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The Scope of Military Jurisdiction for Violations of International Humanitarian Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 December 2020

Claire Simmons
Claire Simmons*
Affiliation:
PhD Candidate at the University of Essex Law School and Human Rights Centre, United Kingdom; [email protected]
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Abstract

Drafters of international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties clearly envisaged a role for military justice systems in the implementation and enforcement of these treaties. Nevertheless, the adequacy of military jurisdiction over violations of international law is being questioned in certain spheres. In the context of these debates this article considers the domestic rationale for military justice systems and explores the role and limits of military jurisdiction in combating impunity for violations of IHL. In focusing on the need to effectively repress and suppress all violations of IHL, the article addresses the extent to which some sort of military justice may be necessary for the effective enforcement of certain provisions. It also explores the way in which increased scrutiny of the impact of these justice systems on the rights of individuals has led to restrictions on the format and scope of military jurisdiction. Although there are difficulties in internationalising the discussion on military jurisdiction because of differences in domestic legal traditions, the choice of effective IHL enforcement mechanisms, which includes the choice of military or civilian jurisdiction, is key in combating impunity for violations of this body of law and protecting the rights of those involved.

Keywords

military jurisdictionIHL violationscombating impunitymilitary justicemilitary offences
Type
Articles
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 3 - 23
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press in association with The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Footnotes

The author would like to thank the Minerva Centre for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for the opportunity to present preliminary ideas for this article at the 14th Minerva/ICRC Conference on International Humanitarian Law, and the Israel Law Review's anonymous reviewers for their insight. Special thanks to Dr Katya Alkhateeb and Professor Noam Lubell for their support in the revision of this article.

References

1 The term ‘military justice systems’ is used here in a very broad sense, encompassing a variety of proceedings used to enforce laws and regulations within the military, from informal disciplinary proceedings to criminal judicial proceedings. Military justice systems in practice will vary considerably from state to state in their structure, the status and hierarchy of those involved, and their relationship with the operational branches of the military. The term ‘military jurisdiction’ is used to denote the field of responsibility of these military justice systems, namely the set of laws and regulations under the authority of the military justice systems. It is not limited to criminal proceedings. ‘Military laws’ is used to refer to the set of laws applicable only to military personnel. See Liivoja, Rain, ‘Military Justice’ in Dubber, Markus D and Hörnle, Tatjana (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 326Google Scholar.

2 eg, Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (GC III), art 84; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (GC IV), art 66; Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (GC I), art 45; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (GC II), art 46; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (AP I), arts 86, 87.

3 Jean Pictet (ed), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 – Commentary: Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (ICRC 1952) (Commentary GC I (1952)), art 1, 26; ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (2nd edn, ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2016), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary (Commentary GC I (2016)), art 45, para 2714.

4 Commentary GC I (2016) (n 3) art 45, para 2718.

5 The politically declared state of ‘war’ is not identical to the factual existence of an armed conflict (and therefore of the application of IHL). Nevertheless, there is a definite overlap between the two, as well as with other political states, which may trigger extended use of military jurisdiction such as states of emergency or martial law.

6 This choice of explanatory factors is not exhaustive but are the reasons most cited in the defence for, and the criticisms of, the use of military jurisdiction, and therefore enable a cross-cutting analysis of the arguments. There exists a myriad of other considerations as to why military justice systems exist and are still used that are much more state-specific, such as the willingness of military institutions to be subject to civilian authority or the historical civil–military ties.

7 This article focuses on the actions taken by states in relation to members of their own armed forces for the implementation of IHL and therefore does not cover issues such as jurisdiction over civilians or members of other armed forces; see Liivoja, Rain, ‘Trying Civilian Contractors in Military Courts: A Necessary Evil?’ in Duxbury, Alison and Groves, Matthew (eds), Military Justice in the Modern Age (Cambridge University Press 2016) 81Google Scholar; Schmid, Evelyne, ‘A Few Comments on a Comment: The UN Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 32 on Article 14 of the ICCPR and the Question of Civilians Tried by Military Courts’ (2010) 14 The International Journal of Human Rights 1058CrossRefGoogle Scholar; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Gabriela Knaul (7 August 2013), UN Doc A/68/285, para 102.

