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DEMOCRAZIA E COMMERCIO: IL CASO DELLE GRANDI POTENZE TRA IL 1980 E IL 1998
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 July 2018
Introduzione
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Sin dall'Ottocento, l'economia politica dei classici ha prodotto modelli del commercio internazionale per spiegare tanto i vantaggi derivanti dall'apertura agli scambi, quanto la struttura dei flussi commerciali tra i diversi paesi. A tutt'oggi, gli assunti avanzati dal modello ricardiano del commercio internazionale e dal modello Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson, che spiegano i flussi di scambi commerciali rispettivamente basandosi sui concetti di vantaggio comparato e di dotazione di risorse, forniscono strumenti ampiamente utilizzati nella spiegazione dell'insorgenza e del mantenimento di rapporti commerciali tra stati. A differenza della letteratura economica, che si è concentrata in buona misura sulle cause dell'apertura commerciale e sulla spiegazione delle direzioni dei flussi di scambio, spesso limitandosi a individuare i fattori costanti nelle politiche protezioniste o liberiste degli stati, la letteratura politologica ha puntato il proprio interesse sulla spiegazione delle variazioni nella scelta degli stati di promuovere, oppure limitare, il grado di apertura agli scambi con l'estero.
Summary
Starting from the origins of the Liberal tradition of political thought, this article tracks back the roots of the link between trade and democracy. They are to be found in the idea of «economic commerce» from the writings of Montesquieu and Olson's political economy work on the nexus between regime representativeness and fiscal policy choices to the most recent empirical literature on the «democratic difference». The assumption that, for causes of both fiscal optimization and policy constraints exerted by a protectionist legislative on the executive, democracies are more prone towards free trade than non democracies. This study proves that domestic political regimes have an impact on the level of bilateral trade among great powers, while also endowing with robust empirical evidence the proposition according to which pairs of democratic states tend to trade more with each other than mixed pairs (e.g. pairs composed by a democracy and an autocracy) do. Furthermore, this research stands as the first empirical test of the relevance of the difference for trade made by democracy after the end of the Cold War and the democratization of Russia.
- Type
- Ricerche
- Information
- Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , April 2003 , pp. 31 - 69
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2003 by Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna
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