This short article deals with two of the Deuteronomic laws: the law of the tithe (Deut. 14:22–28; 26:12–16) and the law of the Hebrew slave (Deut. 15:12–18). It is not intended to present a comprehensive study of these two laws, but to limit the investigation to the uncovering of those ancient laws referred to only by the author of Deuteronomy and not by the authors of the other Biblical codes, including that of the Covenant Code.

I. Bashanah hashlishit shnat hama'asar “in the third year, which is the year of tithing” (Deut. 26:12).

The reader of the law of the declaration of the tithe will quickly discern a contradiction: the tithe of the third year is given to the Levite, sojourner, orphan, and widow, bisharekha, literally, “within your gates” (within which there are no cultic places according to the laws of Deuteronomy—Deut. 26:2b). On the other hand, the tithe is declared in the Temple lifnei adonai “before the Lord” (Deut. 26:1s). Another surprising point is that the law creates an impression of unfamiliarity with the annual tithe. Apparently, only the triennial tithe is known: “in the third year, which is the year of tithing”.

Market overt deals with the conflict between the bona fide purchaser of a chattel and the person whose rights in the property are injured by the sale. Schematically there are three people involved in this situation: the original owner, the seller and the purchaser. The most simple illustration is the case in which A steals goods belonging to B and sells them to C, who does not know of their origin. On the common assumption that A disappears or is insolvent (and even on the assumption that his whereabouts are known and it is possible to file a claim against him) the question arises, who is entitled to the goods, B or C, and who must bear the loss. In the absence of special circumstances, one is unable to say which of the two has a more “just” claim to title — both have an absolutely valid claim. The layman and the legalist are confounded by this situation, and are without even a clear intuition of whom to favour.

The large variety of solutions to this dilemma offered by different legal systems is testimony to this conundrum. As in other questions, the Israeli legislature did not adopt a solution drafted by any particular foreign system, but drafted an original and independent rule. Elements of this rule are similar to the constituent elements in comparative rules in other systems, but the compilation of all these constituents is unique and different from all other rules.

In this article we are concerned with the problem of the attitude of the criminal law towards the destruction of one's own property. In the elucidation of this problem it will be necessary not only to analyse various provisions of the special part of the criminal law, but also certain extra-penal laws, and to consider them against the wider background of the different social interests they are designed to protect.

The accepted view of our legal system is that among the liberties a person enjoys is the liberty to destroy or damage his own property.

This view is an outcome of both the influence of Roman Law, and of our social and economic system. This liberty is nowadays subject to limitations ensuing from the needs of society, the state or even of individuals, in the same way as use of property is not unrestricted, but has sometimes to submit to the rights of others (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas), The extent and form of these limitations depend mainly on the structure of a given society and its ideologies, but the differences between most societies, at least in the western world, are diminishing gradually.

The new Israel Civil Procedure Rules, 1963 re-enact in rr. 269–82, with certain amendments, rr. 241–50 of the Palestinian Civil Procedure Rules, 1938 dealing with “Summary Procedure on Specially Endorsed Statement of Claim”, which in their turn were a colonial version of Order XIV of the English Rules of the Supreme Court. A glance at some recent judgments in Israel shows a surprising number of cases in which doubts have arisen as to the application and scope of the Summary Procedure in general and the defendant's right to be heard in particular. One may wonder whether litigants and lower courts quite understand the rules of the game or whether the game is after all not as easy as might be expected of a summary procedure. And indeed, compared with institutions in continental Europe, where scores of thousands of claims are disposed of without discussion and complaint, our Summary Procedure seems inelegant and burdensome on plaintiff and defendant alike. It is the object of this study to compare it, and the procedure under the English Order XIV, with those European institutions. In view of the gap between Anglo-Israel and Continental notions of civil procedure it may be useful also to sketch the history of the various forms of action, viz. the (summary) trial by documents, the non-litigious executory instruments and the conditional command to pay.

The deontological justification of punishment is generally associated with the notion of “retributive justice”. This notion, however, underlies only one of two distinct approaches by which one may attempt to justify punishment within deontological morality. According to this, the classical approach, punishment is to be regarded as an end in itself, intrinsically valuable, from the moral point of view. According to other deontological views, however, punishment has only instrumental value – not, as in consequentialism, in the maximization of some general social good, but in the maintenance and equal distribution of basic individual rights. Borrowing Dworkin's terminology, this view can be called a “right-based” conception of punishment.

The courts and the legislature in both Israel and Britain have recently been occupied with the problem of the valuation of investment property upon conversion to business use. The problem involves the whole complex of income tax and capital gains taxation and goes to the root of the income tax system. Different approaches to the basis of valuation in “converted property” cases have been taken by the American Internal Revenue Code, under the British Finance Act and according to the Israel Income Tax Ordinance. The main object of this study is to analyse and compare the similarities and differences of these tax systems and try to draw conclusions which will suggest the lege ferenda to be applied in Israel. I shall first examine the American practice, then deal with the British views and finally consider the approach adopted by the Israel courts.

Extradition law and process is the complex vehicle for the return by one state of accused or convicted fugitives from the criminal justice of another state. From an international law perspective, it is for the most part, a treaty matter bearing on the rights and duties of states and the emphasis is on inter-state cooperation, reciprocity and mutuality of obligations. However, it is also part of the domestic criminal law process and as the result will be the potential or actual deprivation of the liberty or even the life of the fugitive, if the requesting state retains the death penalty, today extradition is seen as necessarily protecting the human rights of the fugitive.

