This address considers the role of culture in economic history. It argues that AngloSaxon culture was an important factor determining where and when industrialization began and spread. The contrast between Anglo-Saxon individualism and Japan’s more collective culture also is important in understanding the differences between Japanese and American industrial practices today. I predict that Japan’s collective culture may give it an economic edge in the coming years despite its current difficulties. And I advocate greater attention to culture by both economists and historians in the practice of economic history.

The article quantifies the impact of cheap grain on the European economy in the late nineteenth century. Falling transport costs led to dramatic declines in Anglo-American grain price gaps, but price convergence was less impressive between the U.S. and other European economies, and within Europe. Cheaper grain meant lower rents throughout Europe, and protection boosted rents, but the magnitudes involved differed between countries. Similarly, cheap grain increased real wages in Britain, but lowered them elsewhere. The grain invasion implied different shocks across countries, and this partly explains the varying trade policies pursued in Europe during this period.

In 1587 the English Privy Council issued its first Book of Orders for the relief of dearth, a program of grain-market control that included forced delivery of private stocks to local markets in crisis periods. The policy has been described as an effective response to irrational hoarding and credited for a significant reduction in English grain-price variance. In contrast, I find support for an alternative profit maximizing model of storage. The occurrence of similar price stabilization in other European markets in the early seventeenth century is also demonstrated, suggesting English policy was not the cause.

Whether anthropometric-mortality risk relationships as found in present day populations also characterized past populations is disputed. This article finds U-shaped body mass index (BMI)-mortality risk relationships among nineteenth-century men that were similar to such relationships as found in twentieth-century men. No relationship between height and mortality could be detected. This article infers from the socioeconomic homogeneity of the sample that the BMI-mortality risk relationship, although apparently invariant with respect to time, is driven by noneconomic factors.

This article uses state and city level data to evaluate empirically Brinley Thomas's immigrant-as-deterrent view of the relationship between black emigration from the South and European immigration to the North. The article suggests a Todaro-like interpretation of the Great Migration, which emphasizes the importance of job availability to blacks in determining their expected wages. The combination of mass European immigration and hiring practices that favored white immigrants over blacks may have delayed the Great Migration by decades. The empirical work supports this view.

Strange as it seems, the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff might have had an expansionary effect on the U.S. economy. Basic macroeconomic principles indicate that the direct effect of a tariff increase is expansionary. This expansionary effect might be offset by retaliatory increases in foreign tariffs. Barry Eichengreen has recently questioned whether significant retaliation to Smoot-Hawley occurred. This article demonstrates that the tariff increases enacted during 1930 in Canada—the largest trading partner of the United States—were in direct response to Smoot-Hawley. The conventional wisdom that Smoot-Hawley hurt the U.S. economy may be right after all.

The greater flexibility associated with workers being able to choose the time and circumstance of their work allowed cottage manufacture to compete with technically more productive manufactories by rendering it more effective at harnessing a part time or offpeak workforce whose opportunity cost was low. Not only did this mean that cottage manufacture was better suited to the employment of women and children, who preferred flexibility in their hours and place of work, but also that the greater seasonality of labor supply in England led that economy to rely more on cottage manufacturing than did the United States during early industrialization.

Recent studies suggest that the earnings of pre-1890 immigrants grew slowly compared with those of natives and imply that these immigrants did not assimilate well into the American labor market. Using data for Michigan and California this article estimates new specifications for immigrant and native-born earnings, and finds that immigrants who arrived as children had similar earnings profiles to the native-born. Immigrants who arrived as adults suffered an initial earnings disadvantage but their earnings grew faster than those of the native-born. These results are consistent with the traditional view that pre-1890 immigrants assimilated well.

There are two views of the British Industrial Revolution in the literature today. The more traditional description sees the Industrial Revolution as a broad change in the British economy and society. This broad view of the Industrial Revolution has been challenged by Crafts and Harley who see the Industrial Revolution as the result of technical change in only a few industries. This article presents a test of these views using the Ricardian model of international trade with many goods. British trade data are used to implement the test and discriminate between the two views of the Industrial Revolution.

Manorial accounts allow detailed investigation of the market involvement of medieval seignorial demesnes. Production decisions taken locally emerge as strongly, if indirectly, influenced by the market. Disposal decisions, in contrast, were much more a matter of estate policy and therefore of institutional factors. Probably because of differential transaction costs, many lords preferred to provision their households directly from their estates rather than sell the bulk of their produce and purchase most of their provisions. The forces promoting commercialization within the seignorial arable sector appear to have been stronger at the opening than the close of the fourteenth century.

