Under common law and in other legal systems, including our own, which have in whole or in part adopted English tort law, each tort possesses its own special physiognomy. Yet, the very term “tort” in its generality attests to the existence of certain elements, in addition to those which distinguish one tort from another, common both to the constituent facts—the situations giving rise to tortious liability, as hypothesized by law—and to the normative provisions—the general body of rules which in Israel is set out in various sections of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 1944–1947. We may, therefore, speak of a law of torts, with every tort having its own characteristic features, as well as of a law of tort, with one concept embracing the totality of torts. By attributing to these expressions a meaning other than that ascribed to them by the two schools of thought which have considered them antithetical, we indicate a state of co-existence.

Professor S. Z. Feller, to whom this article respectfully is dedicated, wrote a critical attack on the problem of concurrent criminal jurisdiction. The adverse consequence of more than one state claiming jurisdiction over a given criminal behaviour may be the abduction of the alleged offender by officials of one of these states. This issue was recently raised in the United States Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain case. Chief Justice Rehnquist's holding allowing a U.S. court to try Dr. Alvarez-Machain, who was abducted by U.S. authorities, caused vehement national and international criticism. Subsequently, the United States District Court of Los Angeles acquitted Dr. Alvarez-Machain on 14 December 1992.

The long list of abduction cases of recent history, together with the absence of a satisfying solution are alarming. I shall not attempt to cut this “Gordan's knot”, but rather shall focus on an issue that has as yet not been clearly addressed in the current debate.

One may ask what changes have occurred in Israeli civil procedure in the 40 years of the existence of the State. The answer is clear—almost none. This is true as to both of the major concerns of civil procedure, i.e., (a) the conduct of the proceedings pursuant to the rules of civil procedure, and (b) the court structure and allocation of jurisdiction among the different courts.

Of course there have been some changes in the last 40 years. Regarding the Rules of Civil Procedure one can point to changes such as the expansion of the use of summary process and originating summons, along with the abolition of the docket preference given to summary process proceedings after a right to defend has been granted; the adoption of the American pre-trial conference proceeding; important developments as to linkage differentials and interest that are added to money judgments; and expansion of third-party practice proceedings.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (Amnesty), and other like-minded organisations have become major actors in the world of international humanitarian law (IHL). Every year they issue hundreds of publications purporting to document violations and to promote IHL enforcement. These publications are ubiquitously cited in the media, and used as source material for governmental and United Nations inquiries, quasi-judicial bodies, the International Criminal Court, academic studies, and other frameworks. Yet, despite the increase in the number, role and influence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working on IHL enforcement, conflicts and civilian deaths show no signs of abating. Among the factors that reduce NGO impact in these areas is the demonstrated weakness of these organisations in the realm of fact-finding, and the tension between these activities and emphasis on political advocacy. This article will thus analyse both objective and subjective aspects of NGO fact-finding during armed conflict, including mandates and methodology, selectivity, the application of legal standards, military expertise and sourcing. These issues will be examined through case studies of Amnesty and HRW publications on the conflicts in Yemen, Ukraine and the 2014 Gaza War. The article will conclude with recommendations for NGOs and the actors with which they interact.

The commission of large-scale international crimes (namely, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide) could result in populations fleeing from their homes, seeking protection. There is an increasing number of victims of these crimes who have been forcibly displaced and currently live in settlements widely known as refugee camps. Victims of international crimes have the right to receive reparations for the harm they have suffered. This means that international criminal tribunals, particularly the International Criminal Court, will have to consider reparations for victims in refugee camps in the near future when the victims seek to enforce their right to reparations. To date, the delivery of reparations in these contexts has not been analysed adequately in the academic literature; this is the gap that this article aims to discuss. The article explores the extent to which it is suitable and feasible to deliver reparations in refugee camps. One of the main arguments is that living in a refugee camp could compound the crime-related harm already sustained by victims. This feature, along with the instability of the situation of victims and the infrastructure of the camp, constitute key characteristics of refugee camps and should each be taken into consideration in delivering reparations. As this article suggests, the instability of the victims’ situation will inform which modalities of reparations are suitable to be delivered in the context of a refugee camp. Subsequently, the compounded harm and the camp's infrastructure will inform which particular reparative measures, corresponding to each modality, will be suitable and feasible – respectively – to be delivered. The methodology includes desk-based and qualitative research and analysis of primary and secondary sources and case studies.

