In direct contrast to Israel's western flowing streams, Lake Kinneret is used for a multiplicity of beneficial uses. The lake supplies 45% of the country's total water supply, 6% of its fish catch, a vacation spot for 1½ million tourists a year, a purification plant for 3 million cubic metres of sewage yearly, an annual supply of tons of smooth, decorative pebbles, and a source of income for at least 70 scientists.

Again in contrast to Israel's streams and wadis, data are available to those interested in preventing pollution of the Kinneret. Scientific studies of the lake began as far back as 1847. Beginning in the 1950's Israel scientists concentrated their efforts on solving a myriad of problems in the lake and its watershed. In the 1950's geographic surveys of the watershed were completed which described the type of land, its quality, texture and suitability for agricultural use. By 1964, scientific studies included the quality of lake water for drinking, lake currents, salt concentrations in the lake, sources of radiation, the lake's temperature, phytoplankton, zooplankton, algal blooms, floating plants, organisms living at the bottom of the lake, the lake's water level, thematodes and nematodes in the lake, water birds, chiromed flies, pesticides, commercial fish, and, last but not least, the Tabgha blind prawn, the only unique species endemic to the lake's waters.

The Coptic-Ethiopian case is the first dispute between Christian Churches over their rights in the Holy Places to come before the Supreme Court of Israel. It concerns only a small area, but the legal issues involved are far-reaching. They deal with the jurisdiction over Holy Sites, and therefore affect potentially all Christian communities which claim rights in the Sanctuaries.

The history of the jurisdiction over the Holy Places is dramatic and rich in contradictions. For many centuries control over the Sanctuaries was in the hands of Moslem rulers who decided disputes according to their discretion. In view of the widespread impact of these decisions on the Christian world as a whole, the tendency gradually developed to avoid all changes, and in 1878 the Treaty of Berlin suspended every jurisdiction by its Art. LXII which prescribed “that no alteration can be made in the status quo in the Holy Places”.

In every system of law there exist formalized rules of evidence, according to which facts have to be proven.

A party in court may be required by his opponent to prove all the facts on which he desires to rely.

Yet there must be a limit to the legal uncertainty of an endless chain of facts for which, otherwise, an equally endless chain of proofs might be demanded.

Judges have a proper and powerful way to prevent superfluous debates as to the existence of what they deem to be generally known, or to have been already sufficiently established in a number of previous cases. Such facts can be declared to have become “public”, “judicial” or “common knowledge”.

A fact so declared may, actually, be of a very complicated nature, such as a generally accepted scientific theory. The danger is, that no scientific theory is completely static, and widely accepted theories may, with justification be undermined by newer and more refined insights, but it usually takes some time until the new—and perhaps better—theory becomes generally accepted.

For that reason, theories which are in a flux, or are being competently questioned, cannot be easily declared to have been solved one way or the other. Predilection towards a particularly emphasized conception to such extent as to declare that conception not merely preferred, but “public knowledge” may foreclose for a considerable time the prevalence of better conceptions.

Very soon after the establishment of the State (and as an important part of its constitutional structure) the office of State Comptroller, responsible to the Knesset alone and independent of the Government, was established under statute—the State Comptroller Law of 1949. After undergoing a number of amendments, the Law was eventually replaced in 1958 by a Consolidated Version but without any substantive change being made in the functions and powers of the Comptroller, a fact which goes far to demonstrate the proven worth of the office.

Briefly, the functions of the Comptroller are to carry out “inspection of the finances and the management of the finances and the property and administration of the State and of the bodies subject to the inspection of the Comptroller, and to perform the other functions assigned to the Comptroller by this Law”.

The bodies subject to inspection include, in addition to every government department, state enterprises and institutions and local authorities, persons or bodies holding, otherwise than under contract, or managing or controlling any state property or funds in the management of which the Government has a share or which are made subject to inspection by the Knesset or by agreement with the Government.

Who ought to bring about the essential reform in criminal law? At first glance, the answer appears obvious and unequivocal. In all modern Western democracies, the norm is for the function of lawmaking to be in the hands of the legislative branch of government, to the exclusion of the judiciary or any other organ inside or outside government.

