1 Schenk, M. and Spaan, J., De Koningin sprak: Proclamaties en radiotoespraken van H.M. Koningin Wilhelmina gedurende de oorlogsjaren 1940–1945 (n.p. 1945) 56.Google Scholar

2 The six islands of the Netherlands Antilles at that time were Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, St Maarten, Saba, and St Eustatius.

3 This paper is partially based on previous research and secondary literature, while the analysis of the present situation is based on interviews with the spokesmen of the three largest political parties in the Netherlands: the Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party), the liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratic (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), and Christen Democratisch Appel (Christian Democratic Appeal), the chair of the so-called parlementarian Antillean commission, the rear admiral of the Royal Dutch Navy, with policy officers of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations in The Hague. I want to thank all of them for giving me their time and insights on this matter.

4 When asked, Dutch politicians say they care about the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, and Suriname, but in the same breath they admit that it is not a top priority for them or their party. The lack of public interest in the three countries is obvious and if there is news in the Dutch media it tends to be negative, focusing on mass migration, crime, drugs, corruption et cetera.

5 The government of the Kingdom consists of the Dutch cabinet plus the ministers plenipotentiary of the Caribbean countries.

6 For a recent and comprehensive overview of this subject see Meel, Peter, Tussen autonomie en onafhankelijkheid: Nederlands-Surinaamse betrekkingen 1954–1961 (Leiden 1999) 61–74.Google Scholar

7 This is not to say that nothing happened: Suriname, for example, tried to gain more latitude to conduct its foreign affairs, but the Dutch government would not hear of it. See for example Meel, Tussen autonomie en onajhankelijkheid.

8 On the events of May 30, 1969 see Oostindie, Gert, Curaçao, 30 met 1969: verhalen over de revolte (Amsterdam 1999)Google Scholar and Oostindie, Gert ed., Dromen en littekens: dertig jaar na de Curaçaose revolle, 30 mei 1969 (Amsterdam 1999).Google Scholar

9 For a detailed account in English of the process leading toward Suriname's independence see Dew, Edward, The Difficult Flowering of Suriname: Ethnicity and Politics in a Plural Society (The Hague 1978)Google Scholar; a more general overview of Suriname politics in the twentieth century is Hans Ramsoedh, ‘Playing Politics: Ethnicity, Clientelism and the Struggle for Power’ in: Hoefte, Rosemarijn and Meel, Peter, Twentieth-Century Suriname: Continuities and Discontinuities in a New World Society (Kingston/Leiden 2001) 91–110.Google Scholar

10 Dew, The Difficult Flowering, 182.

11 Speech Ed van Thijn in Amsterdam, February 19, 2001.

12 van Galen, John Jansen, Het Suriname-syndroom: de PudA tussen Den Haag en Paramaribo (Amsterdam 2001).Google Scholar

13 In the 1980s, when Suriname was plagued by political unrest and a military dictatorship, the United States made it clear that it considered the Netherlands as the country with primary responsibility regarding Suriname. For Suriname's positioning in the world, see Ad de Bruijne, ‘A City and a Nation: Demographic Trends and Socioeconomic Development in Urbanising Suriname’ in: Hoefte and Meel, Twentieth-Century Suriname, esp. 23–25. For a review of Suriname's foreign policy see Meel, ‘Not a Splendid Isolation: Suriname's Foreign Affairs' in: Hoefte and Meel, Twentieth-Century Suriname, 128–154.

14 Hans Buddingh', ‘Failure of a Model Decolonisation: Dutch-Surinamese Economic Relations’ in: Hoefte and Meel, Twentieth-Century Suriname, 81.

15 According to the 1975 treaty, fifty per cent of the funds should be spent on productive projects, twenty-five per cent on infrastructural projects, and twenty-five per cent on social and educational programmes, Buddingh’, ‘Failure’, 81.

