In the mid-1820s, banks became the first businesses in Great Britain and Ireland to be allowed to form freely on an unlimited liability joint-stock basis. Walter Bagehot warned that their shares would ultimately be owned by widows, orphans, and other impecunious individuals. Another hypothesis is that the governing bodies of these banks, constrained by special legal restrictions on share trading, acted effectively to prevent such shares being transferred to the less wealthy. We test both conjectures using the archives of an Irish joint-stock bank. The results do not support Bagehot's hypothesis.

We calculate the natural rate of unemployment in 1909 by first estimating equations for the incidence and time lost in unemployment on a pooled dataset integrating the manuscript sample of the 1910 census and state BLS surveys and then simulating a counterfactual unemployment rate as if the economy had been on trend that year with business-cycle effects neutralized. Following a similar procedure for the 1960s, we find the natural rate in the earlier period to have been substantially higher. The demise of casual unskilled labor, or floaters, seems to have been an important contributory factor.

Spain provides an opportunity to study the causes of regional differences in industrial development over the nineteenth century. As transportation costs decreased and barriers to domestic trade were eliminated, Spanish manufacturing became increasingly concentrated in a few regions. This article combines Heckscher-Ohlin and economic-geography frameworks and finds that comparative-advantage and increasing-return effects were economically very significant and practically explained all differences in industrialization levels across regions. The deficits of some regions in terms of industrialization appear to have been largely attributable to their factor endowments and the absence of home-market effects for modern industries.

Are firms with strong market positions powerful engines of technological progress? Joseph Schumpeter thought so, but his hypothesis has proved difficult to verify empirically. This article highlights Schumpeterian market-power and creative-destruction effects in a sample of early-twentieth-century U.S. industrial firms; his contention that an efficiently functioning capital market has a positive effect on the rate of innovation is also confirmed. Despite market power abuses by incumbents, the extent of innovation stands out: 21 percent of patents assigned to the firms sampled between 1920 and 1928 are cited in patents granted between 1976 and 2002.

The new sectoral estimates of industrial production in 1871, 1881, 1901, and 1911 are regionally allocated using census labor-force data. The regional aggregates suggest that the “industrial triangle” emerged over these decades out of a traditional surplus-recycling economy. The concomitant change in the industrial rankings argues against attributing the regions' different paths to their different initial conditions; surprisingly, too, overall growth does not seem closely tied to industrial development. The disaggregated estimates suggest in turn that the industrial structure of the various regions remained relatively similar, as if comparative advantages were generically industrial rather than sector-specific.

Why did state governments begin to regulate the food industry in the late nineteenth century? One possible explanation is that pure food regulation was the result of rent seeking on the part of traditional food producers who wanted to limit the availability of new substitutes. Another potential hypothesis is that regulation was desired because it helped solve an asymmetric information problem in the market for food products. I find the evidence to be more consistent with the latter hypothesis.

The Solow growth and the Heckscher-Ohlin trade models describe two competing processes through which regional incomes converge over time. Solow's model attributes rising productivity of labor to additional regional capital investments. Heckscher-Ohlin's trade model ascribes the relocation of high value industries to regions with low wage rates. On the other hand Paul Krugman expects incomes to diverge over time as regions with an initial advantage maintain it through ever increasing external economies of scale. The Solow and Heckscher-Ohlin models imply that incomes converge through the movement of high quality labor and capital and high value goods and services into low income regions respectively.

The sixty-fourth annual meeting of the Economic History Association will be held in San Jose, California, 10–12 September 2004, at the Fairmont San Jose. Joel Mokyr, 2003/04 E.H.A. President, announced the theme “Technological Change and Economic Growth in History.”