The question posed above, however, is meant to explore a different issue, namely, the interrelationship between parliament and the judiciary in the province of criminal law reform, and their respective functions in effecting new policies. Assuming the task of legislation to be reserved to parliament, is there no room for judges to read into parliamentary enactments trend-making reformative content which would allow the implementation of what judges conceive to be the policies of the legislature in the field of penal law reform? Or is it, rather, incumbent upon the legislature itself to shape the character of the necessary reform with the statutory tools available to it?

The following are some reflections on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abu Khadrah v. Attorney-General. The facts of the case, albeit very simple, enable a number of primary legal problems regarding the offence of “covering-up” a criminal act to be considered.

a. The facts. The appellant was aware from what someone had told him that his informant along with the appellant's brother and other persons had sailed in his brother's boat to Gaza—obviously before the Six Day War—had there met Egyptian intelligence personnel, had handed over a sack and received from them a not inconsiderable sum of Israel money. The appellant was charged under sec. 5 of the Penal Law Revision (State Security—Foreign Relations and Official Secrets) Law, 1957 (hereinafter called the State Security Law) with “covering-up” of an offence committed by his brother and the others contrary to sec. 22 (b) of that Law.

The question of differentiating between an employee and an independent (self-employed) person has always been of primary importance in Israeli Income Tax law as a result of the various rules that distinguish these two types of assessees. In light of the adoption of the Ben-Shahar Commission's recommendations, this distinction has acquired even greater importance, as shall be explained.

This article discusses the law as it stands at present, which is not to say that in our view the current law is ideal. On the contrary, it is our opinion that the distinctions between the employed assessee—employee— and the independent assessee—self-employed—ought to be abolished. However since Israeli law does draw such distinctions at present, we shall discuss what is, de lege lata, and leave the discussion de lege ferenda for another time.

This paper examines the authority of the Military Commander to requisition privately owned land for the construction of the Separation Barrier within the West Bank, which is held through a regime of belligerent occupation. The examination focuses on Article 52 of the Hague Regulations, which deals with the issue of requisitions in kind. Moreover, the relationship between Articles 23(g) and 52 of the Hague Regulations is discussed, in light of the ICJ's decision whereas Article 23(g) is irrelevant after the close of active hostilities. This paper argues that while Article 52 grants the Military Commander the authority for such requisitions, Israel must demonstrate in each specific case that there a specific duty of the army of occupation which gives rise to a specific need of the army of occupation, in accordance with Article 52. The relevant decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) are examined, especially the High Court of Justice's Beit Sourik judgments and the International Court of Justice's Legal Consequences case.

Close to one billion people, a third of the total population of the world, live under systems of government broadly defined as liberal-democratic, of which it can be said that authority rests on public opinion and is accountable to it. Out of the said number, only sixty million, i.e., 6%, live in states which have no formal written constitution. Great Britain is a notable example. New Zealand is another. Israel is a third in this exclusive company. In these countries it falls to the Courts, fortified as they are by the traditions of the Common law, to be the mainstay of the liberties of the individual. The English Common law, however, is “just like an English oak. You cannot transplant it to (another) continent and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England. It will flourish indeed but it needs careful tending”. (per Lord Justice Denning).

The application of western principles of the rule of law to the reborn Jewish State was more in the nature of a grafting than of a transplantation. It was a combination which offered an interesting legal experiment. While drawing upon ancient legal traditions and heritage, the Israel courts were vitalized through their access to the legal experience of English-speaking countries, especially so since the Common law in its mother country exemplified the adaptations of old principles to new needs long before it was exported abroad.

This note deals with some of the procedural and substantive issues raised by the Legal Opinion rendered by International Court of Justice on the legality of the separation barrier. In the note it is argued that the motivations behind the General Assembly's request where political and not legal. It is contended that he partiality of the choice of the dossiers' material as submitted, issues relevant to propriety and the judicial character of the Court, should have led it to decline to give the requested opinion. The note is critical on the participation of Judge Elaraby, which the note argues affects the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings and affect the value of the Advisory Opinion. Israel did not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. The problems inherent in the lack of relevant factual basis and in the fact-finding function of the Court, its total disregard of Israel's needs to protect its citizens against Palestinian terrorism, and the categorical and unmotivated rejection of Israel's security claims, led to an unbalanced and unjust result. Basic humanitarian law principles relating to the protection of civilians and international human rights are disregarded by the Court when it comes to the right to life of Israeli civilians and to their right to be protected against terror attacks. The note contends that the Court's denial of Israel's right to self-defense lacks legal and factual basis. The procedural and substantive deficiencies of the Advisory Opinion affect its value and persuasiveness.