8 See, eg, from the fifth century BC, Sun Tzu, The Art Of War (Lionel Giles tr, 1910) Ch 9, para 43.

9 McCarthy, Amy H, ‘Erosion of the Rule of Law as a Basis for Command Responsibility under International Humanitarian Law’ (2018) 18 Chicago Journal of International Law 2Google Scholar; Gilissen, John, ‘Evolution actuelle de la justice militaire’ (1981) 8 Recueils de la Société Internationale de Droit Pénal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 1, 40Google Scholar; Patrick Gleeson, ‘Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Military Courts: Remarks by Mr. Patrick Gleeson’, Expert Consultation on the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals, 24 November 2014, 3; Michael Gibson, ‘Military Justice in Operational Settings, Peacekeeping Missions and Situations of Transitional Justice’ in Duxbury and Groves (n 7) 381, 383.

10 Gilissen (n 9) 40.

11 ibid 43.

12 Peter Rowe, ‘How Well Do International Human Rights Bodies Understand Military Courts?’ in Duxbury and Groves (n 7) 15, 16.

13 Gilissen (n 9) 48.

14 Denton, David H, ‘The Australian Military Justice System: History, Organisation and Disciplinary Structure’ (2016) 6 Victoria University Law and Justice Journal 26, 26–27Google Scholar.

15 Winthrop, William, Military Law and Precedents (2nd edn, Washington Governmental Printing Office 1920) 18Google Scholar.

16 Gilissen (n 9) 48.

17 Rollman, Robert O, ‘Of Crimes, Courts-Martial and Punishment – A Short History of Military Justice’ (1969) 11 US Air Force JAG Law Review 212, 214Google Scholar.

18 ibid 214.

19 Pariselle, Jean, ‘La Justice Militaire Française à la Lumière de Son Histoire’ (1980) 19 Military Law and Law of War Review 291, 300Google Scholar (citing Victor Foucher, Conseiller à la Cour de Cassation, Commentaire sur le Code de Justice Militaire pour l'Armée de Terre (1858).

20 ibid 300.

21 ibid 300–01.

22 Supreme Court of Canada, R v Généreux [1992] 1 SCR 259, 293 (emphasis added). Some of the arguments put forward in this case were again under review in the Canadian Supreme Court in 2019 in R v Stillman [2019] SCC 40; the Court once again emphasised the need for a separate military justice system.

23 See, eg, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions 1949 (n 2); GC I (n 2) art 51; GC II (n 2) art 52; GC III (n 2) art 131; GC IV (n 2) art 148.

24 See, eg, GC I (n 2) arts 18(1), 30(10); GC II (n 2) arts 28, 37; Commentary GC I (2016) (n 3) art 52, para 2721; ICRC, Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention: Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces (ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2017) (Commentary GC II (2017)), art 46, para 2832; AP I (n 2) arts 86, 87.

25 Frederic de Mulinen, ‘Law of War and Armed Forces’ (1982) 21 Military Law and Law of War Review 35, 47–48.

26 Renaut, Céline, ‘The Impact of Military Disciplinary Sanctions on Compliance with International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 319, 319–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 GC III (n 2) art 4; AP I (n 2) art 43.

28 AP I (n 2) art 87.

29 McCarthy (n 9); United States Military Commission, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Manila, 8 October – 7 December 1945; and the Supreme Court of the United States, 4 February 1946, as recorded in United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals Vol IV (1948) 1–96; ICTY, Prosecutor v Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, Judgment, IT-01-47-A, Appeals Chamber, 22 April 2008, [1777]; ICTR, Prosecutor v Bagilishema, Judgment, ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Chamber I, 7 June 2001, [50].

30 Victor Hansen, ‘The Impact of Military Justice Reforms on the Law of Armed Conflict: How to Avoid Unintended Consequences’ in Duxbury and Groves (n 7) 106, 108.

31 ibid 129; Dahl, Arne Willy, ‘Military Justice and Self-Interest in Accountability’ in Bergsmo, Morten and Song, Tianying (eds), Military Self-Interest in Accountability for Core International Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2016) 21, 32Google Scholar; Heng, Benjamin and others, ‘Military Justice in a Comparative and International Perspective’ (2016) 20 Journal of International Peacekeeping 133, 137CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Issue of the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals: Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Emmanuel Decaux (13 January 2006), UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/58, Principle 8, and commentary on Principle 9, para 32; Gibson, Michael R, ‘International Human Rights Law and the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals: Preserving Utility while Precluding Impunity’ (2008) 4 Journal of International Law and International Relations 1, 39Google Scholar.

