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“There Must Be Some Misunderstanding”: Sir Edward Grey's Diplomacy of August 1, 1914

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2014

Stephen J. Valone
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Extract

For over two generations, scholars have studied Sir Edward Grey's response to the Sarajevo crisis, apparently considering every aspect of his dual effort to find a diplomatic solution while convincing the cabinet that England must intervene in a general war. Historians have generally agreed that Grey's last hope to prevent war evaporated by the end of July, although the cabinet did not decide to intervene until August 2. In this light, the events of August 1, 1914, are only considered to be either a prelude or a postscript to more significant events. The purpose of this essay is to suggest that Grey pursued two distinct, yet interrelated, courses of action on August 1, 1914: (1) for as long as he was unsure of cabinet support for intervention, he sought to make a diplomatic deal with the German ambassador so that a neutral England could salvage something from the crisis, but (2) once confident England would enter the conflict, he sought to prevent the war altogether by applying diplomatic pressure on France.

Historians have overlooked Grey's diplomacy on August 1 primarily because of the cloud cast over the events of the day by the so-called misunderstanding between Grey and the German ambassador, Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky. The first Grey-Lichnowsky exchange took place that morning when Sir William Tyrrell, Grey's private secretary, brought a message to the German embassy. After subsequently receiving a personal call from Grey, Lichnowsky, at 11:14 a.m., sent a wire to Berlin in which he indicated Grey had proposed that, if Germany “were not to attack France, England would remain neutral and would guarantee France's passivity.”

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of British Studies , Volume 27 , Issue 4 , October 1988 , pp. 405 - 424
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 1988

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References

1 For example, see Steiner, Zara, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914 (Cambridge, 1969), p. 159Google Scholar; Ekstein, Michael and Steiner, Zara, “The Sarajevo Crisis,” in British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. Hinsley, F. H. (London, New York, 1977), p. 403Google Scholar; Wilson, K. M., “The British Cabinet's Decision for War, 2 August 1914,” in British Journal of International Studies 1 (1975): 148–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hazlehurst, Cameron, Politicians at War (New York, 1971), pp. 85–86Google Scholar.

2 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, Die Deutschen Dokumeme zum Kriegsausbruch, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Berlin, 1919), 3, no. 562:66Google Scholar (cited hereafter as DD3).

3 Ibid., no. 570, p. 70.

4 Young, Harry, “The Misunderstanding of August 1, 1914,” Journal of Modern History 48 (December 1976): 650CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 King George to Kaiser Wilhelm, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 612, pp. 103–4.

6 Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, ed. Gooch, G. P. and Temperly, Harold, 11 vols. (London, 1926–1936), 11, no. 419:250Google Scholar, n. 2 (cited hereafter as BD11). Lichnowsky, Karl Max, Heading for the Abyss: Reminiscences, trans. and ed. Delmer, Sefton (London, New York, 1928), pp. 75–76Google Scholar. There is no reference made to the “misunderstanding” in either the Grey or Tyrrell papers deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). See PRO, Foreign Office (FO) 800/35–113, 220.

7 See Young, pp. 644–45, 660–61, 665.

8 See Geiss, Imanuel, ed., Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch, 2 vols. (Hanover, 1964), 2:530Google Scholar; and Fischer, Fritz, Krieg der Illusionen (Dusseldorf, 1969), p. 724Google Scholar.

9 Young, pp. 663–65. Young placed great stock in the fact that both Grey and Lichnowsky, in “independent” accounts of August 1 written later that month, stated that Lichnowsky had not understood the inclusion of Russia in a Franco-German standoff. Since the two men met with each other on August 3 and again on August 5, one must, however, question the value of these “independent” explanations. It should be mentioned that the Grey-Lichnowsky exchanges of August 1 are not discussed by either of Grey's principal biographers. See Trevelyan, George M., Grey of Fallodon (Boston, 1937)Google Scholar; and Robbins, Keith, Sir Edward Grey (London, 1971)Google Scholar.

10 Albertini, Luigi, Le origini della guerra del 1914, 3 vols. (Milan, 1942–1943)Google Scholar, cited here in The Origins of the War of 1914, trans. Massey, Isabella (London, 1952–1957), 3:368, 385Google Scholar. With respect to the “misunderstanding” itself, he wrote on p. 382 of the same volume, “It is, moreover, obvious that he [Lichnowsky] can hardly have misunderstood first Tyrrell and then Grey, who over the telephone had put the direct question.”