16 Buddingh', ‘Failure’, 84.

17 Emphasis is mine. Protocol van conclusies van het overleg tussen de regering van de republiek Suriname en de regering van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden inzake nauwere samenwerking (Bonaire 1991) and Raamverdrag inzake vriendschap en nauwere samenwerking tussen de republiek Suriname en de regering van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (The Hague 1992).Google Scholar

18 Buddingh', ‘Failure’, 86.

19 See Ramsoedh, ‘Playing Polities’, 105–107.

20 NRC Handelsblad, September 15, 1998. This remark about Suriname's centrality to Dutch foreign policy was in all likelihood made to show that new brooms sweep clean; after all, the previous Foreign Minister, H.A.F.M.O. van Mierlo, had bluntly stated that Suriname was the only country where the Netherlands still had influence.

21 Similar thoughts were expressed in a speech by Dutch Member of Parliament Wouter Gortzak, Paramaribo, November 2000.

22 On Kingdom relations during this period see Reinders, A., ‘Veertig jaar Statuut, van 1994 tot 1954’, Nederlands Juristen Blad 69/44 (1994) 1509–1517.Google Scholar

23 During a so-called Round Table Conference in 1948 a petition requesting financial and administrative autonomy and signed by more than 2000 Arubans was presented to the Dutch government. Aruba, however, did not become a separate state in an Antillean federation. The separation movement was not only frustrated by the Netherlands and Curaçao, but also suffered from internal frictions which ultimately led to a split in the movement. For a review of Aruban identity and the quest for autonomy see Alofs, Luc and Merkies, Leontine, Ken ta Arubiano?: sociale integratie en natievorming op Aruba (Leiden 1990).Google Scholar

24 Reinders, ‘Veertig jaar Statuut’, 1515. The issue of independence in 1996 led to great political tension in the island, but the elections were overshadowed by the shooting of Bettico Croes.

25 On the changes in Dutch politics regarding this topic see Hoefte, Rosemarijn and Oostindie, Gert, ‘The Netherlands and the Dutch Caribbean: Dilemmas of Decolonisation’ in: Sutton, Paul ed., Europe and the Caribbean (London 1991) 71–98.Google Scholar

26 Toekomst in samenwerking (The Hague 1999).

27 Handelingen Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 24–1136, 27 maart 2001.

28 There are no restrictions on travel from the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba to the Netherlands, even though especially the Dutch liberals, WD, make periodic pleas to implement visa requirements for Antilleans/Arubans entering the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, these immigrants are entitled to social benefits. In the three years between 1997 and 2000 the number of inhabitants in Curaçao has dropped from 152,000 to 124,000. It should be emphasised that I focus here on the emigration of young Curaçaoans which presents major problems for a number of Dutch cities which have to deal with Antillean crime and unemployment. Currendy, there is a second migration movement of middle-class Curaçaoans who have considerably less difficulty in settling in the Netherlands because of their (language) skills and their chances in die Dutch job market. These two migration movements present different problems and opportunities to Curaçao and the Netherlands. The migration of youth lessens Curacao's social problems and has a positive effect on youth unemployment figures, while it increases social problems in the Netherlands. The migration of the middle class means that Curacao experiences a brain drain, but is welcomed in the Netherlands as skilled individuals are much in demand. It also should be noted that in the 1990s Aruba has seen a growth in the number of (Caribbean and Latin American) immigrants; its population increased from approximately 60,000 to 90,000 people.

29 In October 2000, a referendum in St Maarten showed a majority supporting a status aparte à la Aruba. The Dutch government is not in favour of this development, but awaits proposals from St Maarten, which had not been delivered when this article went to press.

30 Oostindie, Gert and Verton, Peter, ‘Ki sorto di Reino?/What Kind of Kingdom? Antillean and Aruban Views and Expectations of the Kingdom of the Netherlands’, New West Indian Guide 72 (1998) 43–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

31 This proposal for more autonomy in foreign affairs is in a way comparable to Suriname's attempts in the 1960s to gain more freedom in this respect, see note 7.

32 The role of the IMF does not mean, however, that The Hague is dogmatic in its financial policy as millions of dollars for non-governmental organisations and several educational and economic projects were committed in 2000 and 2001.