This short article deals with two of the Deuteronomic laws: the law of the tithe (Deut. 14:22–28; 26:12–16) and the law of the Hebrew slave (Deut. 15:12–18). It is not intended to present a comprehensive study of these two laws, but to limit the investigation to the uncovering of those ancient laws referred to only by the author of Deuteronomy and not by the authors of the other Biblical codes, including that of the Covenant Code.

I. Bashanah hashlishit shnat hama'asar “in the third year, which is the year of tithing” (Deut. 26:12).

The reader of the law of the declaration of the tithe will quickly discern a contradiction: the tithe of the third year is given to the Levite, sojourner, orphan, and widow, bisharekha, literally, “within your gates” (within which there are no cultic places according to the laws of Deuteronomy—Deut. 26:2b). On the other hand, the tithe is declared in the Temple lifnei adonai “before the Lord” (Deut. 26:1s). Another surprising point is that the law creates an impression of unfamiliarity with the annual tithe. Apparently, only the triennial tithe is known: “in the third year, which is the year of tithing”.

The Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Israel Law Review wish to honour the memory of a brilliant young Jewish scholar who was killed in action while fighting for France in the First World War.

Jean Juster born in 1881 at Piatra-Neamtz, in Rumania (Moldavia), was of a family well-known in the region. His grandfather, Abraham Lipa Juster, one of the leaders of the Jewish community, was erudite and active in public affairs. His father, Moshe, was also learned in Jewish studies and active in the promotion of the well-being of the community.

Jean probably received his Jewish education at Piatra. In that town, which N. Sokolow called “the Moldavian Jerusalem”, a branch of the Hovevei Zion movement was created in 1894 and from 1897 groups of supporters of Zionism were active.

In 1995, the Association Agreement between Israel and the European Community was signed in Brussels. This instrument is the product of years of negotiations. Europe's traditional policy on a linkage between the nature of its economic and political ties with Israel and progress in the Middle East peace process have led to static relations between the two, despite the importance attached by the Community to the region as part of its Mediterranean policy. The achievements of the Israeli-Palestinian (and Israeli-Arab) peace process, which was renewed with the October 1991 Madrid Conference, have at last enabled Israel and the Community to establish the Association status sought by Israel. A true comprehensive understanding of the Association Agreement necessitates therefore an examination of several other subjects such as the previous relations between the sides and the legal arrangements institutionalising these relations; Israel's trade position with Europe; the European Community's Mediterranean Agricultural and Commercial policies, and many other. This, however, cannot be done within the limits of this paper. Instead, this section merely seeks to briefly survey the legal regime embodied in the Association Agreement, that is, its general structure, main features and important legal, economic and political provisions. It should be emphasised that no detailed analysis of the provisions of the Association Agreement is intended, for the Association Agreement encompasses many fields and areas.

The advent of modern technology such as drones provides states with unique capabilities to acquire, with ease, high-quality information regarding acts performed by armed forces and agencies, such as (but not only) targeted killings. In some cases, this information can shed light on the facts of the case, when alleged violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law have occurred and thus investigation is called for. However, although calls for disclosure are increasing, states are reluctant to disclose information relating to such activities. This article discusses potential sources for obligations of disclosure, whether to civil society or to certain international bodies such as the International Criminal Court. In essence, the article posits that disclosure obligations can derive from the principle of transparency, as it applies, inter alia, to investigations, augmented by an emerging positive right to receive information. These obligations must be balanced, in turn, with considerations of national security. The article suggests that this balance, across a wide spectrum of international contexts, should be conducted in light of standards of necessity, proportionality and specificity. Accordingly, blanket non-disclosure may constitute a violation of international law or result in factual inferences to the detriment of states or individuals.

Yehuda Blum's article, ostensibly devoted to an examination of the lawfulness of a military order under the law of occupation, actually explored a preliminary question – whether Jordan had valid title to the West Bank (referred to as ‘Judea and Samaria’). Concluding that Jordan had no title, Blum concluded that the law of occupation did not apply. This reflection revisits Blum's thesis. It suggests that Blum's argument failed to elucidate the relevant legal questions and therefore his conclusion was hasty. It would be distressing to think that it was Blum's article that convinced Israeli decision-makers to deny the formal applicability of the law of occupation to the West Bank and Gaza.

