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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 June 2016
È apparsa evidente, sin dall'inizio, la necessità di una ricerca di équipe per affrontare il tema delle commissioni delle assemblee legislative in una prospettiva comparata piú ampia di quelle sin qui condotte. A tal fine si è deciso di affidare la ricerca ad uno studioso per ciascuno dei Paesi prescelti, senza predeterminazione di modelli teorici rigidi, sia perché si era constatata una notevole carenza di dati di fatto in riferimento a numerosi Paesi, sia perché vi era la convinzione che il tradizionale approccio anglo-americano tendeva a sopravvalutare, a fini comparati generali, i risultati delle ricerche condotte in riferimento alle commissioni delle assemblee legislative statunitensi e britanniche.
This paper summarises the findings arising from a study of the main committee structures in the national legislatures of nine countries. Contexts were chosen in which the legislature is important and there is a mix of political practice. From strongest to weakest, the rank order of committee systems is: United States, Italy, Chile, West Germany, Philippines, Canada, Britain, India and Japan. American committees, as the strongest, are in many ways a deviant case, a consequence of an undisciplined party system and cultural and historical predispositions. At the other extremity, Japanese committees have virtually no effect on governmental outputs, a consequenceof very strong party discipline, party distance and deferential cultural predispositions.
The nine committee systems are examined from the perspectives of constitutional system, party system, cultural attitudes, the stage of political development and the standing orders of the legislature. Party arrangements were found to provide the most important conditioner of committee behaviour, the strongest committees having the least party control and the weakest committees having the most party control. There tend to be stronger committees in countries with presidential systems than in those with parliamentary systems. Procedural arrangements determine such important matters as whether committees will be, for example, all-purpose, open, or generously staffed, and whether there will be subcommittees.
The following distinctive committee functions were discerned: (a) Committees promote consensus, being less partisan than plenary meetings of the legislature; (b) Since there is far less pressure of time committees than in plenary meetings, committees make it possible for legislatures to give detailed scrutiny to public affairs; (c) Committees broaden the policy base by facilitating the involvement of minority legislators; (d) Committees assist in system maintenance, providing occasion when Governments explain the realities and bargains are quietly struck.
* Queste cose erano esatte, ovviamente, prima della dittatura, n.d.t. Google Scholar
1 La mancanza della Francia tra i Paesi esaminati è dovuta a circostanze del tutto accidentali, in quanto l'autore cui era stato assegnato il capitolo sulla Francia non ha potuto terminarlo.Google Scholar
2 Vedi, ad esempio, Fenno, R. Jr., The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress , Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1966; Id., The House Appropriation Committee as a Political System: the Problem of Integration, in ≪ American Political Science Review ≫, LVI (1962), p. 130 ss.; Froman, L. Jr., Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress, in ≪ American Political Science Review ≫, LXII (1968), p. 518 ss.; Mainley, J., The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee, in ≪ American Political Science Review ≫, LIX (1965), p. 927 ss.Google Scholar
3 L'iter della ricerca sulle commissioni è stato, dunque, simile a quello della ben nota ricerca sull'opposizione politica in prospettiva comparata condotta e coordinata da Dahl, R. A., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies , New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966.Google Scholar
4 Vedi sul punto Almond, G. A. e Powell, G. B., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach , Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1966, tr. it. Politica comparata, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1970.Google Scholar
5 Vedi Goodwin, G. Jr., Subcommittees: the Miniature Legislatures of Congress , in ≪ American Political Science Review ≫, LVI (1962), p. 596 ss.; Id., The Little Legislatures, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1970.Google Scholar
6 Political Reorientation of Japan: Report of Government Section; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers , Washington, Government Printing Office, 1969, V. 1, p. 164.Google Scholar
7 (Anche il modello italiano, peraltro, appare fortemente caratterizzato dalla presenza di correnti organizzate sul piano nazionale sebbene il fenomeno sia, come è noto, piú marcato nei partiti di governo: n.d.t.).Google Scholar
8 La relatività della distinzione tra sistemi parlamentari e sistemi presidenziali è nota. In riferimento specifico al Cile, sono state adoperate tutte le possibili sfumature: ≪ quasi presidenziale ≫, ≪ semi-parlamentare ≫, ≪ limitatamente parlamentare ≫: Agor, W., The Senate in the Chilean Political System , in Romberg, A. e Musolf, L. L., (eds.) Legislatures in Developmental Perspective , Durham, Duke University Press, 1970.Google Scholar
9 Parrish, C., autore del capitolo sul Cile nella nostra ricerca, lo definisce ≪ presidenziale non puro ≫.Google Scholar
10 Pye, L., Aspects of Political Development , Boston, Little. Brown and Co., 1966.Google Scholar
11 In riferimento all'esperienza cilena della presidenza Allende vedi da ultimo Agor, W., Senate: Integrative Role in Chile's Political Development , in Hirsch, H. e Hancock, M. D., (eds.), Comparative Legislative Systems , New York, Free Press, 1971.Google Scholar
12 Vedi Inter-parliamentary Union (curatore Ameller, M.), Parlements , Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1966 2 , pp. 121–122.Google Scholar
13 Nel capitolo sulle Filippine, Jackson afferma che in quel sistema il controllo sull'amministrazione è rimesso quasi integralmente alle commissioni.Google Scholar
14 Vedi per tutti Crick, B., The Reform of Parliament , London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966 2 , p. 83.Google Scholar