11 Corp, Edward, “Sir William Tyrrell: The Eminence Grise of the British Foreign Office, 1912–1915,” Historical Journal 25, no. 3 (1982): 705CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Lutz, Hermann, Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1927)Google Scholar, cited here in Lord Grey and the World War, trans. Dickes, E. W. (London, 1928), p. 296Google Scholar.

13 For example, see Hinsley, ed. (n. 1 above). The “misunderstanding” of August 1, is not mentioned in any of the essays.

14 Burns Diary, July 29, 1914, British Library Additional MS 46336.

15 Grey to Goschen, July 29, 1914, BD 11, no. 286, pp. 182–83.

16 Grey to Bertie, July 29, 1914, BD 11, no. 283, p. 180.

17 Goschen to Grey, July 29, 1914, BD 11, no. 293, pp. 185–86.

18 Ibid.

19 Quoted in Hazlehurst (n. 1 above), p. 81.

20 Grey to Goschen, July 30, 1914, BD 11, no. 303, pp. 193–94. SirGrey, Edward (Viscount Grey of Fallodon), Twenty-Five Years, 2 vols. (New York, 1925), 1:329Google Scholar.

21 Quoted in Hazlehurst, p. 84.

22 Grey, , Twenty-Five Years, 1:329Google Scholar.

23 Grey to Goschen, July 31, 1914, BD 11, no. 340, pp. 215–16.

24 Grey to Bertie, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 352, p. 220.

25 Ibid., no. 367, pp. 226–27.

26 Buchanan to Grey, July 30, 1914, BD11, no. 347, p. 218. This telegram arrived at 5:20 P.M. on July 31. See the note added to the document that corrects the date the telegram was sent. Asquith announced news of the mobilization to the House of Commons at about five o'clock.

27 BD11, July 31, 1914, no. 372, pp. 229–30.

28 Grey to Buchanan, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 384, pp. 235–36. See also Asquith, Herbert, Moments of Memory: Recollections and Impressions (London, 1937), p. 198Google Scholar.

29 Villiers to Grey, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 377, p. 233.

30 Bertie to Grey, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 382, p. 234.

31 Goschen to Grey, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 383, pp. 234–35.

32 Crackanthorpe to Grey, July 30, 1914, BD11, no. 388, p. 237.

33 Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 411, p. 246.

34 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 562, p. 66.

35 See Young (n. 4 above), p. 657. He noted that the strongest evidence that they met “is provided by Lichnowsky whose cable of 11:14 a.m. reported that the proposal Tyrrell had just vaguely indicated to him would issue from a ministerial consultation [Ministerberatung] which was taking place at that moment. After Tyrrell left him, as the prince reported further in his cable, Grey called him by telephone and said that he would make use of the prince's assurance with regard to France in ‘today's cabinet meeting,’ an obviously different gathering from the one taking place when Tyrrell first came to the German embassy.” Haldane also mentioned this meeting in a letter to his mother. See Hazelhurst (n. 1 above), p. 90.

36 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3 no. 562, p. 66.

37 Albertini (n. 10 above), 3:381, 382–83.

38 Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 426, p. 253.

39 Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 448, pp. 260–61.

40 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 570, p. 70.

41 Samuel, Herbert Louis, Memoirs (London, 1945), p. 101Google Scholar.

42 Hazlehurst, p. 99.

43 Villiers to Grey, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 395, p. 240.

44 Goschen to Grey, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 404, p. 243.

45 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 596, pp. 89–91.

46 Young, Harry, Prince Lichnowsky and the Great War (Savannah, Ga., 1977), p. 117Google Scholar.

47 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 596, pp. 89–91.

48 Ibid.

49 Albertini (n. 10 above), 3:386.

50 In his memoirs, perhaps as an apology to Lichnowsky for the trouble he had caused him, Grey wrote, “Do his [Lichnowsky's] countrymen yet recognize, not only how clear he was of any responsibility, but the debt that is owed him for his efforts for peace during the whole of his Embassy in London? We, at any rate, remember him gratefully for having tried to avert a war that has been a calamity for everyone, victors as well as vanquished.” See Grey (n. 20 above), 2:233.

51 LadyLennox, Algernon Gordon, ed., The Diary of Lord Bertie, 1914–1918 (New York, 1924), p. 5Google Scholar. There are other similarities between the thoughts of the two men. That same day Bertie also wrote that “People, however, do not realize, or do not take into account, the difficulty for the British Government to declare England solidaire with Russia and France in a question such as the Austro-Servian [sic] quarrel.” On August 2 he prophesied, “The war will not be over soon. What carnage and suffering, and how disgusting the cause!” See Lennox, pp. 5, 9.