The principle of proportionality, notoriously obscure in application and subjective in interpretation, has been enforced so rarely as to call into question its potency as a meaningful international legal standard. Nonetheless, international criminal tribunals, academics, and the ICRC's monumental study on customary international humanitarian law all confidently proclaim the principle as embedded in the customary international law applicable to both international and non-international armed conflicts. To assess whether these claims are accurate, and to flesh out how states interpret the principle in practice, the author and a colleague have undertaken a long-term, multinational empirical study of state practice in interpreting and enforcing the proportionality principle. This article discusses the methodological options available and explains the one chosen for the proportionality study. The limitations of the study, in spite of its deliberate methodology, suggest that the debilities of the proportionality principle may not be conceptual as much as a byproduct of unnecessary military secrecy. This article concludes that greater transparency in state compliance with the rule of discrimination and the principle of proportionality would, at least, facilitate an understanding of how the hitherto obscure principle operates in practice and, at best, could create systemic effects that would decrease the dangers to civilians in armed conflicts.

Some fifteen years ago, an address on the subject of judicial review of the actions of the Knesset would have been extremely short and quite familiar to English jurists. Our practice was basically the same as in England: the Parliament is sovereign, its laws inviolate, and its inner proceedings immune from review.

Beginning with two decisions in the early 1980s, Flato-Sharon and Sarid, the Court has gradually recognized the justiciability of a limited range of Knesset decisions. While the precise level of review varies according to the type of decision at issue, the Court's review has been motivated in all cases by the need to preserve the rule of law and the integrity of our democratic regime.

Babatha had a dispute with the guardians of Jesus, her son (from her first marriage). We do not know the reasons for this dispute, however, she seems to have been interested in the formula by which, under Roman law, the tutor could be called upon to account for the loss that the ward had suffered. Hence, we can find three nearly identical Greek translations of the actio tutelae in her archive (about 124/25 A.D.). Here we will only examine the appointment of the judges. The text of Pap. Yadin 28 1.1–4 runs as follows:

These lines were translated in the standard edition of the Babatha archive by N. Lewis in this manner:

Lewis does not comment on his (cautious) translation of xenokritai as “local judges”. Presumably, however, it reflects the opinion of the first editor, H. J. Polotsky, that the xenokritai are non-Roman judges (iudices peregrini). Consequently, the Latin version should have been as follows:

I. Survey of Transplant Techniques

The kidney is one of the few organs which today can be successfully transplanted from a living donor to an ailing recipient. A healthy donor can function satisfactorily with a single kidney; therefore the removal of one kidney for transplantation does not significantly endanger the donor's life. However, removal, or even partial removal, of other organs, such as the heart, lungs, or pancreas, will present a serious risk to the health and life of the donor.

In addition to organs, skin, bone marrow, blood and other body parts can be transplanted from living donors.

A. Kidney Transplants

The kidneys function to regulate the body's electrolyte and water balance and eliminate various wastes. Severe kidney dysfunction endangers the patient's life, and requires treatment by dialysis or kidney transplant. Up until a decade ago, the life expectancy of patients treated by dialysis exceeded that of patients who underwent kidney transplants. Over the past decade, the life expectancy of patients who have undergone kidney transplants from deceased donors has increased to a point where it is now comparable with the life expectancy of patients on dialysis.

Two decisions were rendered recently by Israeli courts of lower instances which concern the field of diplomatic immunities. The first, delivered by the Magistrate Court in Petah Tikwa, deals with the inviolability of diplomatic premises and with the waiver thereof; and the second, by the District Court in Jerusalem, refers to the question of state immunity from attachment and execution, and seems to constitute a clear diversion from the accepted international norms and rules on this issue. Both decisions, rendered in the matter of the residence of the Ambassador of Côte d'Ivoire to Israel, will be examined separately, following the factual background relevant to each.

The question of the inviolability of diplomatic premises, as well as that of a diplomat's immunity from jurisdiction, is a separate issue from that of state immunity. The first considers the treatment given to diplomats in foreign countries, and is codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (the “Convention”), while the latter consists only of customary international law, and deals with the concepts of acts of state and the immunity of sovereign states from jurisdiction by the courts of another state. In the following survey we will show that in some instances, the two issues have been confused and conclusions drawn from one to the other without consideration of the differences between the two.

The Gotovina case presented the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with a unique opportunity to adjudicate on issues connected with the law of targeting and international humanitarian law (IHL) in a criminal context. This opportunity was especially important given the fact that legal issues arising out of complex, intense combat situations have only rarely been adjudicated. Although Gotovina was not formally charged with carrying out unlawful attacks on civilians, attacks by Croatia on four towns over the course of ‘Operation Storm’ were the focus of the proceedings. This led both Trial and Appeal Chambers to deal with issues related to the law of targeting such as classification of military objectives, proportionality, and the intent behind an attack. This article argues that the judges failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to discuss these issues. They failed consistently to articulate the legal reasoning behind their findings; they failed to explain the branch of law on which any of their substantive determinations were based; and, perhaps most importantly, they did not explain the relationship between IHL and criminal law and how IHL is to be applied in a courtroom.