The enactment of the Trust Law, 1979, not only introduced the institution of trusts into Israeli law with complete and final validity, but it also focussed current legal attention on the primary duty derived from the function of the trustee, i.e. the duty to act loyally. The word “trust” denotes the institution, but it is also an expression of the nature of the relationship between trustee and beneficiary: a personal relationship based on mutual trust. The obligation to act loyally, which will henceforth be called the “fiduciary obligation” arose from the English institution of trusts, but was not confined by its bounds. It spread to a variety of relationships to which English law applied “fortified” norms, more demanding and more strict than those prevailing in the regular course of commerce.

On February 24, 1998, the government submitted the International Treaties (Approval by the Knesset) Bill, 1998 to the Knesset. This governmental bill represents the culmination of fifty years of exchange between the Executive and the Legislature concerning the constitutional authority to conclude international agreements on behalf of the State of Israel.

Normally, it would have been preferable to await the completion of the enactment process before commenting on the new legislative arrangements. Due to the constitutional importance of the Bill and the fact that it raises several important questions, the regular practice will be abandoned in this case.

Despite the availability of an abundance of materials on the treatymaking practice of the State of Israel and the status of treaties under municipal Israeli law both in English and in Hebrew, an in-depth analysis of the Bill requires an extensive exposition de lex lata on both these questions. Only then will the provisions of the Bill be presented. This will take the form of an issue-by-issue analysis, with conclusions drawn in each segment. The review will conclude with several additional observations de lege ferenda.

In the United States, administrative law suffers from a perceived lack of legitimacy largely due to a lack of democratic accountability or what some have called a democratic deficit. These misgivings stem, in part, from a deep-seated American distrust of bureaucracy. This Article examines how the quest for legitimacy has led practitioners (and theorists) of administrative law to undertake four interrelated projects: the Accountability Project, the Rationality Project, the Transparency Project, and the Participatory Project all designed to create a substitute or shadow form of democratic legitimacy.

Through an examination of these projects, I clarify how they try to address the democratic deficit, and whether they effectively do so. Specifically, this article investigates the impact of judicial review, informal rule-making, increased access to information, and public participation as efforts to meet the legitimacy challenge. Moreover, it disputes the contention that the pursuit of democratic legitimacy is less consequential for administrative law than the need for bureaucratic rationality, by illustrating that bureaucratic rationality is but one component of a larger scheme intended to serve as a functional substitute for legitimacy. At bottom, because Americans do not share the fondness for the technocratic model displayed by many other legal systems, legitimacy projects have an enduring place in American administrative law.

There are two aspects to a treaty. On the one hand, it constitutes a procedure, an operation whereby several minds meet and, if necessary, meet again to review, amend or even abolish the commitments contained in the treaty; on the other hand, it describes and establishes rights and duties, defines individual situations, or lays down general rules. In the language of continental jurists a treaty is at the same time a “legal transaction” and a “collection of norms”. Consequently, it is possible to distinguish in the articles of the treaty between those containing provisions pertaining to the mechanism of the legal transaction, which may be termed its “operational rules”, and those containing rules of content, which may also be called—to borrow from the language of private international law—“rules of substantive law”.

What we mean precisely by judicial reasoning is the reasoning of the judge as disclosed in the grounds of his judgment. The writings of jurists, the arguments of counsel, the indictment filed by the prosecuting officer—all provide grounds which may effect the judge's decision ; but it is the reasoned judgment alone which provides all the elements required to unfold the characteristic features of judicial reasoning.

The operative part of the judgment, the very ruling, is preceded by the grounds which constitute the reasoning on which the ruling is based. Judicial reasoning thus constitutes a model of practical reasoning, aimed at justifying a decision, a choice or a claim, and establishing that they are neither arbitrary nor unjust: the judicial ruling is justified if the conclusion following its reasons conforms to the law.

Assimilating judicial reasoning to a syllogism whose conclusion is true because it can be formally proved as deriving from true premises, would deny the very nature of practical reasoning and make it impersonal and devoid of its essential element of adjudication. The specific juridical nature of the judge's reasoning is not the formally correct deduction drawn from premises—in this respect legal deduction bears no distinctive features—but lies in the reasoning which serves to lay down those premises within the frame of an existing legal system.