Since the promulgation of Uganda's new constitution in 1995, the Law Reform Comission (LRC) has had the task of revising statutory laws to conform to the new constitution. One focal point has been the drafting of a Domestic Relations Bill. The bill proposes significant changes in women's legal status within the institutions of marriage and succession. Under the new statute, for example, women would gain joint marital property rights over any assets acquired during the course of marriage. Women could use the law to challenge husbands who seek to sell property or shift assets among their wives. The bill also proposes that when a married person dies intestate, the suviving spouse(s) should be appointed administrator to the estate, unless the courts have good reason not to do so. This should facilitate widows who seek to protect their assets from relatives who perceive in death opportunities to grab property. Not suprisingly, publication of the bill generated considerable outrage among men who perceive the extension of property rights to women as a direct threat to a natural social order privileging male authority.

Richtersveld Community and Others v. Alexkor Ltd and Another is the first case to consider whether aboriginal title is part of South African law. Aboriginal title is asui generis proprietary interest in land recognized in common law jurisdictions such as Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. It recognizes the prior occupation of those territories by aboriginal peoples before the arrival of settlers or colonization. Richtersveld was brought before the Land Claims Court which under the 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act considers claims to restitution of rights in land to individuals or communities dispossessed of such rights after 19 June 1913, as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices. The Court's jurisdiction is confined to redressing the discriminatory effect of land policies of the apartheid era, “considering the fact that more than 3.5 million people and their descendants have been victims of racially based dispossession and forced removal during the apartheid era”. It cannot consider the broader issue of the effect of colonial acquisition of territorial sovereignty on pre-existing customary land tenure systems, or rights in land.

The last decade of the twentieht century was a period that saw a worldwide shift from state command economies and welfare states to market-driven economies. In many countries the telecommunications industry has always been seen as as strategic one and thus wwas in most cases completely in the hands of state-owned corporations. It is there fore inevitable that telecommuncations industries the world over have undergone or are undergoing dramatic transformations as governments give up, wholly or in part, ownership and control of the industry.

Both Nigeria and the UK have recently overhauled their securities regulation regimes, Nigeria by its Investment and Securities Act 1999 (ISA 1999) and the UK by its Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000). The FSMA 2000 has resulted in a single, cross-sectoral regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). It regulates the whole of the UK financial services sector: investment business, banking and insurance. This Act is the culmination of an evolutionary process which began with self-imposed so-called “self-regulation” (in particular, of the London Stock Exchange in the 19th century) and led to self-regulation within a statutory framework under the Financial Services Act 1986. The main umbrella regulator under the 1986 Act was the Securities and Investments Board, the SIB, a registered company limited by guarantee, to which statutory powers were (revocably) delegated by the Government. But the day-to-day regulation of investment businesses was in fact undertaken by a number of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), which were “recognized” and overseen by the SIB. This complex institutional structure proved unsatisfactory and the FSMA 2000 now directly vests all regulatory powers in a single regulator, the FSA. In status the FSA is the SIB re-named but it now has extensive, directly conferred, statutory regulatory powers over the whole financial services sector.

After the political and constitutional transformation of Malawi between 1992 and 1995, numerous laws and various aspects of the legal system have been undergoing review to fit the new constitutional order. As expected, some of the legislative activity has focused on employment and labour relations. The law on these issues has ossified for almost the entire three decades of independence and Dr. Banda's single-party rule. Labour-related issues were also very prominent during the transition from single-party to multi-party rule. Multitudes of unemployed or under-employed people, and workers clamouring for improved wages, filled the ranks of campaigners and agitators for political change. The trade union movement also provided some of the erstwhile leaders of the political campaigns. The end-result is that Malawi has a revised Constitution with prominent provisions on labour issues, and a set of new labour law statutes. This article describes and assesses reforms introduced under two of the main statutes, the Labour Relations Act 1996 and the Employment Act 2000, in the light of the dictates and characteristic features of the 1995 Constitution. The article is a sequel to a review and assessment of the law carried out prior to these reforms.

This article discusses the application of international human rights law by the courts in Malawi. It is divided into five parts. The first part examines the constitutional position of international law at the municipal level and will focus primarily on the position under the current Constitution of Malawi. The second discusses the relevance of international human rights law before national court, with the third part then analysing the relevance of such law in the courts. The fourth part considers the reasons for the attitude of the courts to international human rights law, whilst the final part contains some concluding remarks. The case law discussed is largely that handed down by the Supreme Court and the High Court since 1994.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Charter), adopted over two decades ago, entered into force on 21 October 1986. It made provision for the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission), which was established in 1987. The purpose of the Commission, according to the Charter, is “to protect human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa”. But the Commission has not been able to discharge that office satisfactorily. An important reason for the inability of the Commission to attain its principal objective of protecting human rights in Africa is the fact that it has no power to grant a remedy. It has no jurisdiction to make binding decisions against state parties that have violated the provisions of the Charter. Once the Commission reaches a decision on the merits of a case, its only jurisdiction is to make recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) of the Organization of African Unity. But the AHSG itself cannot make binding decisions against state parties. It can only decide to permit publication of their violations.

