One of the so-called “Damascus Covenant” fragments discovered in Qumran Cave 4 calls for bona fides in negotiations leading to marriage.

The following is Baumgarten's reading of the text and his translation:

• 4. … And concerning what is said (Lev. 25:14)

• 5. [“When you sell anything to or buy anything from] your neighbour, you shall not defraud one another,” this is the expli[cation …

• 6. …] everything that he knows that is found …

• 7. … and he knows that he is wronging him, whether it concerns man or beast. And if

• 8. [a man gives his daughter to another ma]n, let him disclose all her blemishes to him, lest he bring upon himself the judgment

• 9. [of the curse which is said (Deut. 27:18)] (of the one) that “makes the blind to wander out of the way”. Moreover, he should not give her to one unfit for her, for

• 10. [that is kil'ayim, (plowing with) o]x and ass and wearing wool and linen together (Deut. 22:10–11) …

The first item (lines 4–9) should be read against the background of rabbinical morals extending to the rule of fraud to other forms of injury by word of mouth:

• a. Just as a concept of ona'ah (fraud) exists regarding sales, there exists a concept of ona'ah (offence, fraud) by mere speech. One should not ask for the price of goods without having the intention of buying, one should not remind a repentant person of his sinful past or a proselyte of his ancestors' deeds. This was meant by the admonition: “Do not offend or oppress the stranger, for you were strangers in Egypt”.

Babatha had a dispute with the guardians of Jesus, her son (from her first marriage). We do not know the reasons for this dispute, however, she seems to have been interested in the formula by which, under Roman law, the tutor could be called upon to account for the loss that the ward had suffered. Hence, we can find three nearly identical Greek translations of the actio tutelae in her archive (about 124/25 A.D.). Here we will only examine the appointment of the judges. The text of Pap. Yadin 28 1.1–4 runs as follows:

These lines were translated in the standard edition of the Babatha archive by N. Lewis in this manner:

Lewis does not comment on his (cautious) translation of xenokritai as “local judges”. Presumably, however, it reflects the opinion of the first editor, H. J. Polotsky, that the xenokritai are non-Roman judges (iudices peregrini). Consequently, the Latin version should have been as follows:

Examination of the institution of the gift in the Talmud reveals that giving gifts to Gentiles is prohibited. The prohibition is generally believed to be motivated by the desire to restrict social intercourse between Jews and Gentiles. Gift-giving, it is argued, might lead to, or indicate the existence of, overly-close social relations. On this understanding of the institution, then, it is the potential consequences of the gift-giving that are problematic, rather than the act itself. I will argue that this social account of the origin of the prohibition is unsatisfactory, and that while social considerations did play a role, to regard the inhibition of fraternization with Gentiles as the sole or primary factor underlying the prohibition is a facile oversimplification. Further, I will argue that the explanation for the prohibition must be sought in the act itself, rather than in its consequences.

1. It is with the greatest pleasure that I contribute this paper to this volume published for my dear friend Reuven Yaron. He was one of the very first foreign colleagues whom I invited to give lectures for the students of the Amsterdam Law Faculty some months after my appointment in 1965, and eight years ago Reuven Yaron was a visiting professor at our University for a period of six months. On that occasion he read fascinating papers on Ancient Near Eastern laws and brilliantly participated in my Papinian-seminar, where also other participants such as Eric Pool and Laurens Winkel made numerous astute remarks. I therefore decided to make Papinian's text D. 17.2.81, concerning societas omnium bonorum and dos, the main topic of my contribution to this volume published in honour of Reuven Yaron. However, I found in the Digest-title 17.2 two additional texts by other classical lawyers, viz. Paul and Gaius, in which they also examine problems in connection with societas omnium bonorum and dos (D.17.2.65.16 and D.17.2.66). It is instructive to discuss these three texts together in this paper. In each of the three texts the situation is different. In the cases that Paul and Gaius deal with, it is the husband who, having received a dowry, is a socius omnium bonorum (Situation I). In Papinian's text which is — even for Papinian! — exceptionally rich in legal ideas, the lawyer gives solutions for many legal questions in a situation, wherein a father, being one of two socii omnium bonorum, promised or gave a dowry to his son-in-law on behalf of his daughter (Situation II).

After Felix Wubbe's study ‘Iavolenus contra Labeonem’, any attempt to draw general conclusions from differences of opinion voiced by two classical Roman jurists concerning specific points of law must appear less than promising. According to Wubbe's finding, not even the critical comments which Iavolenus (head of the Sabinian law school) appended to the posthumous works of Labeo (who supposedly founded the rival Proculian school) seem to yield any tangible evidence of methodological or other principles fundamentally distinguishing the two jurists. How then could one expect controversies within one and the same Proculian school, namely the rejection or modification of individual opinions of the jurist Labeo by his successor Proculus, to offer insights of a jurisprudential nature, particularly with respect to the character of the early classical law schools and the so-called school conflict between Sabinians and Proculians?

Reflections of this kind may, indeed, dampen expectations, yet there is little reason to despair. With some patience it should be possible to conduct an analysis of the content and form of Proculus' criticism aimed at Labeo that will lead to observations supporting or amplifiying other information (e.g. concerning the relationship of Celsus to Proculus) and will eventually enable us to draw a broader picture.

