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War Games: North Korea'S Reaction to US and South Korean Military Exercises

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2016

Vito D'Orazio
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Since 1976, the militaries of the United States and South Korea have been holding routine joint military exercises (JMEs) for the purposes of military training and deterrence against North Korea. These exercises are frequently cited as a cause of tension on the peninsula, causing North Korea to escalate its conflictual rhetoric and behavior. I empirically assess this claim using new data on US-ROK JMEs and machine-coded event data collected by the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System. The findings show that North Korea does not systematically escalate its conflictual rhetoric or behavior during or near the occurrence of JMEs. The results hold for both low- and high-intensity exercises and for rhetoric that has the United States and South Korea as its target.

Keywords

joint military exerciseconflictdeterrenceescalationevent dataNorth Korea
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , May 2012 , pp. 275 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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