33 Pariselle (n 19) 308.

34 Winthrop (n 15) 19.

35 ibid 19.

36 ‘William and Mary, 1688: An Act for Punishing Officers or Soldiers Who Shall Mutiny or Desert Their Majestyes Service [Chapter V. Rot. Parl. pt. 5. nu. 2.]’ in John Raithby (ed), Statutes of the Realm: Vol 6, 1685–94 (s l, 1819) 55–56, preamble, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol6/pp55-56.

37 ibid; Liivoja, Rain, Criminal Jurisdiction over Armed Forces Abroad (Cambridge University Press 2018) 178Google Scholar.

38 Halleck, Henry Wager, ‘Military Tribunals and Their Jurisdiction’ (1911) 5 American Journal of International Law 958, 959CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Pariselle (n 19) 293.

40 Gilissen (n 9) 39–40.

41 ibid 39–40.

42 ibid 40.

43 Gleeson (n 9) 4.

44 Gilissen (n 9) 41.

45 Gleeson (n 9) 4.

46 Dahl (n 31) 30.

47 Collins, Pauline, The Military as a Separate Society: Consequences for Discipline in the United States and Australia (Lexington 2019) 25Google Scholar.

48 Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 1949 (n 2).

49 States may choose to criminalise at the domestic level a broader range of IHL violations beyond war crimes; see Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights/ICRC, ‘Guidelines on Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Law, Policy, and Good Practice’, September 2019, para 16.

50 ibid paras 12–17; Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany, ‘Beyond the Grave Breaches Regime: The Duty to Investigate Alleged Violations of International Law Governing Armed Conflicts’ (2011) 14 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 37, 45; Jesse Medlong, ‘All Other Breaches: State Practice and the Geneva Conventions’ Nebulous Class of Less Discussed Prohibitions’ (2013) 34 Michigan Journal of International Law 829, 840; Françoise J Hampson, ‘An Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2016) 46 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 1, 12; Commentary GC I (1952) (n 3) commentary on art 49, 368; Commentary GC I (2016) (n 3) commentary on art 1, paras 2841, 2896.

51 See, eg, the way in which this division is used in commentaries on the Geneva Conventions 1949: Commentary GC I (1952) (n 3) commentary on art 49, 368; Commentary GC I (2016) (n 3) commentary on art 1, para 2841 (‘Penal sanctions, as opposed to disciplinary ones, will be issued by judicial institutions, be they military or civilian’). This divide has also been considered in various international human rights law cases, eg, before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as to what constitutes a ‘disciplinary’ versus a ‘criminal’ offence for the purposes of fair trial guarantees: Panagiotis Kremmydiotis, ‘The Influence of Human Rights Law on the Reform of Military Justice’ in Duxbury and Groves (n 7) 311, 322; ECtHR, Engel and Others v The Netherlands, App nos 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72, 8 June 1986, paras 82 and 85.

52 Gibson (n 32) 39.

53 See the ICRC National Implementation Database, which collects information on domestic legislation on IHL obligations, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl-nat.

54 Some exceptions are presented below in Section 4.2.

55 Belgium, Colombia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Kenya. See responses to the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War (ISMLLW), ‘Comparative Studies on Military Jurisdiction in the World’, carried out in 2001 and 2011; Recueils of the ISMLLW are available from the General Secretariat of the ISMLLW at , https://www.ismllw.org/publications (ISMLLW Recueil (2011)).

56 Bulgaria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Switzerland, Tunisia. See responses to ISMLLW Recueil (2011) (n 55); Joshua E Kastenberg, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Concept of a Fair Trial: Prosecutor v. Fulgence Niyonteze: A Swiss Military Tribunal Case Study’ (2004) 12 University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review 1.

57 Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ireland, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States. See responses to ISMLLW Recueil (2011) (n 55); and Second Report of the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (The Turkel Commission): Israel's Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to International Law’, 2013, Annex C, https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/downloads_eng1/en/ENG_turkel_eng_b475-941.pdf (Second Turkel Report, Annex C).

58 Examples include reviews carried out for ‘lessons-learned’ purposes, or military inquiries; see Geneva Academy (n 49) Guideline 13.

59 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 14(1); Rowe (n 12) 24.