Drafters of international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties clearly envisaged a role for military justice systems in the implementation and enforcement of these treaties. Nevertheless, the adequacy of military jurisdiction over violations of international law is being questioned in certain spheres. In the context of these debates this article considers the domestic rationale for military justice systems and explores the role and limits of military jurisdiction in combating impunity for violations of IHL. In focusing on the need to effectively repress and suppress all violations of IHL, the article addresses the extent to which some sort of military justice may be necessary for the effective enforcement of certain provisions. It also explores the way in which increased scrutiny of the impact of these justice systems on the rights of individuals has led to restrictions on the format and scope of military jurisdiction. Although there are difficulties in internationalising the discussion on military jurisdiction because of differences in domestic legal traditions, the choice of effective IHL enforcement mechanisms, which includes the choice of military or civilian jurisdiction, is key in combating impunity for violations of this body of law and protecting the rights of those involved.

This article will explore the travaux préparatoires of the key legal instruments on the laws of war and international humanitarian law (IHL) with a view to obtaining crucial insight into the ‘original’ understandings of their drafters as to the provisional nature and the temporal length of occupation. The findings of the travaux show the general premise of the framers of the ‘classic’ instruments on the laws of war that the legal regime of occupation should be provisional. In the concurrent doctrinal discourses this premise was endorsed by most scholars. Examination of the records of the negotiations on the drafting of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 reveals that even the proponents of ‘transformative occupation’ did not seem to envisage occupation that would endure for decades. Nevertheless, by the time the 1977 Additional Protocol I was drafted, several instances of protracted occupation already existed, which seems to have led to a decisive shift in the argumentative structure. There is no disputing the applicability of IHL to any occupied territory, irrespective of the length of the occupation. Yet the suggestion that nothing under IHL would forestall an occupying power from engaging in protracted occupation departs from the traditional premise that occupation ought to be provisional. This also seems to be paradoxical in historical perspectives.

Dr Rabbi Isaac Breuer, a German jurist and Jewish rabbi, represented the ultra-orthodox community in Palestine before the international committees which considered the future of the Palestine Mandate. In his work, Breuer criticised the concept of sovereignty and introduced an alternative regime for global governance of developing peoples. His unique position, as analysed in this article, can contribute to contemporary debates surrounding the role of sovereigns as trustees of humanity, sovereignty and international law and ways of promoting global peace and human welfare.

By introducing Breuer's thought, this article seeks to contribute additional sources – both Jewish and universal – to these ongoing debates. Letting these neglected voices in international legal history enrich the debate can convince us, once again, of the importance of the periphery and of peripheral voices for the development, vitality and relevance of international law.

Breuer's model replaces the notions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘rights’ with those of internalised obligations and subservience to law and justice. Limiting any national aspirations to total sovereignty, he implored the United Nations to refrain from elevating the Jewish national home to statehood. Opposing the Zionist position, he insisted that the Mandatory power and international institutions would enable two nations to develop side by side, in what he termed ‘the state of peace’, under international trusteeship.

We carefully draw on Breuer's insights to reflect on present debates on trusteeship, sovereignty and the management of areas devastated by conflict.

The role of courts as lawmakers has been scrutinised, partly because of the questions it raises regarding legitimacy. This scrutiny has sometimes assumed that courts are safe from legitimacy-based criticism in their role as appliers of law. However, recent events in the United Kingdom show that, regrettably, this is not so: the media reaction to the judgments in the Brexit case of Miller went far beyond criticism of the courts’ reasoning or conclusions. It was an attack on legitimacy. Insofar as such attacks arise out of misunderstandings about the nature of adjudication (including, for example, the existence and scope of judicial discretion), one way of countering them is for the legal community (scholars, judges, practitioners) to continue to increase public awareness about these issues. However, it is incumbent upon other parts of the state – the executive and the legislature – to respond promptly to such attacks in order to uphold the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law.

A fairly common premise in academic research about Israel is that the State of Israel has expropriated large tracts of land from Arabs, whether citizens or Palestinian refugees. This premise does not distinguish between the taking of property, which was expropriated from Arab refugees during the War of Independence, and the expropriation of land during the State's “regular course of business.” Blurring the distinction between land belonging to refugees and land belonging to citizens creates the impression that the State of Israel has expropriated large tracts of land as a regular “course of business.” This research isolates and clarifies the extent of “regular” expropriations on the national level according to the Lands (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance 1943—the main and permanent tool for large scale expropriations in Israel It shows that the common premise about expropriation of Arab citizens ‘land is highly exaggerated. The Arab population's share in the burden of expropriation was fairly small in absolute terms and is not significantly greater than the Jewish population's share.

While a quantitative analysis of the expropriations cannot in itself produce a conclusion about harmful and unjustified influences of the expropriations on Arab citizens, a quantitative analysis of each expropriation may produce information on which to make such a conclusion. Moreover, arguing against all expropriation of lands—which actually results in the transfer of resources from Arabs to Jews, irrespective of its scope and circumstances—may entail an a priori negation of Israel's right to use land resources and police powers to answer real public needs of the Jewish majority and can entail an a priori negation of the nature of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State—rather than a legitimate criticism on the merits of each expropriation.

