients to Americans’ opinions on welfare? A recent study employing a conjoint-experimental method finds that Americans’ stereotypes of welfare recipients as undeserving drive negative attitudes toward welfare, while stereotypes of welfare recipients as Black have little effect. However, this finding may be produced by the measure of welfare attitudes that includes questions implicating deservingness. We implement a conceptual replication of that study using different measures of welfare policy opinions that directly ask respondents about spending, both on welfare generally and on specific welfare programs. We show that when support for welfare is measured using the spending questions, stereotypes about race are significantly associated with opposition to welfare. These results have important implications for the debate on Americans’ opposition to welfare programs, as well as for the measurement of policy opinions in surveys.