This article is concerned with a specialized area of constitutional theory and practice, namely the regulation of the foreign affairs powers. Foreign affairs is a wide term which expresses more than mere relations. “Affairs” include matters and things, as well as relationships and a constitutional grant of legitimate plenary powerr. This entails that foreign affairs are matters relating to foreign countries, i.e. affairs other than domestic and, specifically, matters having to do with the interests of the home country in foreign countries. In this context, foreign affairs may be identified as a function. A function is an activity specially fitted for, appropriate to or expected of some particular type of operation because of its peculiar nature, or qualifications. The foreign affairs function, thus, as Bonfield says, may be in an activity specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of international relations—the interests of a state in foreign states—due to the peculiar nature or attributes of such relations. In addition, “power” may be defined as the competence to decide and act that is attached to a specific function. Hence the foreign affairs power is the competenbce to decide and act in matters having to do with the interests of the home state in foreing states. It is made up principally of the following elements: treay making, diplomatic relations, recognition of states and governments, and war and peace. Appropriate regulation of the elements of the foreign affairs power is a vital element of good governance in any particular state.

One of the most critical factors on the conclusion of an insurance contract is to determine the extent of the insurance risk or cover. This enables parties to the contract to ascertain for themselves the rights and obligations under the policy. On the one hand, the extent of insurance risk determines what is recoverable by the insured or assured on the occurrence of the insured event, and, on the other hand, what level of liability is assumed and the premiums payable to the insurer. The extent of insurance risk also determines what rememdial action, if any, may be undertaken by the insured or assured by way of taking out extra insurance, if the policy at hand is not adequate.

With Nigeria's transition from military rule to democratically elected government in May 1999, a new constitution took effect. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, establishes a framework for democratic governance on the basis of a presidential system of government, with a two-chamber National Assembly, and organizes Nigeria as a federal republic. Soon after the new constitutional framework came into effect, it was thrown into the spotlight during a dispute between the president and the National Assembly that caused a four-month delay in the passing of the federal budget for the 2000 fiscal year.

The independence of the judiciary is a logical corollary of the principle of separation of powers in that the vesting of judicial functions in a body of persons separate from the executive and the legislature can only have real meaning if that body of persons is truly independent. Virtually all constitutions pay some regard to the principle of separation of powers and the extent to which a constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary is usually a good measure of the seriousness with which the principle of separation of powers is taken.

This article raises a number of issues, such as voting rights in general and the extent that government should go to ensure that all are able to exercise this right in a democracy. Also raised is the issue of prisoners' rights. Finally, the peculiarities of the South African prison system are at issue here too. The article will examine prisoners' voting rights in general elections. Provincial and local government elections are somewhat different and will not be discussed.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter) allows any state party that has good reason to believe that another state party has violated the provisions of the Charter to make a complaint (communication) to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission). But, in spite of persistent reports of widespread human rights violations in Africa, there is no evidence that state parties make use of this procedure to report each other to the African Commission for violations of the provisions of the Charter. State parties are generally not keen to complain about human right violations by another state of its own nationals within its territory. The reason for this reluctance may lie in the well-known adage that people who live in glass houses should not throw stones. However, if the decision in the recent Nigerian case of Gunme & Ors v. Attorney General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is good law and is followed in other countries, then an important way by which to overcome this reluctance on the part of state parties may have been established. In that case the Federal High Court of Nigeria in Abuja allowed 12 Cameroonians, who alleged that their right to self-determination under the African Charter had been violated by the Republic of Cameroon, to maintain an action in Nigeria for an order requiring Nigeria, as a state party to the African Charter, to present the case of the peoples of Southern Cameroons for self-determination and independence before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

RESPONDING TO TERRORISM

The tragic events in the United States on 11 September, 2001, have brought terrorism to the forefront of the agenda of the world community. This comes at a time when there are also widespread concerns about the impact of internqational and organized crime. The need to develop effective legal responses to these problems is reflected in the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September, 2001, which calls upon all States to adopt further measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law, including intyernational standards of human rights, to prevent terrorism and to strengthen international co-operation in combating terrorism. Similary, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime seeks to “promote co-operation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively”.

The debates surrounding both the content and interpretation of human rights have always been contentious. It seems that the points of difference between countries, including those on the African continent, are such that consensus on the content of human rights is difficult if not impossible to reach. Perhaps the time has come to move away from “one size fits all” initiatives. Short of abandoning human rights altogether, heresy in this day and age, perhaps we should seek consensus amongst smaller groupings of states, hence the suggestion made here that the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) should go it alone. Indeed one could argue that the process of going it alone has already begun. In gender issues that has been achieved in SADC by way of two Declarations, the first the 1997 SADC Gender and Development Declaration and the second the 1998 Addendum to the Declaration on Violence Against Women. Before examining the provisions of the two declarations, it is as well to give a brief background to SADC.

Section 149(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act gives the court a discretion to allow amendments to be made in the indictment or summons at any time before judgment if it considers that such amendment will not prejudice the accused in his or her defence. It provides: “Whenever, on the trial of any indictment or summons, there appears to be any variance between the statement therein and evidence offered in proof of such statement, or if it appears that any words or particulars that ought to have been inserted in the indictment or summons have been omitted, or that there is any other error in the indictment or summons the court may at any time before judgment, if it considers that the making of the necessary amendment in the indictment or summons will not prejudice the accused in his defence, order that the indictment or summons be amended, so far as it is necessary, by some officer of the court or other person, both in that part thereof where the variance, omission, insertion, or error occurs, and in every other part thereof which it may become necessary to amend.” The general rule is that an amendment of a summons should be done before the accused pleads and not during the reading of judgment or delivery thereof. However, in terms of this section, an amendment may be applied for and granted at any time before judgment.