60 Schmitt, Michael N, ‘Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed Conflict’ (2011) 2 Harvard National Security Journal 31, 84Google Scholar; Goldrick, James, ‘A Strategic Commander's Perspective’ in Lovell, David W (ed), Investigating Operational Incidents in a Military Context (Brill/Nijhoff 2015) 21, 23Google Scholar; Helen Durham and Eve Massingham, ‘Moving from the Mechanics of Accountability to a Culture of Accountability: What More Can Be Done in Addition to Prosecuting War Crimes?’ in Jadranka Petrovic (ed), Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Essays in Honour of Tim McCormack (Routledge 2016) 267.

61 Ian Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 167; APV Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (3rd edn, Manchester University Press 2012) Ch 5 ‘Precautions in Attack’; Carolin Wuerzner, ‘Mission Impossible? Bringing Charges for the Crime of Attacking Civilians or Civilian Objects before International Criminal Tribunals’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 827, 915; Alon Margalit, ‘Did LOAC Take the Lead? Reassessing Israel's Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh and the Subsequent Calls for Criminal Accountability’ (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 147.

62 Schmitt (n 60) 84; Dahl (n 31) 27–28 (‘In a high-tech environment such as in air and missile warfare, the demands for expertise are substantially higher. An investigator who does not understand, for example, weapons options, fusing guidance systems, angle of attack, optimal release altitudes, command and control relationships, communications capabilities, tactical options, available intelligence options, enemy practices, pattern of life analysis, collateral damage estimate methodology, human factors in a combat environment, and so forth, will struggle to effectively scrutinise an air strike’).

63 Dahl (n 31) 27. See also Wuerzner (n 61) 925.

64 Gilissen (n 9) 41; Gibson (n 9) 385; Hampson (n 50) 3.

65 Heng and others (n 31) 135.

66 ISMLLW Recueil (2011) (n 55) 71–79. Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany and The Netherlands also have provisions for the training of civilian judicial officers in military matters.

67 Code de justice militaire (France), art L.111-1. The Tribunal aux Armées was abolished in 2012, although specialised military courts can still be set up in times of war or other situations of emergency.

68 Heng and others (n 31) 135.

69 Gibson (n 9) 386.

70 Commentary GC I (2016) (n 3) commentary on art 45, para 2711.

71 Rain Liivoja, ‘Service Jurisdiction under International Law’ (2010) 11 Melbourne Journal of International Law 309, 310.

72 GC I (n 2) art 49; GC II (n 2) art 50; GC III (n 2) art 129; GC IV (n 2) art 146; AP I (n 2) art 85. For customary law see Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol I: Rules (ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2005, revised 2009) (ICRC Study) rule 158.

73 There are often exceptions; for example, in the UK for sexual offences against children, certain terrorism-related offences, fraud and bribery; see Crown Prosecution Service, Legal Guidance: ‘Jurisdiction’ (updated 7 November 2019), https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/jurisdiction; Liivoja (n 71) 310.

74 Liivoja (n 71) 310; Gleeson (n 9) 5; Heng and others (n 31) 135. See above n 7.

75 eg, The Netherlands and France; Second Turkel Report, Annex C (n 57) 918; Response of France to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, States’ Responses to Questionnaire on Military Courts (2011) 6.

76 Hansen (n 30) 126.

77 Gilissen (n 9) 49.

78 Gibson (n 9) 386.

79 Dahl (n 31) 28.

80 UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General's Special Advisor, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein, on a Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (24 March 2005), UN Doc A/59/710, para 35.

81 Gibson (n 32) 37; Rowe (n 12) 28.

82 ICRC Study (n 72) rule 100; GC III (n 2) arts 99, 102, 105, 106; GC IV (n 2) arts 5, 66, 71; AP I (n 2) art 75(4), Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 1949 (n 2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609, art 6 (AP II); ICCPR (n 59) art 14.

83 Wager Halleck (n 38) 959.

84 For some gruesome examples see Rollman (n 17) 213–14 (who cites losing one's right hand for threatening to strike a superior officer, or as punishment for murder upon a ship to be ‘bound to the dead man and thrown into the sea’).

85 Wager Halleck (n 38) 959; Rowe, Peter, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces (Cambridge University Press 2006) 79Google Scholar.

86 Rollman (n 17) 218.

87 ibid 219.

88 ibid 220.

89 ibid 220–21.

