One of the main driving forces of man is fear, and its very paralyzing effect has, in the solution of human conflicts, been sought as method for both attack and defence. No wonder then that Montesquieu recognized fear as the principle of the despotic type of government; while organized terror as practised nowadays on a wide scale has become an instrument for undermining the authority of established government.

Its origin can be traced to Anarchism, that frightful episode in “the war between two divisions of society,… the world of privilege and the world of protest…, the last cry of individual man,… the last fist shaken against the encroaching State”. But organization in every form was so repellent to the 19th century anarchists that they were incapable of drawing together, even for the sake of concerted action.

The article examines the approach of leading rabbis toward levirate marriages following the establishment of the State of Israel. Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi Herzog supported the abolishment of levirate marriages and attempted to impose on all ethnic communities the Ashkenazi approach, which since the 13th century favored chalitza. Chief Sephardic Rabbi Uziel supported rabbi Herzog although the levirate commandment takes precedence over chalitza in the Sephardic and oriental traditions and is practiced in these communities. In 1950, the two Chief Rabbis led a council of rabbis that enacted a regulation rejecting levirate marriages and favoring chalitza. Rabbi Uziel believed that two opposing traditions governing an issue as central as family law are not appropriate in a modern state. He perceived the levirate marriage, which binds women in matrimonial relations against their will, to be inconsistent with their status in the modern era. The strong roots of the Ashkenazi Halachic tradition, which has for many generations rejected levirate marriages, allowed him to demand that all ethnic groups adopt it. Rabbi Yossef and other oriental critics regard his actions as submissive to Ashkenazi tradition, a criticism I reject. Rabbi Yossef vigorously opposed the abolition of levirate marriages, and in a decision in 1951 he claimed that it was invalid. It was the beginning of his struggle against what he perceived as Ashkenazi dominance and Sephardic submission, demanding the restoration of the oriental and Sephardic traditions. In time, this became an explicit ideological-political stance under the motto leachzir atara le'yoshna. I suggest that Rabbi Yossef endeavors to restore the golden age of the Bashi sages in Jerusalem, chief among them Rabbi Elyashar, at the twilight of the Ottoman period.

This Article analyzes the probative standard set by Section 25 of the Succession Law, which, provided that certain basic conditions are met, enables the validation of flawed wills. The Article presents the position taken by the Supreme Court, according to which Section 25 requires that prior to its validation, the authenticity of a will be proven beyond any doubt. This standard is criticized as impracticable and normatively flawed, as is another standard, suggested by some Supreme Court Justices, which would impose on those wishing to validate a flawed will a standard of proof similar to that required in criminal law.

The Article then attempts to create a desirable model for the probative standard found in Section 25. This model is based on disutility equations for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty; it leads to the conclusion that the standard that should be required in order that flawed wills be validated is considerably lower than that demanded by today s case law. The Article claims that there is no significant risk that testators might be led to disregard or neglect the formal requirements set by the Succession Law for writing wills.

In conclusion, some arguments are presented in support of a revolutionary hypothesis: I suggest that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 25 reflects an ideology that prefers the mode of asset distribution prescribed by inheritance law over alternative modes, created by individual wills. The Court's preference, however, is not grounded (and cannot reasonably be grounded) in the desire to fulfill the testator's wishes; but rather perhaps it is an expression of the legal system's conception of distributive justice.

Issues such as prison overcrowding, a growing realization that prisons cannot rehabilitate, and the belief that many inmates could be adequately managed in less intrusive and costly settings, have led Israeli scholars and practitioners, in the last four decades, to devote efforts to the development of alternative sanctions to imprisonment. Specifically, the focus has been on the development and elaboration of alternative sanctions that match the severity of punishment to the seriousness of the crime.

Intermediate sanctions (also called “alternative sanctions,” “alternatives to imprisonment,” or “community-based sanctions”) have been proposed as “ways to manage the burgeoning numbers of offenders without sacrificing public safety.” These punishment options are considered to fall on a continuum between traditional probation supervision and traditional incarceration.

