In this article, I analyze diverging political pathways of labor market reform with an empirical focus on the cases of Japan and Korea. Despite similar trends of regulatory reform toward the increase of labor market flexibility, the patterns of labor market reform differed in the two countries. Japan adopted labor market liberalization for nonregular workers with the persistence of employment protection for regular workers. In contrast, Korea opted for regulatory reform for all workers while simultaneously strengthening workers' basic rights and improving protections for nonregular workers. I argue that the institutional features of the employment protection system determine the diverging patterns of labor market reform in Japan and Korea.

The “organizational life” is an important part of the daily existence of North Koreans. Every adult in North Korea has to be a participant in a multitude of rituals that serve a dual purpose of surveillance and indoctrination. In this article, we describe how the organizational life is arranged and also explain the ways it contributes to maintaining the domestic stability of North Korea and to manufacturing consent for the current regime. The study is based largely on refugee interviews.

For the last four decades Sino-Japanese relations have been characterized by steadily growing economic and sociocultural interactions. Yet, greater interdependence has developed in tandem with bilateral tensions. Many analysts have attempted to explain the latter as a result of Japan trying to balance or contain the burgeoning growth of Chinese capabilities. In this article, we question and qualify this widespread understanding of Japan's response to China's rise by examining how Japan has handled China's rise between 1978 and 2011. More precisely, how has Japan dealt with China's long-term core strategic interests, which are embodied in the post-1978 Chinese “grand strategy” that is believed to have been instrumental to China's rise? Our main finding is that to a significant degree Japan has accommodated the rise of China rather than balanced against it.

South Korea, the newest member to join the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, has signaled that it will become a major donor of official development assistance (ODA). Having had its own history of being a large recipient of ODA, South Korea claimed that it will provide aid from the recipient's perspective. Using panel data covering twenty-three years (1987–2009) and 154 recipient countries, we examine whether South Korea's ODA reflects the recipient nation's humanitarian needs more than the donor's interests. We ask three questions: (1) What are the major determinants of South Korea's ODA allocation? (2) Has South Korea's ODA policies changed over different time horizons—that is, years, political regimes? (3) Does South Korea exhibit different standards of allocating ODA for different groups of recipient countries? We find that South Korea provides more aid to higher-income developing countries with higher growth rates, which shows the tendency to serve the donor's economic interests. When we examine the data by time periods, we do not find significant differences over decades or political regimes. However, when we reexamine the data based on recipients' income levels, we find that the relationship between per capita income of the recipient country and ODA allocation is negative only for the middle-income or lower-middle-income group recipients and positive for the rest. This finding suggests the possibility that South Korea's ODA policy may have a dual-track structure.

Since 1976, the militaries of the United States and South Korea have been holding routine joint military exercises (JMEs) for the purposes of military training and deterrence against North Korea. These exercises are frequently cited as a cause of tension on the peninsula, causing North Korea to escalate its conflictual rhetoric and behavior. I empirically assess this claim using new data on US-ROK JMEs and machine-coded event data collected by the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System. The findings show that North Korea does not systematically escalate its conflictual rhetoric or behavior during or near the occurrence of JMEs. The results hold for both low- and high-intensity exercises and for rhetoric that has the United States and South Korea as its target.