The article attempts to examine the structures of the EFTA Court in order to gain insights into its effectiveness. For this purpose the article relies on a rational system approach developed within social sciences to improve understanding the performance of public organisations and calibrated to examine international courts by the ERC Project Researching Conditions for Effective International Adjudication. Under the conceptual and analytical framework advanced by the Effectiveness Project the article, therefore, examines the main structures of the EFTA Court: for example, the Court's budget, jurisdictional rules, judicial independence and main legal doctrines. The article will also, in relation to some aspects, attempt to conduct a qualitative assessment of how some of these features relate to the effectiveness of the Court.

This article considers the recent recognition by the United States of Morocco's territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara. After a review of certain aspects of the history of the dispute over Western Sahara, it focuses on the interaction of arguments based on the recognition and non-recognition of territorial sovereignty with those prioritising the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi people. It concludes that, in as much as the population of Western Sahara has a right to decide its own future, US recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara has undermined key principles of international law.

Some have proposed the development of technologies that improve our moral behaviour – moral enhancement – in order to address global risks such as pandemics, global warming and nuclear war. I will argue that this technology could be weaponised to manipulate the moral dispositions of enemy combatants. Despite being morally controversial, weaponised moral enhancement would be neither clearly prohibited nor easily prohibitable by international war law. Unlike previous psychochemical weapons, it would be relatively physically harmless. I argue that when combatants are liable to lethal aggression to achieve an aim of war, they are also liable to weaponised moral enhancement to achieve that same aim. Weaponised moral enhancement will loosen just war requirements in both traditional and revisionist normative just war theories. It will particularly affect revisionist theories’ jus ad bellum requirements for humanitarian and preventive wars. For instance, weaponised moral enhancement could be more proportional and efficacious than lethal aggression to effect institutional changes in preventive and humanitarian wars. I will conclude that, despite evading international war laws and loosening normative just war requirements, the intuition that weaponised moral enhancement would gravely harm combatants can be defended by arguing that it would severely disturb personal identity, which could potentially ground future prohibitions.

This review essay challenges three main claims about originalism in American legal thought. While it affirms that originalism could be the Law of a legal system, it first challenges the mainstream idea that American originalism is the paradigmatic case in theory and in practice. Second, the essay confronts the normative justification that originalism ensures democracy based on the rule of law. Third, it interrogates the dichotomy between living constitutionalism and originalism regarding the use of history by arguing that originalism is a form of hegemony. The case study analysed in this article is Israeli legal thought and practice after the enactment of the 1992 Basic Laws, with the focus on the right of equality.

Contrary to the ‘rupture thesis’ favoured in Anglo-American academic discourse, Nazi criminal law did not emerge from a vacuum; nor did it disappear after 1945. The article explains and defends this ‘continuity thesis’. In fact, Nazi criminal law adopted earlier authoritarian tendencies of German criminal law and exacerbated them (the ‘radicalisation thesis’). It is for this reason that Nazi criminal law should not lightly be dismissed as ‘non-law’, thus omitting any further engagement with it. The article will show that the same continuity and radicalisation arguments can be made, mutatis mutandis, for German Nazi criminology, which ultimately became a legitimating science (‘Legitimationswissenschaft’) for Nazi criminal justice policy. The argument is developed in four stages. First, an account is given of the racist and criminal-biologistic foundations of National Socialist criminology, including their continuity both with the past and into the future. This is followed by an explanation of the influence of criminal anthropology (particularly that of Lombroso) on the ‘scientification’ of criminology (the ‘Kraepelin and Aschaffenburg paradigms’). Third, the National Socialist radicalisation of criminology on the basis of the criminal-biological utopia of the ‘blood-based’ Volksgemeinschaft is described. Thus, Nazi criminology derived its strength from and built upon biological theories of crime, which in turn laid the foundations of the deadly Nazi criminal justice policy. The discipline became a science that legitimated National Socialism, contrary to Wetzell's thesis of a somewhat dissident ‘mainstream criminology’. With regard to disturbing developments in current German politics, all this will make clear that the approach of the (German) ‘New Right’ to criminal justice is not novel at all but is derived from the ideologically infused theories and policies of Nazi criminologists during the 1930s.