52 Bertie to Grey, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 382, p. 234.

53 Bertie to Grey, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 403, p. 243.

54 August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 406, p. 244.

55 Quoted in Hazlehurst (n. 1 above), p. 90. Note that Wilson apparently meant that the letter arrived at 11:30 because Asquith presided over the cabinet from 11:00 A.M. to 1:30 P.M.

56 Ibid.

57 Ekstein and Steiner, in Hinsley, ed. (n. 1 above), p. 405.

58 In the Paris embassy copy of this telegram, the word is “secured,” not “seemed,” as is recorded in BD11. See PRO, FO 146/4411. In Grey's original draft, it is unclear whether he wrote “seemed” or “secured.” See PRO, FO 371/2160. I have used “secured” because it was used in the embassy copy and makes more sense grammatically.

59 Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 419, p. 250.

60 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 596, pp. 89–91.

61 See PRO, FO 371/2160.

62 See PRO, FO 146/4411.

63 Ekstein and Steiner wrote that, “Grey made his own policy during these July days. At the start he did not consult his officials; as the crisis developed, he often disregarded their advice.” See Ekstein and Steiner, “The Sarajevo Crisis” in Hinsley, ed., p. 409.

64 See PRO, FO 371/2160.

65 Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 426, p. 253.

66 Ibid.

67 Nicolson, Harold, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart., First Lord Carnock (London, 1930), p. 419Google Scholar. Grey wrote in his memoirs that “the interviews with Cambon were distressing to both of us, but must have been even more so to him than to me. The very existence of his country as a great nation was at stake, and it was vital to France to know what Britain would do.” See Grey (n. 2 above), 1:339.

68 Lennox, p. 8.

69 Kaiser Wilhelm to King George, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 575, pp. 74–75. Furthermore, word arrived soon after of Germany's declaration of war on Russia. Given that Grey had still hoped for peace “before any Great Power begins war,” such news effectively ended all hope of avoiding war. Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 411, p. 246.

70 King George to Kaiser Wilhelm, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 612, pp. 103–4.

71 Goschen to Grey, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 383, pp. 234–35.

72 PRO, FO 146/4411.

73 Quoted in Morgan, Ted, Churchill: Young Man in a Hurry (New York, 1982), pp. 393–94Google Scholar.

74 Cambon, Paul, Correspondance (Paris, 1940–1946), vol. 3, pp. 119–20Google Scholar. In addition, note that the Germans invaded Belgium on August 4, not August 3, as Cambon wrote in the letter. The records contained in Documents Diplomatiques Francois (DDF) seem to support the contention that Cambon was referring to the events of August 1, 1914. In DDF no. 579, which was sent at 11:20 A.M. on August 2, Cambon wired that Grey had told him yesterday evening (hier soir) that “he will propose to the Cabinet to declare that the naval forces of England would prevent all operations against France.” With respect to Cambon's dispatch the night of August 1, the editors of DDF noted that the documents were apparently mistimed. See no. 532, n. 1. In their subsequent explanation, the editors stated that Cambon's dispatches no. 171 and no. 172 (which comprise DDF no. 532) are similar to BD11, no. 426, Grey to Bertie, 8:20 P.M. It is much more accurate to say that Cambon's no. 171 is so consistent because in this telegram Cambon did not mention Grey's offering any support to France or Belgium. In no. 172, Cambon reported that Grey “will demand authorization to declare Monday to the House of Commons that the Government of Britain will not permit a violation of Belgium” and that the British fleets “will oppose passage into the English Channel by the German fleets, or if they have already passed, any demonstration against the French coasts.” These declarations of British support are completely different from Grey's message to Bertie at 8:20 P.M. Finally, insofar as the actual timing of telegram no. 172 is concerned, Cambon reported, “The English fleets are mobilized.” Thus it would seem that no. 172 was written sometime after 9:30 P.M. on August 1.

75 Quoted in Hazlehurst (n. 1 above), p. 98.

76 Ibid.

77 Nicolson, p. 422. The next day, in an interview with U.S. Ambassador Walter Hines Page, after saying, “Everybody knows that there will be war,” Grey's eyes filled with tears and he concluded, “Thus the efforts of a lifetime go for nothing. I feel like a man who has wasted his life.” From Hendrick, Burton, Life and Letters of W. H. Page (New York, 1924), 1:313Google Scholar.

78 Ekstein and Steiner conclude that, “While Grey led the Cabinet into war, he more than anyone had a horror of war and forebodings about its consequences. Britain's entry into war was both a victory and a defeat.” See Hinsley, ed. (n. 1 above), p. 410.