Legal procedure does not enjoy great popularity. The layman resents it, since it prevents him from conducting his case by himself and forces him to resort to professional advocates. But even the jurist's attitudes to procedure is far from positive: he sees it as a mere “adjective” branch of the law that detracts from the importance of “substantive” law. Moreover, it has often emerged that the labyrinth of procedure does not lead to the triumph of the substantive law, but rather to the perversion of justice. A person expert in procedure has, as it were, wide scope in which to prevent, or, at least to distort, the revelation of the truth.

From time to time, a judge may be heard speaking out against such abuse of legal process, but mostly, his is a voice crying out in the wilderness.

The notion that a security interest could be created in any kind of property through registration rather than through transfer of possession seemed, until a few years ago, to be impractical and undesirable. When the Pledges Bill was debated in the Knesset, in 1965, the Minister of Justice objected to such a notion, saying that it was too revolutionary, and that it would cause many technical difficulties. Yet, when the debate on the Pledges Bill was over, a new Pledges Law was passed which introduced this very revolutionary notion of registration as a possible substitute for transfer of possession.

The Pledges Law, 1967, sec. 4, provides that:

It is a pleasure and an honour to have been invited to give this year's Lionel Cohen lecture, especially looking at the cast list of my predecessors. It has been a particular pleasure for me to return to Israel after nearly 50 years and to bring my husband to visit the grave of his maternal grandfather, who died in 1917 on the Gaza Strip. This was before my mother-in-law was born so it was something of a poignant moment for my husband, and I am extremely grateful to those who made it possible.

In a short book and in his contribution to this volume, Richard Posner articulates his vision concerning the most talked about subject in today's legal world: the legal treatment of terrorism. I deliberately say the most talked about subject in today's legal world, rather than the most urgent or important subject because I do not share the conviction that terrorism is a major threat to the U.S. or to the West. I believe that in fifty years historians will look at our era in a way similar to the way we look at the destructive global hysteria which led to the First World War. Of course I immediately concede that neither my view nor, if I may add, Posner's view on the matter, is particularly indicative of the future. People, including geniuses, seem to be notoriously bad at distinguishing between real and unreal risks, and the worst is that even time will never tell us whether the risks we face now are real or imaginary but only whether they materialized or not. So if we meet in fifty years to discuss the issue, we could continue the debate whether the risks posed by terrorism were indeed real, irrespective of what happened in the world.

Canada is often cited as one of the principal sources of proportionality analysis – an approach to the determination of limits on constitutional rights that has been adopted in many jurisdictions. The two-step structure of constitutional rights adjudication is built on the idea that these rights are the basic conditions of individual autonomy or liberty that must be protected from the demands of collective welfare. At the first stage of the adjudication the court determines whether the restricted activity falls within the scope of the right. At the second stage the court balances the right against the competing interest advanced by the restrictive law to determine whether the restriction is justified. Yet few of these rights fit this individual liberty model and are better understood as social or relational in character, protecting different aspects of the individual's interaction or connection with others in the community. If we recognise that most constitutional rights do not simply protect individual autonomy but instead protect different aspects of human flourishing or dignity within community then two conclusions may follow. First, there can be no single generic test for limits on rights. The form or character of ‘limitations’ on these rights may differ in significant ways. Second, the two steps of adjudication may often be difficult to separate, or the separation may seem quite artificial. Many of the issues addressed by the courts will not fit easily into the two-step structure of analysis because the ‘competing’ interests are really different dimensions of a social relationship.

The events surrounding the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the ensuing Palestinian naqba (disaster) have generated an abundance of legal literature. It is beyond the ambitions of this article to revisit all or most of the existing literature, or to strive and comprehensively discuss the various legal propositions they consider. Instead, it offers a critical assessment of some of the legal conclusions offered by one of the most influential experts in the field – Professor James Crawford – who, in the second edition of his seminal treatise The Creation of States in International Law, discusses at some length the events surrounding the creation of Israel and the status of Palestine. Section 2 of the article offers some general observations on the continued relevance of the events surrounding the creation of Israel. In particular, it raises the question of the relationship between the principles of ex injuria non oritur jus and ex factis oritur jus in the Israeli–Palestinian context. Section 3 examines the legal significance of the 1922 League of Nations Mandate and Crawford's position concerning its validity. Sections 4 and 5 adopt a similar examination with regard to two other historic events of potential legal significance, namely the 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (the Partition Resolution) and Israel's 1948 Declaration of Independence. Section 5 also briefly examines Crawford's conclusions relating to the status of Palestine, and Section 6 concludes.

This article addresses how and why liberal democratic constitutions, such as the United States, have come to recognise the tension between liberal values of equal liberty and patriarchy in three areas – contraception, abortion, and gay/lesbian sex acts – and to resolve them in the way in which they have: by extending constitutional protection to these activities on the basis of a constitutional right to privacy. The article begins with some historical understanding of the background of the rise of patriarchy, and why the control of sexuality in general, and women's sexuality in particular, was so central to its aims. It then turns to how and why liberal constitutionalism has found these aims to be so problematic as a basis for law.

Ever since the Wednesbury decision in 1947 (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223) courts and public law scholars in the United Kingdom (UK) have been struggling to comprehend the meaning of ‘reasonableness’ and its relation to ‘proportionality’. The main purpose of this article is to promote conceptual clarity in UK public law by describing the nature of reasonableness and proportionality as grounds of judicial review and by highlighting the overlooked similarities and differences between them.

The main arguments of this article are that: (i) reasonableness is, in essence, an exercise in balancing and weighing; (ii) proportionality adds very little to the existing grounds of judicial review in UK public law; (iii) this addition is not necessarily focused on the administrative weighing and balancing process; and (iv) since proportionality adds very little to the existing grounds of judicial review, there is no conceptual or normative reason to prevent having proportionality as a general ground of judicial review in UK public law.

