Close to one billion people, a third of the total population of the world, live under systems of government broadly defined as liberal-democratic, of which it can be said that authority rests on public opinion and is accountable to it. Out of the said number, only sixty million, i.e., 6%, live in states which have no formal written constitution. Great Britain is a notable example. New Zealand is another. Israel is a third in this exclusive company. In these countries it falls to the Courts, fortified as they are by the traditions of the Common law, to be the mainstay of the liberties of the individual. The English Common law, however, is “just like an English oak. You cannot transplant it to (another) continent and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England. It will flourish indeed but it needs careful tending”. (per Lord Justice Denning).

The application of western principles of the rule of law to the reborn Jewish State was more in the nature of a grafting than of a transplantation. It was a combination which offered an interesting legal experiment. While drawing upon ancient legal traditions and heritage, the Israel courts were vitalized through their access to the legal experience of English-speaking countries, especially so since the Common law in its mother country exemplified the adaptations of old principles to new needs long before it was exported abroad.

To reconcile the true boundaries between the individual and the community is the highest problem that thoughtful consideration of human society has to solve. Jellinek, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens (1901).

The legislative authority in Israel is all-powerful. Like the English Parliament, the Knesset “can do everything but make a woman a man, and a man a woman”. In the absence of a formal written Constitution, the Legislature enjoys legislative supremacy: the laws of the Knesset stand at the top of the normative legal order of the State, paramount in the prevailing legal system. Ranged against such a Legislature-giant, whose power knows no formal restraint, the Courts often feel like Lilliputians facing a Gulliver. There is, indeed, justification for this sense of inferiority harboured by the Judiciary. It is undoubtedly true that in the process of adjudicating disputes—between two individuals and between an individual and the authorities—judges apply, construe, and develop the existing rules of law and impart life to them.

In speaking to an international congress on a given field of Israel law it would be natural, in order to facilitate communication with our guests from abroad, to compare the local law with the rules prevailing in one or more foreign systems. By doing so, similarities as well as dissimilarities could be pointed out and thereby the local picture put into proper perspective.

Such comparison would have been easier had this congress taken place some years earlier, say in 1967. At that time a sweeping statement to the effect that the law of contract in Israel was the same as in England would have been fairly correct. To be true, some remnants from the pre-Mandate period of Ottoman legislation were still in force. But their impact on the living law was almost negligible in the face of the pervasive influx of English law and its nearly total domination in the field of contracts.

English principles and precedents were applied throughout, whether in compliance with the mandate contained to that effect in art. 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922 (which was maintained on the establishment of the State) or, simply because English law and English law reports were better known to most lawyers, both on the bench and at the bar. The papers read by Judge Baker and Advocate Shimron at the International Lawyers' Convention here in Jerusalem in 1958 bear ample witness to this state of affairs.

Societies consisting of persons who have associated for a common interest and for objects other than that of deriving profits, which are generally known in this country as “Ottoman societies” are regulated by the Ottoman Law of Societies of August 3, 1909, which is based on a French law of July 1, 1901. Such a society is formed by agreement of the founders and does not owe its existence to any registration, but its founders must notify the competent official of the formation of the society immediately after its formation and supply him with the prescribed particulars. No such society may be established contrary to the provisions of the law, public morality or with the intention of disturbing the peace of the country or aiming at disintegration of the State, or changing the form of the ruling Government, or causing dissension among different communities, and it is prohibited to establish political societies under the title of races and nationalities.

Among Ottoman societies are the Histadrut, WIZO, Hebrew University and professional associations such as the Bar Association.

A few years ago a Supreme Court Justice remarked that in Israel the strike was a sacred tradition. Indeed it was. But now, it is more often regarded as a nuisance. This change of attitude has been reflected in the law.

In this country, as in some other countries, the law concerning labour disputes has swung back and forth during the years like a pendulum: from severe restrictions under the Ottoman Empire, through de facto recognition during the British mandatory period, to a privileged status after the establishment of the State of Israel. True, even after the establishment of the State, the right to strike has not been expressly guaranteed by any statute. But in this respect, it is not different from other basic rights, such as the freedoms of expression or assembly, which are in the nature of common law rights. In fact, it fares better, since other rights are subject under various statutes to substantial restrictions. Only the right to strike was left virtually free from such legal restraints. One might be led to believe that to the socialist leaders of the country, most of whom rose to the Government from the ranks of the trade union movement, the right to strike was dearer than other civil liberties. During the first twenty years of the State, on the few occasions on which the legislature touched upon the right to strike, it only acted to protect it. Most conspicuous is the provision that a strike shall not be regarded as breach of a personal obligation on the part of the individual employee.