In any highly industrialized country, especially one which relies mainly upon private enterprise for its economic development, the managerial system assumes a position of critical importance. It has been widely recognized in this connection that practices and policies developed by management are principal determinants of employer-employee relations and, in turn, affect significantly the outcome of many economic, social, and political problems that emerge in the process of industrialization. Close examination of management in varying cultural and national settings helps to understand the nature of conflicts existing in modern industrial societies and may furnish clues to their solution. A recent study comparing present-day business management in Western Europe and the United States represents a first step in this direction. This article deals with Japan—still another nation in which modern industrialization operates largely under a system of private enterprise the characteristics of which contrast sharply with America.

The primary unit in the hierarchy of Philippine local government is the barrio. The term, barrio, is employed to describe any and all sub-units of the municipalities which lie outside the poblacion (municipal center) as well as sub-divisions of some of the smaller chartered cities. This double use of the term leads to confusion, for the rural barrio differs considerably from a barrio located within an urban or semi-urban area. The latter closely resembles a ward or precinct in a small American city, while the former is more akin to the prototype of an Asian village. In this paper, barrio will be used only in reference to the rural units and where mentioned is made of barrios which are city units, the distinction will be made.

As Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Japanese occupation was a decisive factor in the shaping of political developments in Indonesia after 1945. It is indeed probable that the impact of those eventful forty months was greater in Indonesia than in Burma and the Philippines, both of which countries had progressed further toward autonomy and self-rule under Western colonial rule than had the Netherlands Indies. It is certainly no coincidence that Japan granted “independence” to these areas during 1943, while in Indonesia a guarded promise of the distant goal of such independence came only as the result of the adverse course of the Pacific War in the latter part of 1944, when Allied landings in Indonesia appeared a probability. It was not until September of that year that, on instructions from Tokyo, the military administration on Java took steps which facilitated the ultimate success of the nationalist revolution in Indonesia. An examination of Japanese policies during the early months of the occupation of Java, the center of Indonesian political life then and now, leaves little doubt that the fate of Indonesia would have been far different had Japan continued victorious in the war.

One of the important keys to understanding twentieth-century developments in Central Asia—especially in Buriat Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Tibet—is an appreciation of the important role played by the Buriat Mongolian intelligentsia. The Buriats, in the words of one of them, " … constituted the cultural avant-garde among the Mongolian tribes, introducing and leading the revolutionary ideas of our time…”

Buriat Mongolia, now an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union, includes in its population less than 300,000 Buriats, roughly one-tenth of the total Mongolian population of the world. From this small group, most of whom were illiterate before 1917, arose a group of intellectuals whose influence extended beyond the borders of their homeland to Outer Mongolia and Tibet, and to the smaller areas of Barga (in Manchuria) and Urianghai (incorporated in 1943 into the USSR as the Tannu Tuva Autonomous Oblast'). This Buriat intelligentsia was particularly influential from about 1900 to 1930; in the thirties most of them were purged—killed or sent to concentration camps.

In a paper that appeared some time ago, I suggested that Chang Ping-lin (1868-1936) spared the Classics by condemning the Throne. K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927), the intellectual leader of the fin-de-siècle monarchist Reformers, had tied his radical prescriptions for Chinese society and culture to a highly personal reading of old texts, especially the Kung-yang chuan, one of two long-overshadowed alternates to the Tso-chuan as the key to the meaning of the Ch'unch'iu, the Spring and Autumn annals. His exploitation of the Kung-yang chuan, in turn, depended on the discrediting of a whole class of texts to which the Tsochuan belonged, the so-called ku-wen or “ancient-text” Classics, accepted as the orthodox canon since the end of the Later Han dynasty. Unlike the ku-wen Classics, to whose prototypes orthodox Confucian tradition attributed a pre- Ch'in antiquity, the Kung-yang chuan existed only in a Han (hence, chin-wen or “modern-text”) version, allegedly a faithful reconstruction of an early original.

One wonders what the general reading public has made of the translations of traditional Chinese fiction which have recently appeared in bookstores, in several instances in paper-bound series usually devoted to up-to-date novels of violence and vampires. Chinese colloquial fiction before the coming of Western influences certainly contains enough of both murder and adultery to give the average reader a sense of literary familiarity; but the thoughtful reader must be puzzled by an undefinable inadequacy, by a feeling of literary promise unfulfilled, to which even the student of Chinese stories and novels must confess. Unconsciously conditioned as are we all to the premises and achievements of European fiction, we cannot fail to weigh this fiction of another culture in the same balance and find it vaguely wanting. In the following pages I intend to isolate several of the factors which contribute to our impression of disappointment upon reading those works which have long been a source of delight to the Chinese.

The Struggle to consolidate the gains of Indonesian independence has been dramatically reflected in the fiscal field. In the six years since the transfer of sovereignty from the colonial masters to the new Indonesian Republic, the central government has striven for an unprecedented degree of centralization of fiscal functions. What has emerged appears to be the broadening of central responsibility for expenditures, particularly on Java, without corresponding increases in revenues to meet these new responsibilities. The problems of sharing with localities these responsibilities and the resources to finance them have received much thought but little action. Virtually no attention has been given to the ways in which local governments might contribute to Indonesian economic development by utilizing the resources available to them. The case for greater decentralization of Indonesia's fiscal system is based on the argument that the rate of economic growth could be accelerated by the extension of greater fiscal autonomy to local levels of government and by more effective coordination between central and local development plans, particularly on the matter of financing.

This paper aims to present an informal overview of materials available on United States relations with the Far East as found in the records of the Department of State. At the outset it might be pointed out that the policy of the Department, both with respect to access to its records and in the reasonably expeditious publication of its foreign relations documents, is perhaps the most liberal of any major foreign office. This policy conforms with a fundamental maxim in the Department of State that the Congress, the world of scholarship, and the public at large be kept as fully informed about our foreign affairs as is consistent with sound diplomacy and national security. The opportunities, therefore, of research among primary sources on United States foreign relations are probably richer than those on the foreign affairs of any other country.

The notion that democracy, as the West understands democracy, is meeting a crucial test in the conflict of ideas that agitate the minds and emotions of Indians, is everywhere receiving greater attention. It is a notion as commonly understood by the Indian intellectual as it is popularly appreciated by those who would observe the process from the West. That the Indian view of China plays a significant role in this process is readily apparent.