The process of conversion to Judaism is paralleled to the acceptance of the Torah by the Jewish people at Sinai. In Jewish sources, the Sinaitic experience is viewed as a mass conversion of the Jewish people. The essence of this conversion was the acceptance of the commandments as binding upon the Jewish people. Similarly, the essence of a Gentile's conversion to Judaism in later generations, is his acceptance of the yoke of the commandments as binding upon him. In fact, the Talmudic sources go so far as to state that the Jewish people at Sinai underwent the same process as a proselyte: circumcision, immersion in a mikve and the bringing of a burnt-offering. In short, traditionally, the essence of conversion was the acceptance of the mitzvot.

The British strategy to tame the Palestine press was to be implemented through a sophisticated masterplan. The Press Bureau was reorganized and explicitly directed to woo journalists and thereby achieve press cooperation. Simultaneously, the iron fist of the Press Ordinance was cast, to be used in case gentle handling failed to bear the desired cooperation.

The British analyzed the pitfalls on the road to cooperation correctly. As early as 1932 the Press Officer observed that the “deep-seated antipathy of Arabs and Jews as represented by their respective presses” and “the fundamental opposition of all Arab press to the Mandate” might undermine the entire plan. But even this sober analysis could not foresee the dimensions of the coming crisis.

As Jewish immigration to Palestine and the economic prosperity of the country increased, the Arabs anxiety about their political future in Palestine intensified. In 1936, Arab tensions exploded in the Arab rebellion. Widespread terror, arson and general strikes engulfed the country, and this time they were directed not only against the Jews but also against the British Government. Under these circumstances, the British came to the conclusion that they could no longer support the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. In 1939, the White Paper, expressing a shift in policy, was issued. His Majesty's Government rejected the idea that Palestine should become a Jewish State and announced that hereinafter, Jewish immigration to Palestine would be limited and Jewish purchase of Arab lands prohibited.

The case of the Canadian ambassador's residence has been the subject of several court decisions at various instances in Israel. These decisions (as well as others relating to the doctrine of sovereign immunity) have been reviewed in former issues of this section. On June 3, 1997, the Supreme Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, gave its judgment in this case and delineated the application of the international law doctrine of sovereign immunity in Israeli law. In a different case decided on the last day of 1996, the Tel-Aviv District Court was required to rule on the applicability of this doctrine to a civil suit brought against the government of the United States of America. This District Court decision now needs to be examined in light of the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in the Edelson case.

The recent proliferation of external investigations into military operations raises important questions for the conduct of military operations and the interpretation and implementation of international law. The impact of such investigations and their reports, however, extends beyond how they influence the military and the implementation of the law of armed conflict. As countries and societies embroiled in lengthy conflicts begin to explore the value and effectiveness of undertaking transitional justice efforts during conflict, rather than only after conflict, investigations into military operations and specific incidents can play an important – and perhaps unexpected – role. This article focuses specifically on the inter-relationship between investigations and transitional justice efforts. As investigations into military operations become a common tool in the international and national arsenal, understanding how they interact with and affect broader transitional justice efforts and goals becomes important, both for the conceptualisation of investigations and the development of transitional justice mechanisms. This article addresses the relationship between investigations and the truth-telling aspect of transitional justice mechanisms, as well as the impact of the use of law and legal analysis on the legitimacy of the investigations and on potential transitional justice mechanisms.

While this comment primarily addresses the article by Anat Horovitz and Thomas Weigend on human dignity and victims' rights in the German and Israeli criminal process, it begins with a consideration of the role of the victim in other component parts of the criminal justice system, and in particular the substantive criminal law—a topic addressed in other articles included in this issue. There follows a review of the comparative analysis of the victim's role in Germany and Israel put forward by Horovitz and Weigend and a critique of the issues they raise, particularly as to the salience of the victim's procedural role. It is argued here that the victim should have a somewhat more meaningful role than that envisaged by these authors. The comment concludes with a brief consideration of the potential for the advancement of alternative remedies currently neglected by both systems, such as restorative justice.