The Lago di Bracciano is a lake in Southern Etruria with a surface of 57.5 square kilometers. Its maximum length is 9.3 kilometers. The width goes up to 8.7 kilometers. The extent of the lake is 31.5 kilometers. Its water originates in part from some small rivers, and in part from underground springs. The lake is situated in a volcanic area, a fact which is important in our case.

The Romans called the Lago di Bracciano lacus Sabatinus. We find the lake referred to by this name on the tabula Peutingeriana. Collumella mentions the lake in his work De re rustica in the chapter on pisciculture. He points out that due to farmers' care some lakes have sea-fish, which can stand fresh water:

1. The collection of Biblical and Roman legal texts, usually called Mosaicarum et Romanarum legum Collatio, has been the subject of countless studies and commentaries since 1573 and particularly in the last 170 years. The serious researches of this second period, starting from 1822, have been carried out by prominent authors and deserve careful consideration. Nevertheless some questions are still unsolved and, above all, new ideas, new viewpoints, new ways of study can be suggested. Of course, I do not intend undertaking such an arduous work in this paper: it is a task for younger and more specialized researchers. As for me, I shall confine myself to the attempt of adding some accuracy to a rough suggestion I put forward on the subject two years ago, while trying to outline a general picture of the relationship between Roman law and legal comparison.

As far as we can determine from papyri and from Greek and Roman historians, circumcision was practiced among various nations in the Roman Empire, particularly in Egypt and Arabia. A few of the most important examples will suffice.

Herodotus addresses circumcision in Egypt and elsewhere:

… but my better proof was that the Colchians and Egyptians and Ethiopians are the only nations that have from the first practised circumcision. The Phoenicians and the Syrians of Palestine acknowledge of themselves that they learned the custom from the Egyptians, and the Syrians of the valleys of the Thermodon and the Parthenius, as well as their neighbours the Macrones, say that they learnt it lately from the Colchians.

In all societies disputing parties have similar reasons for choosing to arbitrate rather than to use the regular legal process as a means of resolving their differences. Arbitration may be conducted in private, so that the publicity inevitably attendant on the public hearing which is part of the regular legal process is avoided. Arbitration may be speedier, since the parties do not have to wait until the court is ready; arbitration will normally be less beset by formalities than the legal process and it may be cheaper. These considerations apply whatever the character of the regular legal process.

During the formative periods of Roman law and English law, however, disputing parties had a particular reason for preferring to arbitrate and that derives from the nature of a legal action in Rome and in England. Both in the classical Roman procedure and in the classical common law procedure the plaintiff was constrained to bring his claim within one of a number of specified forms of action. These forms of action were set out in the praetor's edict in Rome and the Register of Writs in England. They specified the circumstances in which a legal action could be brought, and directed the plaintiff to the appropriate formula or writ which was required to set the action on the way to a trial.

I first met Reuven Yaron in 1958, and we immediately became fast friends. The friendship with him and Shoshana has deepened over the years, and will continue. He and I have frequently read one another's draft papers. I thank him for many years of intellectual and emotional support, and hope he will take pleasure in this offering that he has had no possibility of criticising in advance.

The traditional date for the end of classical Roman law is 235 when the emperor Alexander Severus was murdered, or slightly later with the death of Modestinus, the last of the great known jurists. Thereafter, few original juristic books were written, and it is widely but not universally believed that a decline in legal standards began almost at once.

For many scholars there seems to exist a connection, sometimes simply implicit, between the failure of jurists to write new books, and a decline in legal standards. I should like to suggest there was a different reason for jurists ceasing to write new law books. They had already written them all! The claim that for the period, say fifty years, after around 235, all the law books had already been written seems extreme, but is easy to substantiate.

1. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 has defined in its art. 2 the international treaty as an international agreement between states concluded in written form. Only in art. 3 the said Convention makes clear that other international agreements might be valid, too. The United Nations Charter art. 102 ensures that international treaties concluded by the member states are registered and published by the Secretariat of the United Nations. These rules and the practice of our actual Law of Nations are the results of a complicated development which has its origins in antiquity. From the early beginnings in the third millenium B.C. until the 16th century A.D. we can observe that international treaties, in spite of their being reported, registered and passed on in written form, are concluded not through written instruments, but through declarations of the treaty-making parties, solemnly confirmed by mutual oaths. We shall not delve into the history of medieval and modern international law but limit our observations to the legal history of preclassical and classical antiquity, which Reuven Yaron has enriched by so many important contributions.

When I grew up in Hamburg, my home town, I had no Jewish friends or acquaintances. And if I had, I did not notice. Indeed, the very inquiry into whether someone was a Jew would have seemed awkward and inappropriate to me. In 1981 I went to Cape Town, where I was to spend seven years teaching Roman and comparative law. There I had the good fortune to come into contact with a vigorous, selfconfident and highly visible Jewish community. I had Jewish friends and colleagues, Jewish students and team mates. On account of my name I was even sometimes invited, on ceremonial occasions, to the synagogue. I suddenly realized how, for obvious historical reasons, our attitude towards national, racial and religious identity, and towards Jewish identity in particular, has been warped and to what extent we, as Germans, have lost any sense of unselfconscious innocence in these matters. It also struck me how much our culture has been impoverished by the absence of its specifically Jewish ingredient.