This article explores the often neglected relationships between constitution-making (including amendment) mechanisms and constitutional-infringement mechanisms by focusing on the override as one of the possible tools to depart from a Constitution. The article suggests that there are two types of override: a ‘common law override’, which is not uniquely Canadian, and a ‘sunset override’. The common law override evolves in the judicial decisions of a given country when the courts require the legislature to explicitly take responsibility for an action. Under the common law override, we may couple together phenomena that are not typically connected, including a means of protecting common law rights, a judicial presumption against delegation of power to administrative agencies, and mechanisms of dealing with procedural or substantive legislative entrenchment. In contrast, the sunset override is a Canadian invention. For the tool to be part of the infringement mechanisms of a country's Constitution, it must be provided for explicitly in that Constitution, and its exercise must be temporary.

This article follows the various possible uses of the common law override. It shows that Israel has vast experience with the common law override which may shed light on Israel's future possible exploitation of the sunset override. The article then shows that Israel has adopted the sunset override following the Canadian example. When the Rabin government adopted the tool as part of an exchange deal with the ultra-orthodox religious political party Shas, the terms of the deal included Shas' acquiescence to the peace process in exchange for the Rabin government's use of the override to protect the religious status quo from judicial intervention. In addition, the Israeli justices played an active and unique role in the birth and formulation of the Israeli override. As has happened with the Canadian override, supposedly these circumstances should have made the override illegitimate in Israel. However, this article argues that it is not the political uses of the override that result in its lack of use. Rather, the determining factor is the override's compatibility with the constitution-making process in a given country. From a normative perspective, it is easier for the Israeli legislature to override its own earlier enactments, even those titled Basic Laws, than it is for the Canadian legislature to override the People's enactment of the Charter. Thus, it is expected that Israel might more freely deploy the sunset override were it to become a general mechanism embodied in the Basic Laws, while, in contrast, the sunset override has fallen into disuse in Canada.

It is a pleasure and an honour to have been invited to give this year's Lionel Cohen lecture, especially looking at the cast list of my predecessors. It has been a particular pleasure for me to return to Israel after nearly 50 years and to bring my husband to visit the grave of his maternal grandfather, who died in 1917 on the Gaza Strip. This was before my mother-in-law was born so it was something of a poignant moment for my husband, and I am extremely grateful to those who made it possible.

Dumping is defined, basically, as the sale of goods to an export market at a price below that charged for comparable goods in the exporter's home market. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not forbid such action, not even when injurious to the competing domestic industry. However, it has taken the view that dumping constitutes an unfair trade practice. Under GATT, Article VI Contracting Parties (or Members, as they are now termed in the GATT 1994 Agreements) are authorized, as an exception to other GATT obligations, to unilaterally impose antidumping (hereinafter: AD) duties to counteract the effects of dumping. The duties should create a level playing field in which producers all over the world will be able to compete fairly with each other. The principles sound simple and straightforward, yet their application is one of the most contentious topics in international trade law.

The economic coherence of AD rules is controversial. In international trade, price discrimination between national markets is typically made possible when the exporter has a powerful position in the home market and re-exportation to that market is not feasible. In the domestic arena price discrimination is countered by the laws of competition and antitrust. International trade law offers states a very different remedy, that first and foremost protects the competing local industry, regardless of the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of dumping on the market as a whole.

Reviewing the history of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the International Court of Justice from 1922—the World Court, a convenient but possibly misleading expression which embraces both the Permanent Court from 1922 to 1945 and the present International Court of Justice established as an integral part of the United Nations since—four clearly separated periods can be discerned. They run from 1922 to 1931, 1932 to 1940, 1946 to 1966, and from 1967 onwards.

The establishment of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court after a cataclysmic war in Europe and the awe-inspiring Russian Revolution released a wave of euphoria upon the exhausted and war-weary peoples of what is now known as Western Europe, and they placed great hopes in the new League and Court.

After having acquired a prominent place in economic life—and therefore also in the life of law—advertising has begun to draw the attention of both law-maker and legal analyst.

Indeed two fronts are distinguishable which the potential victims of advertising seek to open up against the advertiser—the first by his business competitors and the second by the actual direct and indirect customers. As to the first front, the law has already taken regard of it ever since it took a stand against unfair competition, since advertising is the main instrument to effect some of the different forms of unfair competition (which in Israeli law, following the English pattern, takes the shape of “injurious falsehood” and “passing off”).