90 Gilissen (n 9) 66.

91 Rowe (n 85).

92 ECtHR, Findlay v UK, App no 22107/93, 25 February 1997; Morris v UK, App no 38784/97, 26 February 2002, para 64; Incal v Turkey, App no 41/1997/825/1031, 9 June 1998; Pauwels v Belgium, App no 10208/82, 26 May 1988, para 38; Mikhno v Ukraine, App no 32514/12, 1 September 2016, para 165; Rowe (n 85) 68–70, 79–88.

93 Engel and Others v The Netherlands, App nos 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72, 8 June 1986.

94 See, eg, the Australian system, which uses a gradual scale of increased punishments and procedural guarantees: Second Turkel Report, Annex C (n 57) 683; Yale Law School, ‘Yale Draft Principles for Military Summary Proceedings’, 2 December 2019.

95 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (16 December 2005), UN Doc A/RES/60/147, Annex (OHCHR, Basic Principles), Principle I.

96 Zappalà, Salvatore, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 137, 149CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97 Sassòli, Marco, ‘The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and Inherent Challenges’ (2007) 10 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 45, 55CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

98 CIADH, ‘Cuadernillo de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos No 12: Debido Proceso’ (2017) (in Spanish); Case of Bámaca Velásquez v Guatemala (2000) Inter-Am Ct HR, Judgment of 25 November 2000, (Ser C) No 70, para 197; Case of Heliodoro Portugal v Panama (2008) Inter-Am Ct HR, Judgment of 12 August 2008, (Ser C) No 186, para 115.

99 Weissbrodt, David, The Right to a Fair Trial: Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 29Google Scholar. Of course, not all states party to the ACHR are of Hispanic tradition, yet the prevalence of cases concerning such states before the Inter-Am Ct HR is undeniable.

100 Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al v Peru (1998) Inter-Am Ct HR, Judgment of 30 May 1998, (Ser C) No 59, para 132.

101 Case of Las Palmeras v Colombia (2000) Inter-Am Ct HR, Judgment of 4 Feb 2000, (Ser C) No 67, paras 52–53. See also cases surrounding art 13 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917: eg, Ortega v Mexico (2010) Inter-Am Ct HR, Judgment of 30 August 2010, (Ser C) No 215.

102 In Castillo Petruzzi (n 100), there were structural flaws with the military justice system – inter alia, that military judges remained subordinate to the operational chain of command and were not composed of legal professionals (para 125(e)). In Las Palmeras (n 101), there were significant concerns about the independence and impartiality of the investigators (para 53), in addition to the fact that the initial phases of the investigations were fundamentally flawed, including in the tampering, concealing and destruction of evidence (para 57).

103 ECtHR, Mustafa Tunç & Fecire Tunç v Turkey, App no 24014/05, 14 April 2015, paras 217–34; Imbrioscia v Switzerland, App no 13972/88, 24 November 1993, para 36; Brennan v UK, App no 39846/98, 16 October 2001, para 45; Shabelnik v Ukraine, App no 16404/03, 19 February 2009, para 52. The ECtHR has found on some occasions that fair trial rights may apply to some pre-trial proceedings, but only in limited circumstances when these have a direct impact on the trial itself: Haarde v Iceland, App no 66847/12, 23 November 2017, para 78.

104 ECtHR, Al Skeini v UK, App no 55721/07, 7 July 2011; Jaloud v The Netherlands, App no 47708/08, 20 November 2014.

105 See, eg, the similar approach on jurisdiction: ECtHR, Mustafa Tunç & Fecire Tunç v Turkey (n 103) paras 223–34; Favela Nova Brasilia v Brasil (2017) Inter-Am Ct HR, Judgment of 16 February 2017, (Ser C) No 345, paras 186–91.

106 OHCHR, Basic Principles (n 95).

107 Dahl (n 31); Liivoja (n 71); Heng and others (n 31) 136–37.

108 It has been suggested that any principles addressing the concept of military jurisdiction from an international perspective should ensure knowledge in comparative systems of law: Schmid (n 7) 1066, Gibson (n 32) 43.

109 Hampson (n 50) 17; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol II, Part Two, Commentary to art 41, para 8; Quiroga, Cecilia Medina, The Battle of Human Rights: Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter American System (Martinus Nijhoff 1988) 16Google Scholar.

110 Gibson (n 32) 48.