The focus of this article is on the protection given to the fugitive by the double or dual criminahty rule under the extradition law of Canada. Two major issues will be analyzed. Firstly, whether the crime for which the extradition request is made by the foreign state is an extraditable crime meeting the requirement of double criminality and secondly, whether the extradition judge in Canada is mandated to inquire into and seek evidence of the foreign criminal law.

What is the role of government lawyers? Are they merely agents of their client agencies in court, or do they have a broader function within the world of administrative dispute resolution? On the face of the matter, the lawyer within an adversarial legal system is required to present, to the best of her ability, her client's case in court. The lawyer for the government, however, is not just a professional jurist, but also a public official who is committed to the principles of the rule of law and the constitution. Over the last decade, this tension between the loyalty of the public lawyer to her client and her integrity as a legal bureaucrat who forms an essential element in the process of judicial review has drawn the attention of lawyers and legal scholars.

In this article I describe a model of Public Law litigation in which governmental lawyers play a much more complex role than that of solely being legal agents who seek to maximize their client's rate of success in court. This is the case in Public Law litigation in Israel before the High Court of Justice, where the government's lawyers function not only as representatives of their client agencies but also, in some cases, as arbitrators who handle legal disputes without the intervention of the Court.

The Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Israel Law Review wish to honour the memory of a brilliant young Jewish scholar who was killed in action while fighting for France in the First World War.

Jean Juster born in 1881 at Piatra-Neamtz, in Rumania (Moldavia), was of a family well-known in the region. His grandfather, Abraham Lipa Juster, one of the leaders of the Jewish community, was erudite and active in public affairs. His father, Moshe, was also learned in Jewish studies and active in the promotion of the well-being of the community.

Jean probably received his Jewish education at Piatra. In that town, which N. Sokolow called “the Moldavian Jerusalem”, a branch of the Hovevei Zion movement was created in 1894 and from 1897 groups of supporters of Zionism were active.

The advent of modern technology such as drones provides states with unique capabilities to acquire, with ease, high-quality information regarding acts performed by armed forces and agencies, such as (but not only) targeted killings. In some cases, this information can shed light on the facts of the case, when alleged violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law have occurred and thus investigation is called for. However, although calls for disclosure are increasing, states are reluctant to disclose information relating to such activities. This article discusses potential sources for obligations of disclosure, whether to civil society or to certain international bodies such as the International Criminal Court. In essence, the article posits that disclosure obligations can derive from the principle of transparency, as it applies, inter alia, to investigations, augmented by an emerging positive right to receive information. These obligations must be balanced, in turn, with considerations of national security. The article suggests that this balance, across a wide spectrum of international contexts, should be conducted in light of standards of necessity, proportionality and specificity. Accordingly, blanket non-disclosure may constitute a violation of international law or result in factual inferences to the detriment of states or individuals.

The Gotovina case presented the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with a unique opportunity to adjudicate on issues connected with the law of targeting and international humanitarian law (IHL) in a criminal context. This opportunity was especially important given the fact that legal issues arising out of complex, intense combat situations have only rarely been adjudicated. Although Gotovina was not formally charged with carrying out unlawful attacks on civilians, attacks by Croatia on four towns over the course of ‘Operation Storm’ were the focus of the proceedings. This led both Trial and Appeal Chambers to deal with issues related to the law of targeting such as classification of military objectives, proportionality, and the intent behind an attack. This article argues that the judges failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to discuss these issues. They failed consistently to articulate the legal reasoning behind their findings; they failed to explain the branch of law on which any of their substantive determinations were based; and, perhaps most importantly, they did not explain the relationship between IHL and criminal law and how IHL is to be applied in a courtroom.

1. Foreword: The following judgment of the Supreme Court deals with an affair which lies on the periphary of criminal law, but nevertheless may serve as a means of raising a few problems which are of crucial importance in the sphere of penal law. These problems are all attached to one of the two central pillars of every crime, namely: the actus reus. We shall try to prove that even though this concept is well-known and hackneyed, it still contains many deficiencies and is a source of misunderstandings.

First, we shall try to expose the deficiency in the judgment itself, and then we shall proceed to a broader consideration of the perversions in the definitions of the actus reus of certain crimes in the legislation.

2. The Judgment: The matter under trial was as follows: The official receiver (the respondent) applied to the District Court for an order according to sees. 130 and 131 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance to bring the appellant, who is a bankrupt, to trial for offences under these sections. The appellant was invited to the proceedings on that application, gave evidence at the hearing, and after the respective arguments of the parties had been heard, an order was granted by the Court as required by the applicant.

More than a year has passed since the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967, concerning the “grave situation in the Middle East”. On the basis of this resolution, the Secretary-General of the United Nations designated Ambassador Gunnar Jarring as a Special Representative “to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement…” It is not proposed here to analyze all the political and diplomatic aspects of the Resolution or its practical prospects to bring about peace in the Middle East. Nor is it proposed to advance any particular interpretation of its substantive contents or to assess its merits and shortcomings. The sole purpose of this article is to examine the legal nature and implications of the Resolution within the framework of the United Nations Charter.

Intellectual curiosity and academic research are not the only motivations for this legal inquiry. Sceptics of the political relevance of such “theoretical” inquiry need only obtain the November 24, 1968 issue of Pravda, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.