A case study, a formal model, and an anaLysis of Census of Manufactures data support a conclusion that cost heterogeneity was a major source of the “compliance crisis” affecting a number of National Recovery Administration “codes of fair competition.” Key elements of the argument are assumptions that progressives at the NRA allowed majority coalitions of small, high-cost finns to impose codes in heterogeneous industries, and that these codes were designed by the high-cost firms under an ultimately erroneous belief that they would be enforced by the NRA.

The performance of the Italian economy just before World War I was relatively poor as a result of a backward productive structure. Among other reasons, this may have been caused by the lack of domestic coal reserves, especially given the features of nineteenth-century technology. However, many economic historians resist this argument since coal could be either imported or substituted. Although both solutions were attempted in Italy, this article demonstrates that neither solved the Italian energy problem. In particular, the contribution made by electricity was much less effective than many contemporaries and historians have suggested.

This article offers an explanation for the regional differences in the use of African and European bound labor in colonial America. The migrations of Africans and Europeans to the Americas set in motion an evolutionary process that caused regional changes in the disease ecology of the New World. Biological and epidemiological differences among populations explain the different regional labor supply choices. This article emphasizes the interactions between changing populations and disease environments. Diseases are intermediaries through which populations interact by causing illness and death. Not all populations are equally afflicted by specific diseases. Therein lies the story.

The Near East was subject to many of the same fiscal and monetary forces that affected Europe and parts of Asia during the early modem era. For almost two decades during the seventeenth century, debased European coinage circulated widely in Ottoman markets at values far above their specie content. This article provides an explanation in terms of Ottoman fiscal deficits, currency instability, currency substitution, and decline in local silver mines all of which led to the closure of mints. The reasons behind the conspicuous absence of Ottoman copper coinage during this period are also explored.

Although its role has been overlooked by monetary historians, a two-cent tax on bank checks effective from June 1932 through December 1934 appears to have been an important contributing factor to that period's severe monetary contraction. According to the estimates in this article, the currency–demand deposit ratio was about 15 percent higher, and the M1 money stock about 12 percent smaller, ceteris paribus, than each would have been without the tax. The contractionary consequences had in fact been anticipated by many legislators who were, nevertheless, unable to prevent the measure from being included in the Revenue Act of 1932.

After World War I rent control became a cornerstone of housing policy in many European countries, resulting in quantity constraints on the demand for housing. The theory on complete demand systems provides a framework for analyzing the effects of these policies on consumption. As a test case, a demand model is estimated to calculate virtual rent prices for interwar Belgium. The results are well in line with historical evidence, providing insight into the extent of rationing Simulations with the demand model show that the severe rent restrictions especially favored expenditures on food.

Per capita agricultural output sharply declined in the “Confederate States” between 1860 and 1880. This article asserts that the decline in agricultural output was partially the result of increased disease (hookworm) brought about by substandard living conditions suffered by the Southern population during the Civil War. Skeletal remains and mortality data, ubiquitous hookworm symptoms among the Southern population, and regression analysis support this hypothesis. The econometric results strongly suggest that emancipation and increased hookworm infection were responsible for the income decline while an increase in the percentage of sharecropping tenancy arrangements increased southern productivity.

Ongoing research on British overseas trade does not support supply-side explanations of British industrialization. Contrary to widely publicized views, the share of British industrial exports in alternative measures of industrial output rose almost continuously throughout the period 1723 to 1851. This finding rests on the official values of British domestic exports, and it is confirmed by new annual estimates of Britain's domestic export, and it is confirmed by new annual estimates of Britain's domestic export values at current an constant prices form 1772 to 1821. Further research on prices, and on Britain's strikingly underutilized trade records, may lead to a more balanced perception of supply and demand forces during the Industrial Revolution.

Using annual data on nationally chartered U.S. and Canadian banks from 1929 to 1989, this article empirically evaluates the impact of various regulations on bank profitability. An intercountry comparison reveals that the less restrictive regulatory environment in Canada has historically resulted in higher bank profits. Specifically, higher leverage, greater securities investment and lending opportunities, and the freedom to establish branch units all significantly contribute to higher bank profitability in Canada. Evidence presented also shows that U.S. banks would have been more profitable over the sample period in a regulatory environment similar to Canada's.

The battle over gold is typically explained as driven by proinflation debtors. However, going off gold would also have caused a depreciation, raising tradable prices relative to nontradables prices and helping producers of exportable primary products. An analysis of Congressional votes on monetary legislation indicates that higher constituency debt levels were not associated with opposition to gold, whereas mining and agricultural production were. This suggests that gold politics was at least as much about the impact of the exchange rate on relative prices as it was about inflation of the overall price level.