After being kidnapped by the FARC-EP guerrilla group in 1994, the Colombian war reporter Herbin Hoyos created the radio show Las Voces del Secuestro (roughly, The Kidnapped Voices). Every morning, for 24 years, the families of those abducted by the guerrilla group sent out public messages of remembrance, hoping that their loved ones, deep in the jungles of Colombia, would be able to hear the broadcasts on their radios. Although the show closed in 2018, its legacy lives on, not only in the collective memory of many Colombians but also as an exhibition at the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Museum in Geneva (Switzerland). This article examines this show as a dispositif of power and knowledge that (re)produces a particular understanding of law, justice and memory. The show was used by far-right actors in Colombia to mobilise against the recent (2016) peace process – its crown jewel, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). As the JEP tackles the question of the FARC-EP kidnapping through its macro-case 01, the shadow of the Voces looms large over Colombia's transitional justice system. In the longest non-international armed conflict in Latin America, even radio waves served the continuation of war by other means.

The current political landscape in Israel, with countrywide demonstrations occurring weekly, and citizens calling for democracy in the face of initiatives introduced by the coalition, may be regarded as transformative events with potential constitutional implications. This article explores the question of whether Israel is experiencing a ‘constitutional moment’ and what such a moment entails, taking into account the intricate social, legal and political reality of the country. I argue that the current events should be examined and analysed within a broader context of processes that have been occurring in the Israeli society and legal system over the past two decades. These processes may hinder or create challenges for the realisation of a constitutional moment, rather than facilitating progress towards that goal. Correspondingly, the article lays the basic foundations for the occurrence of an Israeli constitutional moment, which I refer to as ‘constitutionalising Israel's constitutional system’.

Since 1946, the United Nations efforts to codify international crimes and to establish an international criminal court have overlapped, with scant results from either endeavor.

The Assembly began its efforts to codify international crimes in its first session when the United States sponsored resolution 95 (I), adopted on December 11, 1946, which affirmed “the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal”. Furthermore, the Assembly directed the Committee on the Codification of International Law, the International Law Commission's predecessor, to formulate a general codification of offenses against the peace and security of mankind.

In 1947, the United Nations established the International Law Commission (ILC). In a resolution again sponsored by the United States the United Nations directed the ILC to:

(a) formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, and

(b) prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind, indicating clearly the place to be accorded to the principles mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above.

On two notable occasions in the past two years, it was found necessary to use legislation in order to buttress the potency of general collective agreements. The first of these occasions was when legislation was used to give overriding legal force to a general collective agreement between the Histadrut and the Government incorporating the tax reform recommendations of the Ben Shachar Committee. The second was a similar use of legislation with regard to the general collective agreement between the Histadrut and the Government incorporating the special increments recommendations of the Barkai Committee. The two collective agreements concerned shared one important quality: They both purported to derogate from rights previously enjoyed by employees under existing collective agreements. One of the reasons for legislative intervention to support these agreements was the existence of doubt as to the legal effectiveness of their attempt to derogate from the individual employees' rights.

The source of the doubt as to the legal effectiveness of such agreements lies in the existence of two distinct levels at which a collective agreement functions: the collective and the individual levels. At the collective level, conditions are determined by the collective bargaining parties, the employer or employers' organisation on one hand and the employees' organisation on the other; at this level, the collective agreement is a consensual arrangement between the parties to it, the parties fix the terms and have a contractual right to demand their enforcement. The terms fixed at the collective level take effect, however, also at the individual level; the individual employees of an employer bound by the agreement are both bound by the agreement and entitled to enjoy the rights bestowed by the agreement. The Collective Agreements Law gives forceful expression to the effect of the collective agreement's personal provisions at the individual level, giving them immediate and mandatory effect as part of each individual employee's employment contract.

This article explores the tension between the theoretical conceptualisations of liberal peace, transitional justice and reconciliation by focusing on power sharing as a liberal peace institution-building mechanism. Power sharing is based on the premise that identities in conflict in deeply divided societies are difficult, if not impossible, to change. The article outlines the limitations of liberal peace by demonstrating how the implementation of power-sharing arrangements creates a political reality in which conflict patterns are further entrenched, thus hindering the prospects of conflict transformation. In order to address the limitations of liberal peace, the article draws on models of transformative justice to highlight the growing need for a new conceptualisation of reconciliation as a political and transformative concept, in which both justice and reconciliation are recognised as intrinsic goals for post-conflict societies. Thus, the re-establishment of political structures and institutional reforms is envisaged not only as a tool to promote political stability, but as a means of facilitating transformation in conflict patterns in the political and social spheres.

Lionel Leonard Cohen – The Rt Hon Lord Cohen of Walmer in the County of Kent – was a distinguished British lawyer. In 1951, he was appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. Given the fact that he was a committed Jew, this was a remarkable achievement in its time. He chaired the Committee which produced the 1945 Cohen Report, whose recommendations were adopted and in due course enacted in the Companies Act 1948.

This article discusses empirical research in political science on the topics of business and human rights, and transnational governance networks. It argues that transnational governance networks confront norm clashes and power conflicts, which undermine their effectiveness and legitimacy. Transnational governance as a concept and approach to ordering is therefore in need of meta-governance, by which the article understands secondary rules and procedures – that is, institutional mechanisms that allow for the mitigation and resolution of these conflicts. However, the extent to which such meta-governance currently exists, its effectiveness, and the rules and procedures that may legitimately define meta-governance and its actors are still unknown. This article calls for a research agenda to investigate these unknowns, which combines normative-legal and empirical-political science perspectives on the nature, form, legitimacy and effects of meta-governance.